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Abstract
This doctoral dissertation explores an argued normative tension between the legal protection of
foreign investors via international investment agreements and the implementation of a transitional
justice project in Colombia. Considering its nature and extent, this tension is regarded from a
global perspective. These legal fields are acknowledged as the opus of transnational legal
processes that have been triggered both to diffuse the political vision and to represent the interests
of corresponding global epistemic communities. Therefore, their placement at the same
political/legal level, and the shared interest they have in regulating access to and use of land and
natural resources located within the country’s jurisdiction, encompass a conflictual dynamic. That
is, the spread of a neoliberal economic model through the domestic internalization of a set of rules
and institutions that limit the capacity of the state to intervene in certain areas of public concern,
as opposed to the exercise of legal resistance to the detrimental socioeconomic effects produced
on the occasion of the country’s internal armed conflict, by means of the structural adjustment of
social relations. The main contention of this dissertation is that, within the realm of the
aforementioned normative tension, the legal protection offered to foreign investors in Colombia
by virtue of the systematic conclusion of international investment agreements, has the potential to
restrict the country’s democratic and sovereign choice to achieve durable peace through the
production of profound transformations at the level of social justice. In particular, it is argued that
although the international investment agreements concluded by the country are the result of the
effective exercise of sovereign prerogatives and place-binding obligations on the state, they cannot
be constituted as impregnable commands able to shape indeterminately the country’s public policy
space with regards to the implementation of the transitional justice project. Moreover, it is also
contended that the legal responses to these investor-state controversies must encompass strong
political considerations rather than mere technical issues, since they must acknowledge both the
contextual particularities of this type of controversies and the transnational nature of the interests
at stake.
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Introduction
“No debe ser la pretensión del Estado Social de Derecho negar la presencia de los conflictos, ya que éstos son
inevitables en la vida en sociedad. Lo que sí puede y debe hacer el estado es proporcionarles cauces institucionales
adecuados, ya que la función del régimen constitucional no es suprimir el conflicto -inmanente en la vida en
sociedad- sino regularlo, para que sea fuente de riqueza y se desenvuelva de manera pacífica y democrática.”1
Colombian Constitutional Court, Decision C-225 of 1995.

I.

Statement and hypothesis

A powerhouse;2 a regional power;3 a site for inclusive peace;4 a tourist heaven;5 an emerging global
player.6 These recent descriptions were used by the global media to depict the aftermath of a
process that Colombia has gone through during the last years, after having been diagnosed as a
country with a “nearly failed status”.7 The latter concept, coined by Gerald Helman and Steven
Ratner at the outset of the 1990s,8 was originally used to explain the alleged emergence of a
“disturbing phenomenon”: states incapable of sustaining themselves as members of the

“The objective of the Social Rule of Law State must not be the denial of the existence of conflicts within society,
since they are inherent and inevitable. What the state should do, in turn, is providing adequate institutional channels
for their settlement. The objective of the constitutional order is not to abolish but regulate social conflicts, so they can
be a source of wealth and can be peacefully and democratically solved.”
2
CHAN, Ping Szu. “Colombia: from failed state to Latin American powerhouse.” The Telegraph (February 28, 2015).
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/globalbusiness/11441732/Colombia-from-failed-state-to-LatinAmerican-powerhouse.html (last accessed March 20 2016.)
3
DE PRIMIS, Roberto. “Colombia: from a failed state to a regional power.” Eurintelligence (January 31, 2015).
Retrieved from http://www.eurintelligence.eu/2015/01/colombia-from-failed-state-to-regional.html
4
KILLCULLEN, David & MILLS, Greg. “Colombia: from a political economy of war to an inclusive peace.” Daily
Maverick (December 11, 2014). Retrieved from http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-12-11-colombia-froma-political-economy-of-war-to-an-inclusive-peace/ (last accessed March 20 2016.)
5
KAMINSKI, Mathew. “From Failed State to Tourist Haven. If only Iraq, Russia and Libya were more like . . .
Colombia.” The Wall Street Journal (September 8, 2014). Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/from-failedstate-to-tourist-haven-1409872739 (last accessed March 20 2016.)
6
PADGETT, Tim & OTIS, John. “The Colombian Comeback. From nearly failed state to emerging global player –in
less than a decade.” 16 Time International South Pacific Edition Vol, 179 (April 23, 2012). Retrieved from
http://content.time.com/time/covers/europe/0,16641,20120423,00.html (last accessed March 20 2016.)
7 RATHBONE, John Paul. “Nation shakes off ‘nearly failed’ status. Report on Colombia.” Financial Times (May 7,
2012). Retrieved from http://ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1013458886?
accountid=15182 (last accessed March 20 2016.)
8
See generally HELMAN, Gerald B. & RATNER, Steven R. “Saving Failed States.” 89 Foreign Policy (Winter 19921993), 3-20.
1
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international community as a result of civil strife, government breakdown, and economic
privation.9
In the case of Colombia, by the mid-2000s the “failed state” narrative started to be used to tell a
story that goes as follows. After almost an entire republican life under a dynamic of violence,
political instability and precarious economic conditions that at some point threatened the
sustainability of the national project, the country was counting on a “second opportunity on
earth”10 by means of the progressive implementation of crucial transformations at the level of
public policy. These reforms were aimed to warrant the accomplishment of the political project
embedded in the country’s Constitution (1991), which originally could not be crystallized because
of the upsurge of strife, high levels of corruption and a deep economic crisis. Therefore, on the
occasion of a change of government in 2010, Colombia adopted decisive actions to become a stable
market democracy under the rule of law, respectful of human rights, and an effective member of
an international community of states.11 This narrative, infused with a rather optimistic vision, came
to justify the liberal matrix that was chosen to be the model that would drive the destiny of the
country.
Thus the government in office decided to rely on governance formulas that had elsewhere been
tested to confront problems similar to the ones Colombia was going through. In the name of
prosperity,12 it undertook the systematic conclusion of international investment agreements with
capital-exporting countries to create an appropriate legal climate to attract transnational capitals,
See HELMAN, Gerald B. & RATNER, Steven R. “Saving Failed States.” 89 Foreign Policy (Winter 1992-1993),
p. 3.
10
See GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ, Gabriel. One Hundred Years of Solitude. New York: Perennial Classics, 1998, p. 458.
11
See for instance UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly. Study on common challenges facing States in their efforts
to secure democracy and the rule of law from a human rights perspective. A/HRC/22/29. 2012. Retrieved from
http://www.refworld.org/docid/512b19d72.html (last accessed March 20 2016.)
12
See REPÚBLIA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 1450/2011 (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 20102014: Prosperidad para Todos.)
9

3
which were considered necessary to attain economic growth. In turn, the government decided to
address the internal violence problem that had historically affected Colombian society and thus
assumed the existence of an armed conflict rooted in structural causes, and the consequent
responsibility to find durable solutions. In this regard, it adopted a prospective-oriented transitional
justice project, that includes a regulatory regime, to address the victim’s rights to justice, truth, and
reparation, and initiated a peace process with FARC, the oldest and most powerful guerrilla group
in the country. Articulated around a supposedly harmonious constitutional order, these policy
moves were presented as fundamental components of an supposedly single and coherent strategy
to rescue the state from its ignominious fate, and thus confirm its notable role within a global
governance system. Thus, insofar as the emergence of positive outcomes revealed that these public
initiatives were working out according to the plan, the success of Colombia in overcoming the
apparent failure of the project it represented was acknowledged by the international community of
states.13
However, at some point the “failed state” narrative that had been chosen for Colombia was
confronted by other accounts. Something seemed to go wrong with the implementation of the
policies adopted by the not-anymore-failed state. Tensions with respect to access to and use of
land and natural resources located in the country's rural areas started arising between foreign
investors and the people sheltered by the transitional justice project. While the former arrived in
the country to conduct diverse economic activities in light of the protection offered by international
treaties that Colombia had concluded with their home countries, the latter – particularly the

For the purposes of this study, the term “international community of states” is used pragmatically. It refers to a
social system of continuing interaction and transaction in which nation-states are the principal subjects. It entails the
institutional representation of the joint action of nation-states, provided their mutual identification as free and equal
sovereignty units and the emergence of shared interests. This concept is used to signify the traditional state-based
model of international and domestic governance. See KRITSIOTIS, Dino. “Imagining the International Community.”
4 European Journal of International Law Vol. 13 (2002), 961-992.
13

4
country’s peasantry and ethnic communities – benefitted from a collective land restitution program
with restorative and transformative purposes. In particular, the property rights and economic
expectations safeguarded by these international investment agreements were being occasionally
challenged by the adoption of distributive-oriented regulatory measures related to the transitional
justice project. Thus, it seemed that Colombia’s prosperity formula was not much like a single and
harmonious language but rather, it resembled a puzzling conversation between colliding
vernaculars.
This doctoral dissertation intends to explore this puzzling conversation, which takes place within
the realm of the Colombian Constitutional Order (hereinafter CCO) but that, considering its nature
and extent, should be considered from a global perspective. This examination aims to demonstrate
the existence of a normative tension between two legal phenomena.14 On the one hand, the
consolidation of a regime for the promotion and protection of foreign investment via the systematic
conclusion of international investment agreements (hereinafter IIAs); and on the other hand, the
implementation of a prospective-oriented transitional justice project (hereinafter TJP) that intends
to produce structural transformations in the country. These legal fields are acknowledged as the
opus of transnational legal processes that have been triggered both to diffuse the political vision
and to represent the interests of corresponding global epistemic communities.15 Therefore, their
placement at the same political/legal level, and the shared interest they have in regulating access
to and use of land and natural resources (hereinafter LNR) located within the country’s jurisdiction,

By normative tension I mean the stress that occurs between rationales –conceptualizations on the “ought to be”–
that are either pointing to the same objective or intend to drive the action of a subject in opposite directions.
15
Following Gregory Shaffer, this dissertation the term transnational legal process is used to characterize the process
through which the transnational construction and conveyance of legal norms takes place, involving a great variety of
actors with political agendas and a reflection of intensified cross-border interaction characterizing economic and
cultural globalization. See SHAFFER, Gregory. “Transnational Legal Process and State Change: Opportunities and
Constraints.” University of Minnesota Law School, Legal Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-28, 2012,
p. 11.
14
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encompass a conflictual dynamic. That is, the spread of a neoliberal economic model through the
domestic internalization of a set of rules and institutions that limit the capacity of the state to
intervene in certain areas of public concern, as opposed to the exercise of legal resistance to the
detrimental socioeconomic effects produced on the occasion of the country’s internal armed
conflict, by means of the structural adjustment of social relations.
Therefore, the main contention of this dissertation is that, within the realm of the aforementioned
normative tension, the legal protection offered to foreign investors in Colombia by virtue of the
systematic conclusion of international investment agreements, has the potential to restrict the
country’s democratic and sovereign choice to achieve durable peace through the production of
profound transformations at the level of social justice. In particular, it is argued that although the
international investment agreements concluded by the country are the result of the effective
exercise of sovereign prerogatives and place-binding obligations on the state, they cannot be
constituted as invincible commands that can shape indeterminately the country’s public policy
space with regards to the implementation of the transitional justice project. Moreover, it is also
contended that the legal responses to these investor-state controversies must encompass strong
political considerations rather than mere technical issues, since they must acknowledge both the
contextual particularities of this type of controversies and the transnational nature of the interests
at stake.
II.

Justification and theoretical approach

This dissertation starts from a manifest fact. States with abundant lands and natural resources that
undergo post-conflict processes are increasingly concluding international investment agreements
with capital-exporting countries. They do so in order to attract the financial muscle and expertise

6
that could supposedly contribute in the consolidation of durable peace.16 In this regard, there is
now interest by both scholars and policy-makers on the repercussions of foreign investment in
these particular types of political units. Several questions have been addressed at the forefront of
this debate. The first question is whether states undergoing conflict or post-conflict are attractive
places for foreign investment.17 The second area of inquiry reflects on the effects of foreign
investment in post-conflict countries. It is investigated whether foreign investment is beneficial or
prejudicial for a post-conflict national economy.18 Particularly, this area focuses on the extent to
which foreign investment has a role in boosting the transformative role of transitional justice19 or
if, instead, it could be a source of conflict relapse.20 Finally, there have been debates around which
determinants attract foreign investment into post-conflict economies.21
Nevertheless, a current global tendency can also be found in the fact that foreign investors located
in post-conflict states have increasingly resorted to the investment agreements – and particularly,

16

In particular, while Colombia effectively concluded a treaty of this kind as early as 1993, it only adopted a systematic
policy until the outset of the 2000s. Currently, the country has assumed binding legal obligations with most of the big
economies of the world in regards of the protection of the latter’s foreign investors that have arrived within its territory.
In this regard see DE BRABANDERE, Eric. “Jus Post Bellum and Foreign Direct Investment: Mapping the Debate.”
4 The Journal of World Investment and Trade Vol. 16 (2015), 590-603; ZRILIČ, Jure. “International Investment Law
in the Context of Jus Post Bellum: Are Investment Treaties Likely to Facilitate or Hinder the Transition to Peace?” 4
The Journal of World Investment and Trade Vol. 16 (2015), 604-632.
17
See APPEL, Benjamin J. & LOYLE, Cyanne E. “The economic benefits of justice: Post-conflict justice and foreign
direct investment.” 5 Journal of Peace Research Vol. 49 (2012), 685–699; OLSEN, Tricia, Et Al. “Taking Stock:
Transitional Justice and Market Effects.” 4 Journal of Human Rights Vol. 10 (2011), 521-543.
18
See HANNA, Ghassan F. Et Al. “Foreign Direct Investment in Post-Conflict Countries: The Case of Iraq’s Oil and
Electricity Sectors.” 2 International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy Vol. 4 (2014), 137-148.
19
See YELPAALA, Kojo. “Rethinking the Foreign Direct Investment Process and Incentives in Post-Conflict
Transition Countries.” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business Vol. 30 (2010), 23-99.
20
See BRAY, John. “Practice note 3: Foreign Direct Investment in conflict-affected contexts.” International Alert.
Peacebuilding essentials for economic development practitioners, 2009.
21
See UNITED NATIONS, Conference on Trade and Development. Best Practices in Investment for Development.
How Post-Conflict Countries Can Attract and Benefit from FDI. Lessons from Croatia and Mozambique. UNCTAD
Investment Advisory Series, Series B, Number 3. 2009. Retrieved from http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaepcb200915_e
n.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.); MOLOO, Rahim & KHACHATURIAN, Alex. “Foreign Investment in a PostConflict Environment.” 3 Journal of World Investment and Trade Vol. 10 (2009), 341-358; TURNER, Nicholas,
AGINAM, Obijiofor & IGBOKWE, Virtus C. Foreign direct investment in post conflict countries: opportunities and
challenges. London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2010; TURNER, Nicholas, AGINAM, Obijiofor & POPOVSKI,
Vesselin. “Post-Conflict Countries and Foreign Investment.” United Nations University, Policy Brief No. 8, 2008.
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their dispute-settlement arbitral mechanisms – to challenge state regulation issued on the occasion
of the efforts made to achieve alternative public objectives, such as overcoming internal violence.22
In this regard, with one exception23 academic research has generally not adequately addressed this
phenomenon. A number of studies conducted in the context of the alleged fragmentation of public
international law have dealt with the interactions between international investment law and other
self-contained regimes, such as human rights and international environmental law.24 Further, some
academics sympathetic to the investment law regime have occasionally considered the influence
of the political and social conditions of host states in the course of investor-state arbitration.25
These perspectives recognize the existence of pending issues around the protection of foreign
investment in the context of states going through development dilemmas, and with diverse and
even contradictory political agendas. However, they do not directly address the public implications
of this safeguarding at the domestic governance level, nor the legitimacy questions that this legal

22

For instance, see Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe. ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6.
Award of April 22 2009; Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa. ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/01. Award of August 4 2010.
23
Professor Gus Van Harten’s piece contains an anticipatory analysis of the effects of the implementation of a
hemispherical economic integration process – the FTAA – that involved the development of legal protection to foreign
investors on the effective implementation of a set of peace accords recently reached in a Central American country.
See VAN HARTEN, Gus. “Guatemala’s Peace Accords in a Free Trade Area of the Americas.” 1 Yale Human Rights
and Development Journal Vol. 3 (2000), 113-158.
24
See HRISCH, Moshe. “Interactions between Investment and Non-Investment Obligations in International
Investment Law.” International Law Forum of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law Faculty. Research Paper No.
14-06, 2006; JANSEN CALAMITA, N. “International Human Rights and the Interpretation of International
Investment Treaties: Constitutional Considerations”, in BAETENS, Freya (ed.) Investment Law within International
Law. Integrationist Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 330-340.
25
See GALLUS, Nick. “The Influence of the Host State's Level of Development on International Investment Treaty
Standards of Protection.” Journal of World Investment & Trade Vol. 6 (2005), 711-729; KRIEBAUM, Ursula.
“Human Rights of the Population of the Host State in International Investment Arbitration.” Journal of World
Investment & Trade Vol. 10 (2009), 653-677; KRIEBAUM, Ursula. “The Relevance of Economic and Political
Conditions for Protection under Investment Treaties.” The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals
Vol. 10 (2011) 383-404; GRITSENKO, Maria. “Relevance of the host state´s development status in investment treaty
arbitration”, in BAETENS, Freya (ed.) Investment Law within International Law. Integrationist Perspectives.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 330-340.
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field would be facing when defying democratic choices, such as the enactment of regulatory
measures to achieve durable peace.
In turn, another part of legal scholarship – led by David Schneiderman, Kyla Tienhaara and Gus
Van Harten – is devoted to the study of the public law effects of international investment law and
investor-state arbitration from a critical perspective. They have produced important pieces on
themes such as the constitutional-like constraints that the legal regime for the promotion and
protection of foreign investment places on the democratic regulatory action of states;26 the
detrimental outcomes of investor-state arbitration on the effective implementation of public
regulation such as environmental policy;27 and the legitimacy crisis in which investor-state
arbitration is embarked as a consequence of its collision with cherished principles of judicial
accountability and independence in democratic societies.28 The approach adopted in these projects
is oriented to address the regulatory challenge that states may face towards the achievement of
their public objectives on occasion of the conclusion of international investment agreements. Yet,
they entail a general outlook in which the particular case of post-conflict states like Colombia is
not considered, nor the specificities of public regulation produced in the context of peacebuilding
processes infused with transformative-oriented measures.
Therefore, although the latter critical projects are considered as the theoretical cornerstones of this
dissertation due to their contribution to the assessment of international investment law and
arbitration from a public law perspective, there is still a gap to be examined further. It is necessary

26

See SCHNEIDERMAN, David. Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy's
Promise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Resisting Economic Globalization. Critical Theory and
International Investment Law. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
27
See TIENHAARA, Kyla. The Expropriation of Environmental Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the
Expense of Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
28
See VAN HARTEN, Gus. Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007;
Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013.
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to produce research specifically on whether and to what extent the implementation of a legal
regime for the protection of foreign investors via international investment agreements might entail
prejudicial effects on the public political/legal processes that post-conflict states embark on to
achieve stability and durable peace, including transitional justice. Moreover, there is a lack of case
studies able to illustrate the effective existence of these type of normative tensions, and to unearth
the specific implications in the particular realm of countries like Colombia. Thus, the intellectual
breach encountered on the occasion of the preliminary investigation of the phenomenon, as well
as the profound political commitment that the author of this dissertation has to the future of
Colombia, have motivated and justified the assumption of the topic from the theoretical and
methodological perspective described below.
With regards to the theoretical approach selected, this dissertation has strong foundations in a
number of academic projects with a critical orientation that have been contemporarily conducted
within sociolegal studies and political economy, as well in the realm of the legal fields covered
here: public law, international investment law and transitional justice. This research assumes a
transnational legal perspective, according to which law is addressed as a process that takes place
beyond the classical sovereign paradigm; whose production, diffusion and implementation
involves various actors, norms and procedures; but in which the state performs a crucial role as an
agency of political representation. Thus, the works of Paul Schiff Berman,29 Roger Cotterrell,30

29

See BERMAN, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism. A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
30
See COTTERRELL, Roger. The Sociology of Law: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; Living
Law: Studies in Legal and Social Theory. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008; “The Growth of Legal Transnationalism”, in
FEBBRAJO, A. & HARSTE, G. (eds.), Law and Intersystemic Communication: Understanding ‘Structural
Coupling’. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; “Transnational Networks of Community and International Economic Law”, in
PERRY-KESSARIS, A. (ed.), Socio-legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, Subtext.
London: Routledge, 2013, 133-49.
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Saskia Sassen,31 Gregory Schaffer,32 Gunther Teubner,33 and Peer Zumbansen,34 are useful in
addressing the normative tension between international investment law and transitional justice in
Colombia. In turn, the political characterization of this tension taking place in the realm of the
state’s Constitutional Order is articulated from the standpoint of a number of theoreticaldescriptive concepts: Stephen Gill on new constitutionalism,35 Boaventura de Sousa Santos on
subaltern cosmopolitan legality,36 and Karl Polanyi’s embeddedness of the economy in noneconomic institutions such as the law.37 Further, the Colombian Constitutional Order is presented
as an analytical framework and a normative reference point in accordance with the writings of

See SASSEN, Saskia “The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation.” Michigan Journal of
International Law Vol. 25 (2004), 1141-1158; Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages.
Princeton University Press, 2008 updated 2nd ed. (1st ed. 2006); A Sociology of Globalization (Contemporary Society
Series). W.W. Norton, 2016.
32
See SHAFFER, Gregory. “Transnational Legal Process and State Change,” 37 Law and Social Inquiry Vol. 37
(2012), 229–264; Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
33
See TEUBNER, Gunther. Law as an Autopoietic System. London: Blackwells, 1993; Constitutional Fragments:
Societal Constitutionalism in the Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. “Colliding Systems: The Vain
Search for a Unity of Laws Faced with the Fragmentation of Global Law.” 1 Revue Internationale de droit économique
Vol. XXVII (2013), 187-228.
34
See ZUMBANSEN, Peer. “Transnational Law” CLPE Research Paper No. 09/2008, 2008; “Law after the Welfare
State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law.” 3 American Journal of Comparative Law,
Vol. 56 (2008), 769-808; “Neither ‘Public’ nor ‘Private’, ‘National’ nor ‘International’: Transnational Corporate
Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective.” Osgoode CLPE Research Paper No. 22/2010, 2010; “Defining the
Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism.” Osgoode CLPE Research Paper
No. 21/2011, 2011; “Transnational Law, Evolving”, in SMITS, Jan (ed.), Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2nd
Ed.). Edward Elgar, 2012, 899-925.
35
See GILL, Stephen. Power and Resistance in the New World Order. London and New York: Macmillan-Palgrave,
2003; GILL, Stephen & CUTLER, Claire (Eds.). New Constitutionalism and World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014.
36
See SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa. Toward a New Legal Common Sense. London: Lexis Nexis Butterworths,
2002; “The Counter-Hegemonic Use of Law in the Struggle for a Globalization from Below.” Anales de la Cátedra
Francisco Suárez Vol. 39 (2005), 421-474; SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa & RODRIGUEZ GARAVITO, César.
Law and Globalization from Below. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
37
See POLANYI, Karl. The Great Transformation. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944.
31
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contemporary domestic constitutional law authors, including César Rodríguez,38 Rodrigo
Uprimny,39 Juan Carlos Upegui,40 Luis Eslava,41 and Daniel Bonilla.42
From the standpoint of international investment law, this dissertation fundamentally draws on the
abovementioned critical public law approached coined by Schneiderman, Tienhaara and Van
Harten, as well as on the work carried out by Santiago Montt with regards to the balancing of
global public and private interests in the context of International Investment Law.43 On the other
hand, Transitional Justice is addressed here as a tool for durable peace, in line with the literature
that gives account of the evolution of the field to assume a more holistic perspective upon its
transformative function within post-conflict societies.44 Therefore, the Colombian project is
regarded through the lens of Johan Galtung’s work on violence and peace,45 prospective justice,46

See RODRIGUEZ, César & UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. “Constitución y Modelo Económico en Colombia: Hacia una
Discusión Productiva entre Economía y Derecho.” Debates de Coyuntura Económica No. 62 (2005), 23-40.
39
See UPRIMNY, Rodrigo & GARCIA-VILLEGAS, Mauricio. “The Constitutional Court and Social Emancipation
in Colombia”, in DE SOUSA SANTOS, Boaventura (Ed.) Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic
Canon Reinventing Social Emancipation. Verso, 2007.
40
See UPEGUI MEJÍA, Juan Carlos. Doce Tesis en Torno al Concepto de Estado Social de Derecho. Discurso
Jurisprudencial, Elementos, Usos. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, Temas de Derecho Público No. 80,
2009.
41
See ESLAVA, Luis. “Constitutionalization of rights in Colombia: establishing a ground for meaningful
comparisons” Revista Derecho Del Estado No. 22 (2009), 183-229.
42
See FORSTER, Sheila R & BONILLA, Daniel. “The social Function of Property: a Comparative Law Perspective.”
3 Fordham Law Review Vol. 80 (2011), 101-113; BONILLA, Daniel. “Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property
as a Right and Property as a Social Function.” 3 Fordham Law Review Vol. 80 (2011), 1135-1170.
43
See MONTT, Santiago. State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Global Constitutional and Administrative
Law in the BIT Generation. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012.
44
See NAGY, Rosemary. “Transitional Justice as Global Project: critical reflections.” 2 Third World Quarterly Vol.
29 (2008), 275 – 289; GREADY, Paul & ROBBINS, Simon. “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New
Agenda for Practice.” The International Journal of Transitional Justice Vol. 8 (2014), 339–361.
45
See GALTUNG, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” 3 Journal of Peace Research Vol. 6 (1969), 167–
191.
46
See WILLIAMS, Melissa S., NAGY, Rosemary & ELSTER, Jon. Transitional Justice. Nomos LV. New York:
New York University Press, 2012.
38

12
the link between transitional justice and development,47 and the economic dimension of
peacebuilding.48
III.

Structure, methodology and outline of the dissertation

This dissertation can be acknowledged as a sociolegal study. It examines a particular instance –
the potential constriction of Colombia’s sovereign choices around its national project and
development pattern – from the standpoint of the complex interactions between the law and the
social reality where it is recognized as an mechanism of control. Thus it touches upon typical
questions in the field, such as the legal regulation of social life, the social construction of legal
issues, and the relation between law and social change. In this regard, this approach is localized
between two extremes of a methodological spectrum. At one end, the dissertation includes a
doctrinal analysis of a great amount of legislation, public policy documents and interventions, as
well as judicial decisions. On the other hand, it relies on methods from other disciplines including
sociology and political economy in order to analyze and describe the quotidian operation of the
legal phenomenon,49 which is here characterized as a process that involves numerous actors, norms
and procedures. These methodological options are articulated to produce an in-depth description
of both the paths of diffusion-internalization of the transnational legal fields under study and their
corresponding normative rationales. The resulting depictions are in turn instrumental to the further

See MANI, Rama (Ed.) “Special Edition on Transitional Justice and Development.” 3 International Journal of
Transitional Justice Vol. 2 (2008), 253-434; DE GREIFF, Pablo & DUTHIE, Roger (Eds.) Transitional Justice and
Development. Making Connections. New York: Center for Transitional Justice, 2009. BERGSMO, Morten.
RODRGUEZ-GARAVITO, César, KALMANOVITZ, Pablo & SAFFON, María Paula (Eds.). Distributive Justice in
Transitions. Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2010.
48
See MANI, Rama. “Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community after War.” 4 Security Dialogue vol. 36 (2005),
511-526; LAPLANTE, Lisa J. “Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the
Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework.” International Journal of Transitional
Justice Vol. 3 (2008), 331-337. SHARP, Dustin (Ed.) Justice and Economic Violence in Transition. New York:
Springer, 2014.
49
See BRITISH LIBRARY. “Socio-legal studies: an introduction to collections.” Retrieved from
http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpsubject/busmanlaw/legalstudies/soclegal/sociolegal.html (last accessed March 20
2016.)
47
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elaboration of a critical account of the interaction between these legal regimes in a particular
normative and social context – that is, Colombia’s Constitutional Order and society. Crucially, this
dissertation ultimately flows into the conduct of a case study, which aims to confirm the effective
occurrence of the argued normative tension in the context of the Colombian state's public choices,
and to explore the extent and specific implications of the regulatory challenge towards the
achievement of durable peace in the country.
The following chart depicts the structure of the dissertation:
Table 1: structure of the doctoral dissertation
The Colliding Vernaculars of Foreign Investment Protection and Transitional Justice in Colombia:
A Challenge for the Law in a Global Context

Level I
Theoretical
and analytical
frameworks

Level II
Genealogical descriptions

Chapter One
Theoretical
foundations

Chapter Three
Genealogy of International
Investment Agreements
policy in Colombia

Chapter Two
The
Colombian
Constitutional
Order

Chapter Four
Genealogy of Colombian
Transitional Justice Project

Level III
Characterization
and contrast

Level IV
Case study

Level V
Conclusions

Chapter Five
The regulatory
challenge

Chapter Six
Territorial
restitution in
favor of ethnic
communities
in Chocó
(Colombia)

Conclusions

As presented, this research project is built at five argumentative levels that can be considered as
the pieces of a puzzle.
The first level delivers the theoretical and analytical frameworks of the dissertation. Chapter One
introduces the theoretical foundations to situate the problem under study within the context of the
changing role of the state in relation to the progressive rise of globalization, and the emergence of
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a consequent transnational legality. The state is identified as an agency of political representation,
which is in charge of the materialization of diverse global political projects within its jurisdiction
by means of their assimilation into its Constitutional Order. Therefore, it is pointed out that the
law has a constitutive function in these political processes, which is explained through the
introduction of the concepts “new constitutionalism” and “subaltern cosmopolitan legality.” In
turn, Chapter Two introduces the Colombian Constitutional Order. For the purposes of describing
the transnational legal processes under study and their assessment, it is considered as an analytical
framework and a normative reference point. In this regard, the Constitutional Order is depicted as
a democratic amplification pact that aims to articulate diverse and even contradictory political
views coming from a multiplicity of social actors. Thus, the state’s commitment to a social peace
function is projected on the establishment of a social rule of law formula to shape the activity of
public authorities and solve the eventual conflicts produced in the context of the relations between
the public and private spheres, especially in the realm of access to and distribution of scarce
resources. It is within this normative site that the transnational legal processes are encountered and
enter into a complex dialogue.
The next level of argumentation intends to produce comprehensive portraits of the processes that
configured the relevant legal fields by the conduct of genealogical analyses.50 This methodology
is used to revise – and eventually restate – commonly understood rationales associated with the
emergence of these processes, and is thus expected to help unveil the intellectual foundations that
support each of the corresponding normative incorporations into the country’s Constitutional
Order. Correspondingly, they provide a detailed account of the actors, norms and procedures
This descriptive exercise follows the ideas of Michel Foucault on the assimilation of genealogy to an “archaeological
method”. See FOUCAULT, Michel. The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984.
New York, NY: The New Press, 2003, p. 306; “What is Critique?” in LOTRINGER, Sylvère (Ed.), The Politics of
Truth. New York: Semiotexte, 2007, p. 61.
50
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involved in these transnational phenomena and establish connections between the latter's rationales
and the constitutional principles and rules that mediated for their reception. In this regard, Chapter
Three addresses the consolidation of a legal regime for the promotion and protection of foreign
investment in Colombia via the conclusion of international investment agreements. Starting from
the adoption of an economic liberalization program in the outset of the 1990s – the Apertura
Económica program – this policy evolved to support the reforms that lifted the political and legal
barriers for the systematic conclusion of international investment agreements with the main
capital-exporting countries. On the other hand, Chapter Four introduces the Colombian
transitional justice project, which is currently being implemented towards the achievement of
durable peace after a long-term armed conflict. Thereore, the chapter presents the project’s
structure, rationale and content under the contention that transitional justice in Colombia evolved
to assume a peacebuilding function. This role is related to the addressing of the conflict’s structural
causes by means of the adjustment of socioeconomic relations in order to produce effective
transformations in the country, especially in its rural areas.
The third level of argumentation consists of the collection of previously constructed pieces of the
puzzle – the introduction of the Colombian Constitutional Order and the genealogical analyses of
the transnational legal processes under consideration – for their articulation within the
dissertation’s primary contention. This is, that international investment agreements and arbitration
may have restricting public law effects on the Colombian state’s regulatory capacity, and
particularly may limit its sovereign choices regarding the accomplishment of its diverse and
emancipatory national project. Consequently, Chapter Five provides a critical characterization of
these processes that enlightens the nature and extent of the argued normative tension between the
transnational legal processes under study. While the protection to transnational capital granted by
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the international investment agreements concluded by Colombia is depicted as an instance of new
constitutionalism, the implementation of a transformative-oriented transitional justice project is
diagnosed as a case of subaltern cosmopolitan legality. Subsequently, the chapter delivers both
political-economy and socio-legal versions of the conflicting dialogue between these transnational
legal processes within realm of access to and use of Colombia’s lands and natural resources.
After having articulated the transnational legal processes under analysis and identified the
subsequent challenges for the Colombian state in the realm of its public regulatory capacities,
Chapter Six provided an in-depth illustration of this phenomenon through a case study. The
instance selected is paradigmatic, as it comprises the first set of territorial restitutions concerning
Colombia’s transitional justice process in favor of two ethnic communities of the Alto Atrato
Region (Chocó Department, Colombia), which created a conflict of interests with certain mining
concessions assigned to foreign-owned companies. The purpose of the case study is twofold. It
seeks to demonstrate that the intellectual formulations elaborated in the earlier chapters do
materialize in real-life situations, and explore the particular implications of this normative collision
at the regulatory level. In particular, it will assess the extent to which the regulatory measures
enacted in the context of the Colombian transitional justice project could potentially be affected –
such as by being rolled back or disputed at an investment arbitration tribunal – as a consequence
of the binding behavioral obligations that are embedded in the international investment agreements
concluded by the country. Finally, the Conclusions Chapter will assemble the main findings of the
dissertation and propose further areas of research within the thematic and contextual axes of this
project.
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Chapter One: Theoretical Foundations
I.

Introduction

This chapter provides the theoretical foundations for the development of this study. It sets forth a
critical framework to explore a normative tension that is taking place in Colombia between two
legal phenomena: the protection offered to foreign investors via international investment
agreements, and the implementation of a transitional justice project aimed to produce durable
peace. This tension is connected to the regulatory realm of access to and use of lands and natural
resources. In this regard, the framework addresses these phenomena from a sociolegal perspective,
which depicts the relation between the law and society as mutually constitutive, and recognizes
the relevance of considering power relations in the analysis of the nature and extent of law and
regulation. Additionally, this chapter adopts a transnational approach that regards the creation,
diffusion, and application of the law as a complex process, in which several actors, norms, and
procedures are involved. These theoretical foundations are introduced as analytical elements to
further illustrate, characterize, and contrast the legal phenomena subject of consideration.
Therefore, they will serve to highlight the main contention of the dissertation, according to which
the legal protection offered to foreign investors in Colombia via international investment
agreements has the potential to restrict the country’s sovereign choice to achieve durable peace
through transitional justice regulation.
The chapter starts by introducing and explaining the political scenario in which the argued
normative tension takes place. This scenario discusses the changing role of the state on the
occasion of the rise of globalization. It points out that, although the primacy of the state as the
archetypal governance unit has been challenged progressively by the emergence of transnational
actors, norms, and processes, it has a fundamental role in global governance. In this regard, it is
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depicted as a political representation agency in charge of the materialization of diverse political
projects within its jurisdiction. This agency takes place by means of the identification of the
rationales of such political projects within the state’s Constitutional Order, and their consequent
transformation into binding norms or influential dynamics of public action. These instances of
normative reproduction and dialogue are identified as “transnational legal processes”. They are
considered to be the “substance” of global governance, since it is within their realm that global
norms are constructed, carried out, and conveyed. Thus, the idea of legal transnationalism
highlights the influence exerted on the national legal systems by economic, cultural and political
phenomena taking shape beyond their exclusive control.
Subsequently, a series of concepts are introduced: “new constitutionalism” and “subaltern
cosmopolitan legality.” They will serve to characterize the nature of the legal phenomena under
analysis, and to address their problematic interaction from a transnational perspective. In this
regard, the articulation of these concepts illustrates the ambivalent role of the state in this
conflictual dialogue, and the particular implications for its constitutional order. On the one hand,
the introduction of the concept “new constitutionalism” is useful to identify the effects of global
economic norms, such as international investment agreements, on the enforcement of domestic
public regulation, which represent the sovereign choices made by public authorities in favor of
citizens. In turn, “subaltern cosmopolitan legality” is devised to show the instrumental part of the
law in a political project, equally transnational, in favor of social justice and, incidentally, to resist
the advancement of economic neoliberalism.
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II.

The changing role of the state on the occasion of the rise of global governance

For the last five centuries, nation states have progressively emerged and established as the central
and foremost units of mankind’s polity.51 In this regard, the depiction of society has been nourished
by a sovereignty paradigm52 that asserts its inherent homogeneity and absolute coincidence with
the image of the nation state. Consequently, this conception accounts for the prominence of the
latter’s authority and supports a consequent monopoly over the legal norms.53 Social relationships
are thus framed within a segmented picture that is defined by distinctive public and private spheres.
While the former domain is in charge of accomplishing the state’s national project by means of
both determining the content and extent of social relationships and administering scarce resources
among the different social actors, the latter is constituted by the governed, which are deemed as –
ideally – free and equal subjects of rights and duties.
The resulting governance dynamic54 indicates the existence of an original tension between the
abovementioned spheres, which generates a constant negotiation. The state – represented by the
public authorities – tends to monopolize the management of social control mechanisms, including
the production, adjudication and enforcement of the law. Its raison d'être is the exercise of
regulatory intervention. On the other hand, whilst there is an expectation from the private parties
to be safeguarded by the public sphere in whose jurisdiction they are located, they also tend to
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The foundations of what is considered here as the modern state-based governance system started to be configured
in the context of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
52
This is, the existence of a well-defined governing entity that, as a result of a social contract among people, has the
prerogative to administer power within a given jurisdiction without any external interference, and which in a
supplementary fashion performs as a subject of rights and duties within an international community of free and equal
members.
53
In line with this, Roger Cotterrell has contended that “law constitutes society in so far as it is, itself, an aspect of
society, a framework and an expression of understandings that enable society to exist.” See COTTERRELL, Roger.
“Why must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?” Journal of Law & Society Vol. 25 (1998), p. 176.
54
Governance is here regarded as the control of an activity by some means such that a range of desired outcomes is
attached. This function-oriented concept contrasts with the one of government, which focuses on the body that
performs such task. See HIRST, Paul & THOMPSON, Grahame. Globalization in Question, 2nd Edition. Cambridge:
Polity Press (2000), p. 269.
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advocate for high quantities of autonomy and freedom of enterprise. In accordance with the
precedent depiction, state-centered governance (a) is a highly centralized function that is
performed by a set of specialized and coordinated organs within a harmonic structure; (b) appears
to correspond to a unitary political project that aims to synthesize the interests of an supposedly
homogeneous national community; and (c) is determined by an equation that involves the
balancing of the right of the state to regulate in order to comply with its mandate, with the citizens’
expectations upon self-sufficiency and, the maximization of resources through high amounts of
freedom.55
However, it is currently quite noticeable that the latter configuration has been strikingly impacted
by a number of social facts that, supposedly, have come to contend the very position of the state
as an exclusive and excluding governance unit. These facts include, for instance, the escalation of
different types of interactions across national borders; the emergence of a great variety of actors
that come to dispute the state’s pre-eminence in the administration of political, social, and
economic power; and the rise of norms that have been produced through alternative, nontraditional law-making procedures. Considered as components of a systematic phenomenon, they
have been identified around the term “globalization”. Although there are as many visions of
globalization as people studying the phenomenon, the term is applied here – following Paul Schiff
Berman – as the intensification of global interconnectedness in which capital, people,
commodities, images, and ideologies move across distance and physical boundaries with
increasing speed and frequency.56

Bardie and Birnbaum defined the state’s main features as structural differentiation; autonomy; universalism; and
institutional solidity. See BADIE, Bertrand & BIRNBAUM, Pierre. The Sociology of the State. Chicago: Chicago
University Press (1983).
56
See BERMAN, Paul Schiff. Global Legal Pluralism. A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p 24.
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The extent of the impact of globalization on statehood has been alternatively acknowledged by
scholarship. According to those who identify as “hyperglobalists”, we are witnessing a decline in
a state-based political regime. Evidence of this can be observed with, for example, the emergence
of supranational governance structures that tend to replace traditional state functions, or the
proliferation of intents to supplement – or even replace – state-based norms with transnational
legal regimes.57 On the other hand, some would argue that rather than giving up their prerogatives,
states are in fact being transformed to assume an instrumental role in the consolidation of an
emerging global order. This order is composed of a variety of political projects that tend to be
diverse and possibly incongruent, such as the consolidation of a global standardized economic
order or the instauration of a universal human rights system. Although these initiatives have been
conceived, and are formulated, in a transnational fashion – that is, directed to address social
structures and relationships beyond the exclusive normative realm of a national political project –
states have become fundamental pieces towards their crystallization.
In examining the extent to which states participate in global governance, Saskia Sassen has adopted
a transformationist approach. In that regard, she refers to the “embeddedness of globalization in
the national” in order to denote the existence of a substantive association between the two.58 Thus,
she points out that in spite of its undisputable distinctiveness as a scheme that departs from the
traditional sovereignty paradigm, global governance – and especially, the political projects settled
and diffused under its tutelage – requires the state to successfully reach the domain of social
relations within a specific territory. This is the case since first, it confers legitimacy to the projects
given their accommodation within a democratic system in which public authorities represent the
57

See HELD, David ET. Al. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999.
58
See SASSEN, Saskia. “The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation.” Michigan Journal of
International Law Vol. 25 (2004), 1141-1158.
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people and there is a supplementary system of checks and balances that guarantee accountability
and power equilibrium. Secondly, the state apparatus provides operational effectiveness as it
functions with competent institutions, domestic and inter-national law-making prerogatives, and
administrative capacities. Therefore, global governance and its associated projects are able to
properly comply with their essential political objectives.59 Furthermore, the particular symbiosis
that exists between power, territory, and population in the context of the nation state60 generated
by the afore-mentioned global projects – even those advocating for the restriction of the state
intervention as a way to strengthen individual autonomy and the market – require, to some extent,
the use of public regulatory mechanisms to effectively incorporate themselves within a certain
jurisdiction.61
This theoretical construction brings about an important conclusion in terms of the architecture of
global governance: on a number of occasions and supplementary to the emergence of truly
transnational institutions, norms and processes with an autonomous character, states seem to
perform as “agencies of political representation” towards the effective implementation of a variety
of global political projects within their jurisdictional contours.62 In accordance with this
instrumental role and upon the acknowledgement of these independent political initiatives, it

See SASSEN, Saskia. “The Participation of States and Citizens in Global Governance.” 5 Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies Vol. 10 (2003), 5-28.
60
“(…) against conceptions of globalization as a process of state demise or erosion, territorial states are conceived
here as essential geographical components of the globalization process. (…) Global governance turns to be a multiscalar process of reterritorialization in which states play crucial roles.” See BRENNER, Neil. “Beyond StateCentrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies.” Theory and Society Vol. 28 (1999),
p. 44.
61
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explained by the fact that most of territory is encased in a thick and highly formalized national framework marked by
the exclusive authority of the national state. See SASSEN, Saskia “The State and Globalization: Denationalized
Participation”. Michigan Journal of International Law Vol. 25 (2004), p. 1148.
62
Following Hirst & Thompson, the adaptability of state power can be verified in the fact that they have restructured,
realigned and internationalized to behave as primary agents of globalization. See MORE, Elizabeth. “Is economic
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appears that the alleged centralized character of governance – that is, the absolute identification
between a political project, a structural authority and a legal jurisdiction – tends to be replaced by
alternative configurations. Thus, provided that a transnational source of power intends to intervene
in certain social structures localized within a given territory, some kind of outer authority is
delegated to the involved state and acts through its internal regulatory aptitudes.63 This way, states
are devised as power nodes amidst a constellation that participates in the diffusion and
crystallization of global political projects. These tasks are conducted by means of an established
network – the international community – and the effective use of the corresponding regulatory
capabilities.64 This elaboration can eventually be verified by means of an in-depth investigation on
the inclusion of the political projects into the states’ constitutional orders.
III.

The “substance” of global governance: transnational legal processes

Having presented a number of introductory considerations as to the variations that the state – and
its foundational paradigm – has experienced upon the rise of global governance, the task that
follows is to identify whether the legal phenomenon has any role in this scenario. In other words,
the question to address is the function that law and regulation perform in the diffusion and
implementation of diverse political projects in a particular jurisdiction, provided the role of the
state as an agency of political representation. For the purposes of this study, this inquiry must be
answered through a structural-functional perspective, which regards law as a semi-autonomous
field. This signifies that, as a mechanism of social control, it comprises rule-making capacities and
the means to induce or coerce compliance, but is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix that
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infuses it with particular features.65 Therefore, the legal phenomenon is addressed here as a system
that encompasses vigorous processes of norm creation and diffusion whose content and extent are
defined by a permanent interplay with society, under a dynamic that Niklas Luhmann has termed
“structural coupling”.66
In accordance with the sociological perspective of structural-functionalism, society is understood
as a complex organism whose various parts interact to achieve certain objectives. In this context,
social structures are regarded as relatively stable patterns of social behavior that guide the daily
interrelation among individuals or communities, and to which diverse social functions are
associated.67 In this scenario, law would seem to perform predominantly an instrumental role in
the effective control of social structures. In particular, social control is assured through the
determination of people’s behavioral patterns, either to facilitate the anticipation of social conducts
– the generation and protection of expectations, or to produce structural modifications within
society in accordance to a given political mandate. If society were a uniform group of actors
seeking the achievement of common objectives – as presupposed in a traditional account of the
state and its sovereignty paradigm – the legal phenomenon should consequently be acknowledged
as a universalist, harmonic and formal system that is oriented to fulfill a modulatory function. Yet,
society lacks uniformity. Rather than being a homogenous conglomerate that shares a single
system of values and a particular normative view, it is a heterogeneous entity whose contours go
beyond a plain identification with the national unit. On the contrary, society is defined by as many
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interests and associated normative approaches as social constituents. Thus, since the law is a
process that is significantly infused with societal dynamics, it should accordingly be deemed as a
complex apparatus. While it is embedded in formal-rational structures, the legal phenomenon also
encompasses policy considerations and must therefore deal with dialogues among alternative
normative visions of reality. Consequently, the law bears a pluralist nature, which signifies the
acknowledgement of multiple legal manifestations interacting with and within the social order.
A pluralistic conception of the normative life thus comports a cosmopolitan society in which there
are multiple – local and global, territorial, and epistemic – communities, which communicate at
different levels and may overlap in their inherent quest for recognition and expansion.68 These
social units remind us of the abovementioned heterogeneous nature of society. Given their political
nature, they are said to be responsible for developing and circulating causal ideas and associated
normative beliefs.69 According to Peter Haas, they can be defined by a number of features that are
shared among their members. First, they embrace a set of normative and principled beliefs that
provide a value-based rationale for the deployment of social actions. Second, they hold a series of
causal beliefs derived from the analysis of the central problems within their discipline, which
elucidate particular opinions as to the linkages between policy actions and desired results. Third,
they incorporate notions of validity, and criteria for validating and weighting knowledge. Fourth,
their members undertake a common political enterprise that draws on the precedent elements.70
Crucially, although these political subjects may be located within a national context, their very
nature is transnational. They have been conceived under a paradigm that is alternative to an
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absolute identification of society with the nation-state, and function with or without the
instrumental participation of state authority. Consequently, for these communities to deploy their
particular political enterprises, they pursue legal-regulatory projects through the undertaking of
processes that involve complex networks of “actors, norms and procedures”.71 These processes
may incidentally include the states and their institutional arrangements, and aim to interact with
social structures, regardless of the latter’s identification with a particular nation-state.72 Thus, in
the realm of a transnational society, law and regulation are constantly constructed through the
dialogue and contest of these various norm-generating communities, which generate plenty of
interactions and legal orders that exist within the social field.73
Legal transnationalism, as asserted by Roger Cotterrell, entails the influence exerted on the
regulatory policies and practices of nation states by “economic, cultural and political pressures
taking shape beyond their [territorial and ideological] borders, and in that extent beyond their
[direct] control”.74 Under this perspective, the content and extent of global governance is defined
by the continuum of unstable overlapping of claims that come from different transnational
regulatory processes – including those that were diffused and implemented though domestic law
– in a given social arena. These processes compete for authority in relation to each other, and
negotiate their chances of regulatory effectiveness.75 As Saskia Sassen has pointed out, although a
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great extent of the political projects linked to globalization are nationally localized and might even
have been construed in national terms, they involve “trans-boundary networks and formations
connecting or articulating multiple – public and private – processes and actors”.76
In sum, in the context of global governance and the eventual rise of a supplementary role for the
state as an agency of political representation of transnational epistemic communities, the law is
understood as a multifaceted social phenomenon rather than a mere mechanism of social control.
Although this dynamic involves the political representation of epistemic communities that defend
particular normative visions of reality, the legal phenomenon encompasses specific structural and
relational features that confer substantial distinctiveness. Thus, the structural coupling of the law
with a given political project, linked to a transnational community, results in the rise of a legal
process whose purpose is the effective intervention in social structures. When this depiction is seen
from a transnational legal perspective, it is possible to witness, following Gregory Shaffer,
“transnational legal processes” through which norms are constructed carried, and conveyed.77
IV.

The “trace” of transnational legality within the Colombian Constitutional Order and
its regulatory implications

The previous sections introduced ideas on the emerging role of states as agencies of political
representation towards the implementation of normative projects that are linked to transnational
epistemic communities. Provided the socio-legal scope of this study, it is thus necessary to
investigate the effects that the resulting transnational legality – this is, the diffusion and
crystallization of transnational legal processes and foremost, their potential encounter and dialogue
– may entail on the corresponding domestic constitutional orders and associated regulatory
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dynamics. In that regard, the main assertions of this section are the following. First, the
implementation of transnational legal processes encompasses an inevitable shaping of the state’s
constitutional order. This is in turn is reflected in the modification of the content and extent of both
the national political arrangements and the regulatory ambit of action of public authorities. And
second, the fact that a state is often used as an instrument for the consolidation of diverse – and
even conflicting – transnational legal processes results in the emergence of normative tensions.
These tensions can turn into effective legal collisions with respect to the state’s capacity to act
consistently towards the definition and accomplishment of its public objectives.
As a result, the introduction of certain theoretical elaborations help unveil both the dynamics and
the effects of the institutionalization of transnational legal processes at the macro-political level
by means of the legal restructuring of the state and political forms.78 On the one hand, the
phenomenon known as “new constitutionalism” gives an account of the means through which the
global propagation of economic neoliberalism and its most representative institutions – free
markets and the production of goods and services as unrestricted as possible from state regulation
– takes place. Prominently, this phenomenon comports the imposition of binding constraints on
the conduct of public policies so as to insulate key aspects of the economy from the influence of
politics.79 On the other hand, the concept “subaltern cosmopolitan legality” seeks to explain the
emergence of emancipatory political movements that exert resistance against the globalization of
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neoliberalism through the deployment of counter-hegemonic legal practices.80 These two
phenomena will be explained and articulated in detail.
A. New constitutionalism
The concept new constitutionalism – originally articulated by political scientist Stephen Gill81 – is
brought up to explain the nature and extent of global economic governance, and particularly the
effects produced on the capacity of the state to act towards the accomplishment of its public
objectives.82 It is accounted as a political project that is engaged with the reconstitution and
protection of capital on a world-scale so as to make liberal market democracy the primary model
of development.83 Due to its aim to effectively ensure social control, it has a distinctive legal
dimension with the potential to reconstitute both the society and the relations between humanity
and the environment. In this regard, new constitutionalism entails a multilevel governance
dynamic that operate across jurisdictions, but that ultimately projects on states, which are
responsible for their legalization and legitimation.84
In order to comply with its political objective, new constitutionalism seeks to internalize a series
of rules and values within the national constitutional regimes by means of the interplay between
constitutional reforms, judicial interpretation and legislative developments. These norms are
designed to protect transnational economic interests that materialize in the right to property and
other associated entitlements. This protection in conducted by means of the granting of citizenship
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and representation rights; the generation of expectations as to the conduct of the public sphere; and
the corresponding imposition of obligations and duties on the state.85 These entitlements are
enforceable by the rights holders, as they have general access to autonomous mechanisms of
dispute settlement.86 Likewise, they seek to facilitate the mobility of capital and its holders by
providing entry and exit options.87 The resulting legal devices perform as locking-in mechanisms
that place binding constraints on the authority of domestic governments, and particularly on the
autonomy of public authorities to regulate the economy or other sectors related to the
marketplace.88 Consequently, they have the potential to freeze or even roll back state measures
with the potential to affect the interests of global economic actors operating in the corresponding
jurisdiction. This way, it is said that public institutions are “disciplined” to act consistently and in
accordance with the commitments self-imposed by the state through a truly precommitment
strategy.89
The general and most striking effect of new constitutionalism is the insulation of key aspects of
the economy and other areas of public concern from political processes. The supporters of
disciplinary neoliberalism consider that the effects of this scheme of transnational legality are
positive, since the promotion of freedom, nondiscrimination, the rule of law and judicial protection
of individual rights across national frontiers may bring stability and efficiency to the economy of
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states.90 Additionally, the enthusiasts of this analytical perspective sustain that this dynamic of
depoliticization serves the purpose of making legal changes within a state more onerous or
impossible to take place. The state is thus bound far into the future with respect to its possible
intentions to experiment politically or concretely, and undo the neoliberal compact towards a more
redistributive dynamic of governance.91 Thus, in countries affected by structural inequalities and
social disparity, the possibility of achieving social justice is evidently limited as democratic
choices tend to be removed and citizenship is reduced to a single, uniform conception organized
around the value of the market.92
B. Subaltern cosmopolitan legality
The introduction of new constitutionalism gave an account of the modulatory effects that the
spread of a global neo-liberal economic model entails to the constitutional order of a state.
Arguably, it offered an unenthusiastic panorama for those who might negatively be affected by the
consequent constrain of the regulatory capacity of public authorities in their eventual task of
accomplishing alternative public objectives. Nevertheless, although neo-liberal globalization can
be identified as hegemonic – this is, the predominant political and normative matrix under which
transnational legal processes have been shaped, it is far from being an exclusive phenomenon
within the realm of transnational legality. As Boaventura Sousa Santos has explained, throughout
the world, local, national and transnational social groups, networks, initiatives, organizations and
movements have been active in confronting neoliberal globalization and in proposing alternatives
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to it.93 Even more, this counter-hegemonic project counts with a legal dimension – acknowledged
as subaltern cosmopolitan legality – that is oriented to provide tools to resist the patterns of
discrimination and social exclusion associated with the economic model promoted by
neoliberalism, and thus produce the necessary social transformations that could ensure the respect
of alternative normative legitimacies under the idea of the equality of differences.94
The transnational legal processes infused with subaltern cosmopolitan legality are characterized
by a series of elements. First, although law is not reduced to state law nor individual rights, they
are an active part of cosmopolitan legal practices. Indeed, new notions of rights that go beyond the
liberal idea of individual autonomy and incorporate solidaristic understandings of entitlements
grounded in alternative forms of legal knowledge are articulated.95 Second, the construction and
use of legal tools depend upon their integration into a political project, which means that the former
are politicized before their legalization into the realm of the nation state.96 Third, the configuration
of cosmopolitan legality is a process that takes place “from below”, which denotes both the direct
influence of the addressees of the project and the central role played by legal pluralism. Fourth,
even if it is accounted as a global initiative, cosmopolitan legality is developed at different scales
– local, national and transnational. And fifth, in the context of cosmopolitan legality a restorative
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vision of justice is replaced by a transformative one, which entails a project of social justice that
addresses the systematic harm that have affected the ones relegated by society.97
Subaltern cosmopolitanism sends a powerful message. Hegemonic economic globalization has an
undeniable preponderance that can be verified in the preferential way in which its associated legal
processes are localized in the governance landscape. Yet, nation-states, subaltern communities,
and other social actors may still organize in defense of perceived common interests. They can use
their capabilities for transnational interaction, created on the occasion of the intensification of
social interactions across borders, to their benefit.98 In this context, a state’s constitutional/legal
system may perform an emancipatory role towards the contention of the negative effects of
neoliberalism on the most disadvantaged members of its national society.
The greatest consequence of analyzing transnational legal issues through the lens of subaltern
cosmopolitan legality appears to be the acknowledgement of the heterogeneous character of state
regulation. Because of the particular intensity, selectivity and pace of transnational interactions,
different political logics of regulation or different styles of law are identified in different areas of
state intervention.99 Thus, the latter dynamic experience drastic changes as various and potentially
competitive semi-autonomous regulatory paths emerge from an apparently single and coherent
constitutional order. They therefore converge in the domestic legal system, which is deemed a
contact zone where rival normative ideas and agencies meet under unequal conditions and subvert
each other. The outcome, according to Santos, is the coexistence of partial legal fields constituted
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by relatively unrelated and highly discrepant logics of regulation. This certainly entails
undisputable challenges for the state, as it tends to lose coherence as a unified agent of social
regulation. In sum, the very definition of general interest is disputed.100
C. The emergence of normative tensions
This section questioned the particular effects of transnational legality on a state’s Constitutional
Order and the associated regulatory dynamics. In that regard, new constitutionalism and subaltern
cosmopolitan legality were introduced as useful concepts to the analysis aimed to recreate a
sociopolitical scenario that environs the encounter and dialogue between particular transnational
legal processes. Therefore, the objective of ensuring the consolidation of liberal democratic
capitalism as a truly global political project is contrasted with the resistance exercised by counterhegemonic forces whose purpose is to bring alternative models to contend the patterns of
discrimination and social exclusion associated with neoliberalism. Here, the role of the law appears
to be fundamental in the articulation of these political initiatives, as they are oriented towards the
effective intervention in social relationships and structures. A great variety of legal artefacts are
deployed to set binding constraints to the potential production of policy changes that could
contravene the interests of the global economic project within the state’s jurisdiction. In turn, the
emancipatory nature of subaltern cosmopolitanism is supplemented by legal tools that are designed
to address violence and structural inequalities from a transformative perspective. All in all, states
and their constitutional/legal orders perform a central role in this power dialectic.
The latter account reaffirms the idea that in the realm of global governance, the state has become
a distinctive political agency that is in charge of representing and crystallizing diverse and even
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conflicting transnational political projects. Consequently, the emergence of normative conflicts
within its constitutional/legal order is not only a spontaneous outcome of the struggle between
initiatives with conflictual visions of society, but an unavoidable phenomenon that brings both
structural and substantial challenges for the state. Crucially, the apparent existence of a single
national political project and an unambiguous and coherent legal system is put into question, and
instead an invitation to think about a fragmented constitutional order is upon the table. This is
inevitably reflected in the regulatory patterns of public authorities, and particularly in their
capacity to act consistently on the occasion of the definition and accomplishment of their mandate.
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Chapter Two: The Colombian Constitutional Order
I.

Introduction

After having presented the dissertation’s theoretical foundations, this chapter introduces the
Colombian Constitutional Order (CCO). For the purpose of this study, the CCO is used as an
analytical framework that will help to illustrate a normative tension between two transnational
legal processes with strong regulatory implications: (1) the construction of a legal regime for the
promotion and protection of foreign investment through the systematic conclusion of international
investment agreements; and (2) the implementation of a transitional justice project whose main
objective is the effective achievement of durable peace in the country through structural
transformations in society. In that regard, the chapter elaborates on the CCO’s social peace
function, economic foundations, and global projection. Additionally, the depiction of the CCO will
facilitate the further visualization of the regulatory challenge that the state – the natural
implementing agency and guarantor of these legal processes – would be facing as a consequence
of the aforementioned normative stress.
A constitutional order reflects the normative image of a state – and its society – its raison d'être.
Its foundation entails the formulation of a set of principles, values, norms and institutions whose
purpose is to materialize and articulate the aspirations of a political community.101 Consequently,
it is considered as a reference point intended to radiate legal force, normative charge and coherence
on the state’s legal system.102 Therefore, it sets the contours of the exercise of public authority
through the formulation of a bill of rights and duties which modulate the relationship between the
public and private spheres;103 the assignment of specific competences to public authorities;104 and
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the delimitation of the state’s regulatory activity – the capacity to intervene or the duty to abstain
– in accordance with the constitutional objectives.105
In this context, the Colombian Constitutional Order is assumed to be the normative site within
which the transnational legal processes under analysis and their respective rationales can be better
comprehended, both individually and as part of a conflictual dynamic. This is so for a very
pragmatic reason: it was in the realm of the CCO that the transnational legal processes were
effectively incorporated into the country’s legal system. Consequently, they acquired entity as part
of said normative structure.106 In turn, this incorporation provides transnational legal processes
with distinctive features. First, they are provided with legitimacy by means of their framing within
the state’s political project. Second, they become infused with normative support due to their
identification with pre-established constitutional principles and values. And third, their inclusion
within the state’s policy agenda turns them into subjects of regulation. Therefore, it is possible to
assert that these incorporation processes are determiners of the alleged tension, since they situate
both rationales in the same normative level and induce a dialogue among them.
From a methodological standpoint, the depiction of the CCO is based on the account and
contextualization of the relevant constitutional norms and the jurisprudence of the country’s
Constitutional Court, which is in charge of its development. By using the CCO as a decoder, one
can decipher the normative rationales embedded in both the establishment of a legal regime for the
promotion and protection of foreign investors via international investment agreements (Chapter
Two), and the implementation of a transitional justice project that is articulated through
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transformative regulatory measures (Chapter Three). Furthermore, the CCO will frame the tension
between these transnational legal processes from the standpoint of the state’s regulatory activity
(Chapter Four). In sum, although the CCO is not directly assumed as an object of analysis, it is an
useful analytical instrument whose operation should lead to the elucidation of the central role of
the state in the normative articulation of both transnational legal processes in Colombia.
Particularly, it is instrumental for unearthing and particularizing the dilemma that the country will
have to confront when the time comes to decide how to act and whose interests to uphold.
This chapter is divided in four sections. The first part introduces the Colombian Constitutional
Order from the perspective of its social peace function. The second part depicts the CCO in relation
to the interactions between the public and private spheres, and particularly among the authorities
and the economic agents. The third part visualizes the influence of globalization on the CCO as
related to the internationalization of economic relations and the reception of international human
rights and social standards. Finally, the fourth part of the chapter provides preliminary conclusions
as to the relevance of the CCO given its task as the dissertation’s analytical framework.
II.

The 1991 Constitution and the role of public authorities in achieving social peace: The
Social Rule of Law State

This section introduces the current Colombian Constitutional Order from the standpoint of its
social peace function. It describes how the emergence of the 1991 Constitution represented a
milestone in the country’s nation-building process in that it articulated an alternative model of the
state, with the aim of bringing about a more accountable relationship between public authorities
and society after a long period of violence and social inequalities. The emergence of the Social
Rule of Law State – a political project with normative force that was adopted in the new
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constitution – sealed a compromise on the transformation of the country into a democratic,
inclusive, and more equitable state.
A. A new constitution is here to bring social peace
In 1991, a new Constitution was greeted with jubilation in Colombia, and is still regarded as a
historical milestone in the ongoing nation-building process today. By the outset of the 1990s, the
country was immersed in a chaotic situation of extreme violence, political patronage, social
inequality and economic crisis. It had apparently reached a point of no return with respect to the
aspiration of becoming a stable and prosperous nation, and somehow evoked the recently
formulated and likewise controversial idea of the failed state.107 The previous Constitution, enacted
in 1886 under the shadow of the many civil wars that lashed the country during the XIX century
and aligned to a conservative political plan called la regeneración, had proven to be ineffective in
consolidating a national project. Seemingly, the state's capacity to act did not acquire the structural
potential required to influence certain sectors and social groups, which had traditionally been
abandoned to their destiny except for accidental, negative, and sometimes repressive ways.108 In
this context, the new political charter symbolized an opportunity to break with the state’s historical
inability to forge a sustainable national project within a naturally diverse society. It adopted an
aspirational attitude that infused the constitution with a forward-looking perspective, and
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consolidated the normative idea of progress.109 Likewise, it recognized its associates and the
consequent representation of their varied interests.110
Previous attempts were unsuccessful to reflect the existence of plural social concerns into the
law.111 On this occasion, certain sectors of society that had previously been excluded had the
chance to participate in the debates on the configuration of the nation’s political project. As a
result, the Constitution acted as a democratic amplification pact.112 Unlike the historical power
tandem between the Liberal and Conservative parties that contributed to the spread of violence in
the country and especially in the rural areas, the 1991 process gathered a representative group of
social actors. Besides the traditional parties, it included the guerrilla groups under demobilization,
social sectors from a variety of ideological streams, and ethnic communities. The 1991
Constitution was designed to perform a “social peace function”, one which aimed to create
appropriate conditions for the settlement of the complex conflicts – armed, social, and economic
– that had jeopardized the very continuity of the state.113 Likewise, it has been depicted as an
expression of faith, a belief in the law’s capacity to provide substantial answers to the social,
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political and economic ills that faced Colombia.114 It reminds the idea of the law as an instrument
of social change.115
In order to comply with the social peace function – that is, the solution of complex conflicts
through the effective adjustment of social relations – the 1991 Constitution was embedded with
two distinctive features. In the first place, the charter has normative force, according to which it is
a binding and directly applicable norm. This feature is crystallized in the existence of concrete
mechanisms to guarantee the constitution’s supremacy, and particularly to review the conformity
of both the legal rules and the behaviour of public authorities in relation to the CCO.116 In this
regard, the Constitution was functionally arranged to intervene effectively in the settlement of
conflicts between colliding rationales gravitating around the Colombian legal system.117 In the
second place, the Constitution possesses an evaluative character since its content is structured
around a value system – a normative program – that must be promoted and observed by the public
authorities.118 This is reflected in the inclusion of a set of orienting principles and values that guide
the application of the Charter’s bill of rights through a comprehensive institutional structure.
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B. The Social Rule of Law State
The ambition in which a constitution like Colombia’s was formulated brings many challenges for
the state, which is in charge of its effective observation and harmonic implementation. First, there
is a large gap between the aspirational image captured by the charter’s political program and the
reality that needs to be addressed in order to achieve social peace. Second, as the constitutional
process recognized diverse and divergent social actors as valid interlocutors, a great variety of
competing interests are at stake. Third, there are limited means and resources to materialize a greatscale political program, which not only includes objectives based on the passive action of the state
but goals whose compliance require the active involvement of public authorities. Fourth, the
institutional governance apparatus called to implement the constitutional mandates is complex a
set of entities whose dissimilar approaches towards the management of public affairs might
generate collisions. In sum, in the pursuance of its constitutional mandate, the state faces the need
to find a formula to balance juxtaposing normative forces, make a sustainable use of the limited
means and coordinate a miscellaneous collection of public authorities.
The social rule of law state formula (hereinafter SRLS) is embedded in the 1991 Constitution,119
and has been appointed to perform such a balancing task.120 It has been developed progressively
by the Colombian Constitutional Court through its case law, and performs as a core concept for
the maintenance of a sustainable social order in the country. In a social reality characterized by a

“Colombia is a social state under the rule of law, organized in the form of a unitary republic, decentralized, with
autonomy of its territorial units, democratic, participatory, and pluralistic, based on the respect of human dignity, the
work and solidarity of the individuals who belong to it, and the prevalence of the general interest.
120
As Luis Eslava points out, the Constitutionalization of a social rule of law state, based on a generous bill of rights,
was modeled on the 1948 German Constitution and the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Properly speaking, the SRLS
started to configure in Colombia as early as 1936 with a constitutional reform inspired in Leon Duguit’s ideas on
solidarism, so the concepts of state intervention, social duties and social function of property were introduced to the
national legal system. See ESLAVA, Luis. “Constitutionalization of rights in Colombia: establishing a ground for
meaningful comparisons” Revista Derecho del Estado No. 22 (2009), p. 202.
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complex delimitation between the public and private spheres, the SRLS translates the
constitutional premises into concrete criteria to address the challenges associated with the exercise
of power. This formula performs as a compass to drive the action of public authorities toward the
accomplishment of the constitutional objectives, in accordance with their respective mandates. The
SRLS accompanies the democratic character of the process that led to the formulation of the 1991
Constitution, which incorporated institutions with alternative ideological matrixes and recognized
the rights of historically marginalized people so as to find equilibrium and surpass conflict121.
Since the state adopted the general responsibility to ensure well-being and equality conditions to
all the people within its jurisdiction – in consonance with the Constitution’s aspirational
character122 – its purposes and goals significantly extended beyond the classic aims of protecting
persons and property. Correspondingly, its degree of regulatory intervention expanded both in
private and public spheres of social life.123
The practical influence of the SRLS on the conduct of public authorities in order to orient their
action towards the achievement of the country’s socioeconomic objectives is reflected in the
jurisprudential development produced by the Colombian Constitutional Court. These
developments can be grouped in a number of ideas.124 First of all, the incorporation of the SRLS
into the CCO implies a shift in the Colombian state’s paradigm. It comprises a transition from a
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liberal gendarme state to a social-oriented state.125 Thus, it is recognized that public intervention
in social relations is necessary to procure equality, freedom and effective individual autonomy,
since society is not anymore visualized as an entity composed by free and equal subjects in
abstracto. Rather, it is visualized as a conglomerate of people under conditions of material
inequalities.126 Second of all, as a consequence of the placement of human dignity at the core of
the CCO, the concept of equality is now associated to the state’s recognition of material differences
and the identification of scarcities so as to materialize its primary aim: the promotion of decent
conditions of life for the whole of the population, and especially in favor of the people immersed
under conditions of manifest vulnerability.127 Further, in the context of the SRLS

public

authorities do not have unlimited powers and, on the contrary, their competences become
obligations subject to judicial review.128 Likewise, by virtue of the SRLS formula the
Constitutional Court has recognized the existence of an “economic constitution” within the charter,
which conjugates different normative rationales in order to satisfy public objectives.129 Finally, the
Court has pointed out that under the principle of solidarity social public policies must be
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progressive,130 and private parties do have authentic legal duties that are relative to the satisfaction
of public interests.131
In conclusion, in the context of the Colombian Constitutional Order’s normative dimension, the
SRLS performs two functions. First, it acts as a driving force, as long as it channels the activity of
public authorities towards the achievement of public goals. Second, it is a rational referent that
provides patterns on how to solve normative conflicts that occur in the context of the exercise of
public power. As illustrated in the following section, these functions acquire great relevance in the
configuration of the relations between the public and private spheres or, seen from a politicaleconomy perspective, on the establishment of the country’s economic model. Apparently, this
nexus comprises a conflict between the protection of individual rights and freedoms, and the
mandate to redirect social structures towards the achievement of Colombia’s political program.
III.

Constitutional Order and socioeconomic model in Colombia: between economic
freedom and state intervention

After having introduced the foundations of Colombia’s Constitutional Order and its social peace
function, this section intends to present the SRLS in relation to the setting up and functioning of
the country’s socioeconomic model. Particularly, this formula is regarded from the standpoint of
the content and scope of the property rights regime.132 The discussion addresses the concept of
social market economy, which is portrayed as a normative archetype that frames the relationship
between the state and the private sphere, specifically with regards to access and use of scarce
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resources. Consequently, it defines the regulatory dynamics of public authorities – that is, their
capacity to intervene in the realm of the private sphere, and to occasionally restrict or shape the
corresponding individual economic entitlements, in accordance with the country’s political
project.133
A. Colombia’s economic model: a social market economy
The choosing of an economic model for Colombia caused tensions throughout the process leading
to the formulation of the 1991 Constitution. The adoption of a liberal matrix134 was somehow
agreed upon since the beginning of the discussions that took place inside the Constitutional
Assembly. Yet, there were discrepancies among the representatives of different sectors of society
as to the absolute character of individual economic-related rights and liberties in relation to the
state’s intervention prerogatives towards the achievement of social public goals.135 On the one
hand, some believed the economy should be entirely market-driven and that the state should only
impact the assignment of scarce resources by correcting eventual structural failures and protecting
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individual entitlements from external interferences. On the other hand, there were claims
supporting the crystallization of a social-oriented vision of the economy, which had been
permeating the Colombian normative order since 1936 and advocated for the state’s direction of
the economy by means of the allocation of eventual interventionist prerogatives, thus entailing the
relative nature of individual rights.
The formula that was embedded in the Constitution for addressing this normative divergence
entailed the incorporation of two seemingly differing principles: economic freedom and state
intervention. Each represents the normative visions which exist between the state and the private
sphere on the grounds of the allocation of scarce resources. Further, they modulate each other’s
scope of action. As a result, while the Charter is not ideologically neutral with regards to the way
in which economic assets are used to comply with its political program, it did not adopt a stationary
or definitive position on how these aims can be accomplished; that is, which type of economic
policies should be implemented to meet the country’s goals. Rather, the Constitution advocates for
a case-by-case consideration.136
Economic freedom is included in the Constitution as the foundation of the country’s economic
system. The enterprise is placed as the basic unit of economic development, and free economic
private initiative and free competition are established as its associated entitlements. Yet, these
safeguards are put into the perspective of the satisfaction of the public good and the protection of
social interests by including exceptional limitations for their full exercise, or requesting public

See generally RODRIGUEZ, César & UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. “Constitución y Modelo Económico en Colombia:
Hacia una Discusión Productiva entre Economía y Derecho.” Debates de Coyuntura Económica (2005), 23-40
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authorities to control the activity of private economic agents within the market.137 In turn, as the
overall responsibility of managing the economy is assigned to the state, the principle of state
intervention becomes a normative maxim in the context of the Colombian Constitutional Order.
Thus, public authorities are called to use their prerogatives in certain fields – resource extraction,
land use, production, distribution, use and consumption of goods, and provision of public utilities
– so as to rationalize the economy and eventually perform a redistribution role within the economic
cycle. Therefore, observing the principle of legality, they could act to safeguard certain public
interests and ascertain that all individuals have access to basic goods and services.138
Considered together, the CCO sent an aspirational message: by following economic liberal
postulates, it is possible to achieve the objective of a less-unequal society in which there is a fair
income distribution for all citizens. In that regard, the country’s Constitutional Court has, through
its case law, proactively developed the content and scope of economic freedom and state
intervention. As a result, it has progressively constructed a normative archetype which, by means
of the balance of said principles, aims to orient the activity of public authorities intervening in the

“Article 333. Economic activity and private initiative must not be impeded within the limits of the public good.
For their exercise, no one may demand prior permission or licenses without authorization of the law. Free economic
competition is a right of everyone, entailing responsibilities. The enterprise, as a basis of development, has a social
function that implies obligations. The state will strengthen the joint organizations and stimulate enterprise
development. The State, mandated by the law, will check the impediments to or restrictions of economic freedom and
will avoid or control any abuse that individuals or enterprises may create thanks to their dominant position in the
national marketplace. The law will delimit the scope of economic freedom when the social interest, the environment,
and the cultural patrimony of the nation demand it.”
138
“Article 334. The general management of the economy is the responsibility of the State. By mandate of the law,
the State will intervene in the exploitation of natural resources, land use, the production, distribution, use, and
consumption of goods, and in the public and private services in order to rationalize the economy with the purpose of
achieving an improved quality of life of its inhabitants, the equitable distribution of opportunities, and the benefits of
development and conservation of a healthy environment. In a special manner, the State will intervene for the sake of
the full employment of the human resources and to ascertain that all individuals, especially those of low income, may
have effective access to basic goods and services. And also, to promote productivity and competitiveness and the
harmonious development of the regions.
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private sphere and to bring certainty to the expectations of private economic agents: the social
market economy.139
The Colombian Constitutional Court has addressed the tensions between economic freedom and
state intervention as a problem to be solved within the realm of the SRLS.140 In developing the
nature of economic freedom, it asserted that the content and extent of this entitlement was the
result of a historical process around the increasing role of the state in the satisfaction of social
needs.141 Also it clarified that, whereas this type of freedom is a fundamental element of the
economic system due to its connection with the right of personal autonomy, its recognition depends
on the realization of superior values such as justice, equity, solidarity and the common good.142
Likewise, the Court elucidated that the exercise of an economic activity is not absolute and in any
case, must conform to the public interests at stake.143 In turn, the Court depicted state intervention
as a prerogative, distributed among different branches of public power and authorities acting as an
exception to the observance to economic freedom.144 It observed that, although there can be
tensions between economic freedom and the prevalence of general interests within economic
activities, state intervention seeks to reconcile private initiative with public interest.145 Yet, it
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explained that the consequent limitations to individual rights should meet certain conditions, as
they must be founded on reasonable and proportionate motives, linked to the consecution of
constitutional goals,146 carried out according to the law, and not affecting the entitlement’s core
content.147 Thus, the construction of each principle is directly influenced by the other’s scope, as
the promotion of a balanced resolution of eventual normative tensions was highly desired.
Overall, the Constitutional Court justified the choosing of the social market economy model by
remarking the state’s duty to promote the efficient use of resources while ensuring that people have
effective access to basic goods and services, in order to ensure a life with dignity.148 Therefore,
the tribunal recognized that the role of the market as resource-allocator should be reconciled with
the social, political and economic role of the state as resource-redistributor.149 Consequently, it
pointed out that the state’s public authorities have specific behavioral duties in two concrete areas.
In accordance with their competences, they are called to protect and safeguard a free and
competitive market, which is depicted as the site where private economic agents may equitably
enter and offer goods and services. In turn, they must correct market imperfections, either the ones
related to free competition or those which threaten the validity of the rights that are necessarily
tied to the market.150 The social market economy must be seen as a normative model that sets up
the relations between the public and private spheres with respect to the administration of scarce
resources. In the realm of the CCO’s socioeconomic model, a well defined dynamic becomes
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visible. Although economic freedom is defined as a fundamental value and private initiative is
acknowledged as a primary development engine, public authorities have the faculty and the
obligation to intervene in the private sphere by means of their regulatory prerogatives. They do so
to correct market failures and assure the accomplishment of public goals and the protection of
social entitlements.
B. Economic model and property rights regime: the social function of property
One of the pillars on which any economic model with a liberal matrix is built is the recognition
and protection of private property. This legal institution sets up a given scheme of identities and
social interactions that is based on the commodification of land and natural resources151 and the
consequent allocation of exclusionary entitlements that can eventually be interchanged. On this
basis, the market consolidates as a paramount mechanism of social control. In the case of
Colombia, the Civil legislation established a property rights regime that regulates ownership in
line with an absolute vision of individual autonomy and private initiative.152 Yet, the 1991
Constitution advanced on the adoption of an alternative view that situates property in the context
of the country’s constitutional compromise with social justice.153 Following the reasoning path
assumed through the SRLS formula and the social market economy model, property is regarded
not only as a right but as a social function whose exercise entails internal and external restraints.154

151

Here, the concept commodification is used to represent the process through which land and natural resources are
assigned an economic value and a function.
152
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Ley 84 de 1873 – Código Civil, art. 653-1007.
153
Originally formulated on the occasion of the 1936 constitutional reform. See generally BONILLA, Daniel.
“Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a Right and Property as a Social Function.” 3 Fordham Law Review
Vol. 80 (2011), 1135-1170.
154
As accurately pointed out by Forster and Bonilla, the concept social function of property was originally articulated
by French jurist Leon Duguit in a set of lectures given in 1911. From this conception, it comes that property is no a
right but rather a social function, according to which it has both external and internal limits. Therefore, the owner has
obligations with respect to his things as they should be put at the service of the community, and the state should protect
such property rights only when they fulfill their social function; it has the positive obligation to encourage the owner
to exercise his rights in accordance with the social function. See FORSTER, Sheila R & BONILLA, Daniel. “The
social Function of Property: a Comparative Law Perspective.” 3 Fordham Law Review Vol. 80 (2011), p. 105.
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As such, the Constitution introduces and develops a private property regime within the CCO by
means of three well-defined components. First, ownership is generally identified as a right in
accordance with civil legislation and, in principle, it is protected from the eventual retroactive
effect of subsequent laws. Second, property is depicted as a social function that entails duties for
the owner and other right-holders, comprises an ecological dimension, and should favour the
public in case of the emergence of a conflict of interest around regulation. Third, along with the
latter characteristic, property can eventually be expropriated under public utility or social interest
reasons, in accordance with the law, subject to a judicial decision or an administrative procedure,
and mediating prior compensation.155 Therefore, whereas the crystallization of private property
came to confirm the CCO’s predilection for a social order with liberal foundations, the insertion
of a supplementary social function that builds on a right-duties dynamic gave public authorities a
key interventionist tool to comply with their objectives in terms of distributive justice.156
In the same way that the definition of the country’s economic model counted with the crucial
contribution of the Colombian Constitutional Court, the property rights regime was an object of
consideration and clarification. In particular, the Tribunal highlighted three aspects of the theme.
It has depicted and explained the change of paradigm that the right to property has experimented
within the CCO. Also, it has addressed the implications of the social function of property on the

“Article 58. Private property and the other rights acquired in accordance with civil laws are guaranteed and may
neither be disregarded nor infringed by subsequent laws. When in the application of a law enacted for reasons of
public utility or social interest a conflict between the rights of individuals and the interests recognized by the law
arises, the private interest shall yield to the public or social interest. Property has a social dimension which implies
obligations. As such, an ecological dimension is inherent to it. The State will protect and promote associative and joint
forms of property. Expropriation may be carried out for reasons of public utility or social interest defined by the
legislature, subject to a judicial decision and prior compensation. The compensation will be determined by taking into
account the interests of the community and of the individual concerned. In the cases determined by the legislator, the
expropriation may take place by administrative action, subject to subsequent litigation before the administrative law
courts, including with regard to the price.”
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structure and exercise of rights, especially with regards to the raise of eventual restrictions.
Additionally, it has provided normative orientation concerning the projection of the social vision
of property on specific issues associated with the context of the country. The emergence of the
1991 Constitution encompassed, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the crystallization of
a new paradigm to rationalize property.157 Particularly, the new Charter closed a normative gap
between a clearly individualistic notion of this institution – associated with the classical liberal
state and embedded in article 669 of the Civil Code – and the emerging CCO, which embraced a
functionalist perspective. In that regard, as property relinquished to the exigencies of social justice
and sustainable economic development, its nature variated. From being considered absolute, it was
transformed into a relative entitlement, susceptible to limitations or restrictions for the sake of the
effective realization of public and social interests.158 In this context, the CCO property rights
decidedly moved away from an exclusive regard to subjective prerogatives, towards a more
balanced rights-duty perspective.159 Thus, their exercise is only legitimated when they seek the
promotion of social welfare.160
This shift in the conceptualization of property brought a consequent spread of case law devoted to
develop the conditions around the exercise of this institution.161 The social function of property
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-595/2010. M.P. Jorge Iván Palacio Palacio,
p. 9.
158
“Nevertheless, with the instauration of the interventionist state, these purely liberal and individualistic perspective
entered into crisis, so ownership passed from being a strict relation between the owner and a thing to embed the rights
of all the members of society. This is the idea of a social function of property, which entails an important
reconceptualization of this private-law category, as it allows that the legal order imposes wider restrictions and charges
to property rights, as – following Duguit – property lies on social utility.” See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte
Constitutional. Sentencia C-189/2006. M.P. Rodrigo Escobar Gil, p. 20.
159
Crucially, in accordance with the Constitution, “The exercise of the rights and liberties recognized in this
Constitution implies responsibilities.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 95.
160
See Decision REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-491/2002. M.P. Marco Gerardo
Monroy Cabra, p. 9.
161
See Decision REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-006/1993. M.P. Eduardo
Cifuentes Muñoz, p. 17.
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was projected into the internal dimension of the right, so it performs as a driver to materialize the
objectives of the SRLS while serving the interests of the individual.162 Accordingly, the right to
property is acknowledged as an economic entitlement that primarily points to guarantee the
participation of the owner in the organization and development of a socioeconomic system.163
Likewise, the Court explained that the social function of property performs as the main determinant
for the external allocation of limitations to ownership toward the achievement of social benefits.164
Yet, the core of the right, which relates to the minimum degree of enjoyment of an object that
enables its holder to obtain economic benefits, must be respected.165 Therefore, it was concluded
that the rights’ core content is disregarded when a restriction does not correspond to proportionate
and reasonable ends, or is not related to the supremacy of general interest or the principle of
solidarity.166
As a result, with the shift in the rationalization of the entitlement, the Constitutional Court
expanded the scope of the social function of property on specific issues associated with the context
of the country. With regards to rural property it has commented that land exploitation must benefit
the community and not only the owner.167 Additionally, the Court has affirmed that in the case of
vacant rural lands, the social function of property is concretized in a number of obligations for the
right-holder: economic exploitation; exclusive usage for agricultural activities; and the avoidance
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-589/1995. M.P. Fabio Morón Díaz, p. 14;
Sentencia C-740/2003. M.P. Jaime Córdoba Triviño, p. 17.
163
See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-189/2006. M.P. Rodrigo Escobar Gil, p.
15.
164
See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-589/1995. M.P. Fabio Morón Díaz, p. 12.
165
“The legal configuration of property can point to the suppression of certain powers of the owner, to its conditional
exercise, or in some cases to the forced fulfilment of certain obligations.” See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte
Constitutional. Sentencia T-427/1998 M.P. Alejandro Martínez Caballero, p. 16.
166
See Decision REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-278/2014. M.P. Mauricio
González Cuervo, p. 28.
167
See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-223/1994. M.P. José Gregorio Hernández
Galindo, p.6.
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of exploitation if the terrain is expected to serve environmental conservation purposes.168
Likewise, the Court has recognized collective property as a fundamental right for the indigenous
and Afro-Colombian peoples.169 In that regard, collective ownership has been depicted as crucial
for the protection of those peoples’ identity, autonomy, and existence, due to the special link they
have with territory.170 In this sense, the tribunal has opined that collective property entails a
correlating duty of protection from public authorities and the private sphere, which stems from
certain international agreements concluded by Colombia, especially the ILO Convention 169.171
Moreover, the Court established a number of sub-rules regarding the right to collective property.
The first is that there is a right to constitute reserves on behalf of ethnic groups. The second is that
the state has the obligation to protect collective property from the acts of third parties, including
the duty to promote land restitution in case of forced dispossession or abandonment as a
consequence of the conflict and the supplementary implementation of land tenure security by
means of the clarification of property rights and registration towards their effective enjoyment.
The third rule is that in the context of the eventual impact of collective property by economic
processes, prior consultation is a means to ensure the integrity of ethnic communities.172
IV.

A national Constitutional Order with a global projection

This section argues that the Colombian Constitutional Order is a normative system with a global
projection. As a result of the progressive influence of globalization on the Colombian
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-595/1995. M.P. Carlos Gaviria Díaz, p. 12.
See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia T-188/1993. M.P. Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz,
p. 16.
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia T-013/2009. M.P. Rodrigo Escobar Gil, p. 51.
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia T-091/2013. M.P. Luis Guillermo Guerrero
Pérez, p. 11.
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia T-387/2013. M.P. María Victoria Calle
Correa, p. 26-37.
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constitutional setting,173 state sovereignty has been shaped as it passed from being an absolute
prerogative to acquire a relative character. As evidenced by both the constitutional text and the
jurisprudential developments of the Constitutional Court, the structure of the state and its dynamics
of public action have been transformed in order to be compatible with phenomena such as free
trade, capital and human mobility, and the promotion and protection of human rights. Although
the Colombian state indisputably remains the primary governance unit in accordance with the
principles and goals constitutive of its national project, it occasionally performs an alternative role.
From a functional standpoint, the state has been arranged to act as an agency towards the
crystallization of global political projects within its jurisdiction.
The CCO’s global vocation can be seen particularly in two areas of legal development. On the one
hand, the aim of the state to place itself as a relevant actor within the international community of
states provided the existence of shared interests that it is called to endorse. On the other hand, the
state has progressively acquired a commitment to protecting and promoting human rights and other
social-oriented concerns by means of their recognition as superlative components of the legal
order.
A. Internationalization and integration
The first indication of the CCO’s global projection can be found in the constitutional purpose of
ensuring Colombia a relevant position and an active role in the international community of states,
as evidenced by the inclusion of the principles of internationalization and integration in the 1991
Constitution. Whilst the political charter clearly recognized state sovereignty and self-
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Here globalization is acknowledged as the intensification of transnational relations at different levels and the
progressive emergence of actors disputing the exclusive exercise of political, economic and social power to the state.
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determination as the foundations of the country’s foreign relations,174 it also established a series
of supplementary directives on how and in which direction the state should exercise these attributes
in the context of the international realm. The first directive is the internationalization of political,
economic, social, and ecological relations.175 Additionally, the Constitution commands the
consolidation of economic, social and political integration processes with other nations by means
of the conclusion of treaties and the constitution of supranational organizations.176 While these
policy instructions are part of the regular governance dynamic of states, they had not been
expressly included in the country’s previous Constitution.
Therefore, in line with the aim of placing Colombia as a primary global actor, the Constitutional
Court has elaborated a relatively coherent doctrine on the content and extent of the
internationalization and integration principles in a number of areas: the lifting of restrictions to the
transnational mobility of people and capital;177 the study of the legality and convenience of
adherence of the country to integration processes and the transferring of public competences to
supranational institutions;178 and the recognition of transnational private actors’ relative capacity
to produce regulations for certain areas of interaction with the public that are subject to their

“The foreign relations of the State are based on national sovereignty, on respect for the self-determination of the
people, and on the recognition of the principles of international law approved by Colombia.” See REPÚBLICA DE
COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 9.
175
“The State will promote the internationalization of political, economic, social, and ecological relations on the basis
of fairness, reciprocity, and the national interest.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991,
art. 226.
176
“In the same manner, the foreign policy of Colombia will be oriented toward the integration of Latin America and
the Caribbean. Article 227. The State will promote economic, social, and political integration with other nations and
especially with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean by means of treaties which, on the basis of fairness,
equality, and reciprocity, create supranational organizations even to the point of constituting a Latin American
community of nations.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 9.
177
These cases will be introduced and extensively reviewed in chapter 3, with occasion of the conclusion of free trade
agreements and bilateral investment agreements by Colombia.
178
For instance, Decision C-137/1995, regarding the nature and implications of Colombia’s entering into the World
Trade Organization. See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-137/1995. M.P. Jorge
Arango Mejía.
174
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influence.179 Further, the Court became aware that the abovementioned configuration – restricted
state sovereignty to satisfy the internationalization and integration objectives – could conflict with
the effective observance of domestic regulation. Therefore, it acknowledged the consequent
challenges that this governance dynamic could pose on the activity of public authorities as to the
pursuance of certain constitutional objectives, in relation to the compliance with international
obligations acquired by the Colombian state. On the occasion of the assessment of the normative
value of international treaties within the internal legal order, the tribunal pointed out that the
foundation of the international order to which Colombia recognized legitimacy rested in the
concept of consensus (pacta sunt servanda).180 As a result, the Court pointed out that public
authorities were deemed to apply domestic law in a way that the international compromises
assumed by the state could be honoured as much as possible.181 Furthermore, the Court considered
that the breach of an international obligation might entail the impact of Colombian citizens’ rights
before other states.182 However, it also noted that in case of tensions between international
obligations and domestic law, there should be efforts to harmonize the undisputable supremacy of
the constitutional project with the obligatory nature of the compromises assumed by the state as a
subject of international law.183 A vision of absolute state sovereignty was displaced to introduce a
governance perspective that looked beyond the state.
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In Decision T-247/2010, the Constitutional Court identified the existence of a global normative process in the
expansion of corporate social responsibility in Colombia, and referred to the consequent implications for the CCO. In
that regard, it gave an account of the concept, presented the evolution of certain international legal initiatives proposed
around the need to regulate the behaviour of private economic actors – prominently the United Nation’s Global
Compact –, and denoted that in spite of its non-binding nature, corporate social responsibility could be directly
identified with a number of principles and values constitutive of the CCO, including solidarity and the SRLS formula.
See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia T-247/2010. M.P. Humberto Antonio Sierra
Porto.
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-319/1994. M.P. Hernando Herrera Vergara.
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-400/1998 M.P. Alejandro Martínez
Caballero; Sentencia C-155/2007. M.P. Álvaro Tafur Galvis.
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-492/1998 M.P. Fabio Morón Díaz.
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-269/2014. M.P. Mauricio González Cuervo.
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B. Human rights and other social-oriented issues
The aim to place Colombia on a strategic position within the international community had
particular effects on the content and scope of the country’s sovereignty paradigm and its associated
prerogatives. In the same way, the recognition of the prevalence of human rights law and
international humanitarian law within the domestic legal order has progressively shaped the
configuration and structure of the CCO. In fact, the Constitution provides for the domestic priority
of international agreements that include provisions in these areas,184 such as the sui generis
provision according to which the catalogue of rights and liberties acknowledged by the state on
behalf of its citizens transcended the constitutional and international conventional texts.185 As a
result, the Colombian Constitutional Order was designed as a structure oriented to promote and
protect both the individual and the collective dimensions of the person. In this regard, as the
relation between public authorities and the people subject to their jurisdiction is regulated, the
exercise of public power is oriented in accordance with the particular needs of Colombian society.
The Constitutional Court elaborated a line of precedent on the nature and extent of the
abovementioned prevalence of international human rights treaties in the context of the CCO.
Particularly, it interpreted the domestic priority of these legal instruments as an indication of the
existence of a “constitutionality block”. This legal concept, imported from the French legal system,
was developed by the French Conseil d’Etat to preserve the applicability and legal force of certain
constitutional texts originally included in outdated constitutions. In the case of Colombia, the

“International treaties and agreements ratified by Congress that recognize human rights and prohibit their limitation
in states of emergency have domestic priority. The rights and duties mentioned in this Charter will be interpreted in
accordance with international treaties on human rights ratified by Colombia.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA.
Constitución Política, 1991, art. 93
185
“The enunciation of the rights and guarantees contained in the Constitution and in international agreements in effect
should not be understood as a negation of others which, being inherent to the human being, are not expressly mentioned
in them.” REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 94.
184
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Constitutional Court has used the constitutionality block for two purposes. On the one hand, to
integrate a constellation of principles and norms which, although not formally inserted within the
Constitution, own a distinct status within the legal order’s hierarchy because of their connection
with the most essential individual and collective human entitlements and should therefore be
considered for the purposes of judicial review.186 On the other hand, to open the CCO to receive
the direct influence of supranational normative elements associated with the same purpose that in
principle would not be deemed as valid sources of law. In that regard, the Constitutional Court has
in many occasions interpreted the constitutional charter from the standpoint of the case law
produced by the Inter-American Human Rights System, whose rationale was adopted to solve
cases of collision between public and private interests.187 Likewise, it directly applied legal
instruments whose “soft-law” nature would in principle prevent their suitableness to support a
decision on the matter.188
Finally, the transformation of state sovereignty in favor of the protection of human rights is
plausible in the context of the country’s indigenous peoples189 and Afro-Colombian
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See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-033/1993. M.P. Alejandro Martínez
Caballero; Sentencia C-225/1995. M.P. Alejandro Martínez Caballero
187
For instance, see Sentencia C-540/2012 (using the jurisprudence of Inter Inter-American Court of Human Rights
concerning intelligence and counter-intelligence activities in the context of the constitutional right to privacy);
Sentencia C-620/2011 (interpreting the role of the state in the initiation of criminal proceeding in cases of forced
disappearance as established by the Inter-American Human System); Sentencia T-653/2012 (affirming the binding
character of the decisions uttered by international human rights tribunals, Thus pointing out that the domestic
authorities in charge of their effective implementation can not pose internal law arguments to justify a delay in their
task).
188
For instance, see Sentencia T-327/2001 (the Court declared that the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement belonged to the constitutionality block and consequently used them to define the duties of public
authorities on the matter); Sentencia C-540/2007 (stating that although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
not a treaty, it is part of the constitutionality block due to its historical relevance and substantive content); Sentencia
C-1490/2000 (recognizing that a Community Decision passed by the Andean Community of Nations had
constitutional status as it regulated the protection of authors’ moral and patrimonial rights).
189
“The authorities of the indigenous [Indian] peoples may exercise their jurisdictional functions within their territorial
jurisdiction in accordance with their own laws and procedures as long as these are not contrary to the Constitution and
the laws of the Republic. The law will establish the forms of coordination of this special jurisdiction with the national
judicial system.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, Article 246. “Departments,
districts, municipalities, and indigenous reservations are territorial entities.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA.
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communities190. In a number of political, economic and social issues, the Constitution provided a
certain level of governance autonomy to the ethnic groups located within the country. This
prerogative has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court through the enforcement of particular
collective rights to these communities, and by means of the recognition of their right to participate
actively in the decisions that could affect their self-determination, territory, and existence as a
diverse cultural enclave.
V.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the Colombian Constitutional Order. By illustrating
the CCO’s content and scope, it provided a normative reference point for the elaboration of the
genealogic accounts of the transnational legal processes that, according to this dissertation’s main
contention, are under tension (see Chapter Three and Chapter Four). Further, the CCO will be used
as an analytical framework for the characterization and analysis of the normative collision that is
supposedly taking place between the legal protection of foreign investment through the systematic
conclusion of international investment agreements, and the implementation of transitional justice
transformative regulatory measures (Chapter Five).
The illustration of the Colombian Constitutional Order brought up a number of conclusions. The
CCO’s social peace function encompasses the recognition of the diverse and inherently conflictual
Constitución Política. 1991, art. 286. “In accordance with the Constitution and the laws, the indigenous territories will
be governed by the councils formed and regulated according to the uses and customs of their communities. The
exploitation of the natural resources in the indigenous territories will be done without impairing the cultural, social,
and economic integrity of the indigenous communities. In the decisions adopted with respect to this exploitation, the
Government will encourage the participation of the representatives of the respective communities.” REPÚBLICA DE
COLOMBIA. Constitución Política. 1991, art. 330.
190
“Within the two (2) years following the entry into force of the present Constitution, Congress will issue, following
a study by a special commission created by the government for that purpose, a law which will recognize the black
communities which have come to occupy uncultivated lands in the rural zones adjoining the rivers of the Pacific
Basin, in accordance with their traditional cultivation practices and the right to collective property over the areas which
the same law must also demarcate.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, Transitory
Article 55. This transitory article gave birth to Law 70 of 1993, which developed an autonomy regime on behalf of
these communities.
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nature of Colombian society. As a democratic amplification pact, it was designed to embrace a
multiplicity of normative rationales and find a way to articulate them around a national project. In
this way, the Constitutional Order aims to create the conditions to settle the complex conflicts that
have jeopardized the very continuity of the Colombian state under the framework of "equality of
differences" principle. While at first sight it might look like an internally fragmented order, the
various interests comprised by the country’s legal regime are balanced by a formula that was
specifically included to orient the relations between the public and private spheres: the social rule
of law. In this context, the Colombian Constitutional Court has performed a fundamental role in
adapting such formula to the particularities of the country’s socioeconomic order. The result is the
inclusion and development of the “social market economy” and “social function of property”
concepts within the constitutional debates over the dialogue between economic freedom and state
intervention. In that regard, the aspirational message that is sent by the CCO is that in the context
of a liberal matrix and a market economy, it is possible to achieve a less unequal society in which
power and resources are fairly distributed.
Equally relevant, it was found that the CCO was provided with a global scope. Globalization
entails the intensification of transnational relations and the emergence of a variety of actors that
permanently interact with the state in the realm of governance and regulation. Therefore, the
Constitution contains specific tools to assimilate these novelties and incorporate these global
forces into its normative order. Thus, an absolute account of state sovereignty is transformed into
a relative and functional attribute, which not only serves the purposes of a global market economy
but also aims to incorporate human rights and other socially-inspired standards into the country’s
legal order and social relations.
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Chapter Three: The Genealogy of the Protection of Foreign Investment through
International Investment Agreements in Colombia
I.

Introduction

This chapter provides a genealogical analysis to elucidate how and to what extent the adoption of
a legal regime for the promotion and protection of foreign investment by means of the systematic
negotiation of international investment agreements (IIAs) became a primary policy for the
achievement of Colombia’s socioeconomic objectives. This exercise is conducted in accordance
with the country’s Constitutional Order, which for the purpose of this dissertation is envisaged as
both an analytical framework and a normative reference point.191 Thus, the primary objective of
this chapter is to provide an in-depth illustration of the process through which this instance of
transnational legality was incorporated into the country’s legal order. Further, this genealogical
exercise will help to unveil the normative rationales embedded in the public policy. These
outcomes will contribute to the articulation of the dissertation’s main contention: that the
safeguards offered to foreign investors may constrain Colombia’s sovereign choices as to the
implementation of a transitional justice project through public regulation.
In order to identify the normative rationales which are part of this transnational legal process, the
chapter presents its progressive assimilation in Colombia in three stages. Each of these phases
represent a political-legal step taken by the state towards the effective internalization of the IIAs
negotiation as a primary policy to attain socioeconomic development. In the first stage, the
attraction of foreign investment was acknowledged as a relevant component for the
accomplishment of a profound economic liberalization program, denominated apertura
económica. In the second stage, the negotiation of international investment agreements emerged
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See Chapter One: The Colombian Constitutional Order.
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as primary tools for the country to attract foreign capital, and a number of institutional adjustments
had to be adopted for their effective implementation. Further, in the third phase, this policy
consolidated in the context of the stress between the tendency to limit the state’s regulatory
capacity as a means of protecting foreign investors, and the advent of concerns as to the system’s
social and environmental sustainability. Given this framework, the pertinent normative rationales
will be decoded through a detailed examination of the legal and policy pieces – international
agreements, public policies, domestic laws, and judicial decisions – that were produced on the
occasion of each of these landmark phases. Finally, special attention will be placed on their
incorporation into the Colombian Constitutional Order.
This chapter has been divided into four sections. Section I provides the legal antecedents and the
intellectual history on the visualization of foreign investment attraction as essential for achieving
Colombia’s socioeconomic development. Subsequently, Section II relates to how the negotiation
of IIAs became the primary mechanism to attract transnational capital in the country. Particularly,
it presents a number of institutional adjustments that were carried out to facilitate the
implementation of the agreements. Next, Section III focuses on the evolution of the IIAs
negotiation policy from the standpoint of the effective protection of foreign investors from the
activity of public authorities. In this regard, it emphasises the challenges that the state’s regulatory
capacity assumed on the occasion of the internalization of foreign investment protection as a public
interest, and the subsequent effects that this assumption generated on the domestic legal order and
the country’s governance dynamics. To conclude, Section IV summarizes the normative rationales
apprehended throughout the chapter and formulates a number of initial conclusions concerning the
way in which this transnational legal process has shaped the structure and role of the Colombian
state as a regulatory authority.
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II.

Foreign investment attraction as a primary economic policy in Colombia

A. Antecedents and ideological context
The consolidation of a policy on the negotiation of International Investment Agreements in
Colombia took place in the context of a normative shift in the country’s Constitutional Order. As
related in Chapter Two, the 1991 Constitution embedded in an economic model that moved from
a closed orientation to one with a marked neoliberal character. In this regard, foreign investment
acquired political recognition as an economic dynamic whose adoption was inexorable for the
accomplishment of the country’s developmental aims. This Section intends to illustrate the process
through which this political acknowledgement occurred. In order to do so, it emphasises its greatest
outcome: a domestic legal environment that was set up to encourage the arrival of foreign capital,
which created the initial conditions for the ulterior conclusion of IIAs. This exercise entails the
apprehension of the ideological antecedents surrounding the adoption of the policy, and the
identification of the various – domestic, international, public and private – elements whose
complex interaction promoted Colombia’s commitment with the systematic negotiation of IIAs.
In 1990, a constituent assembly was deliberating a new political charter in Colombia. In parallel,
a government with strong neoliberal beliefs came into power with the intent of producing drastic
modifications to the country’s economic model, through the adoption of a comprehensive package
of structural reforms. These are referred to as apertura económica. This policy aimed to replace
the close vision of the economy that the country had maintained for more than 50 years. Between
1930 and the end of the 1980s, Colombia maintained a relatively closed economy through an
import-substitution policy, a direct control of the payments balance and the proliferation of
additional tariff and non-tariff barriers to free trade and investment. In this regard, it was argued
that the effective change of economic paradigm depended on the reduction of the state’s
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involvement in the governance of domestic economic affairs; on the expanding of the role of
private actors and market forces; and on access to the global economic system. While the 1991
Constitution provided public authorities with interventionist prerogatives to comply with the
country’s social goals, it adopted an open economic model. Accordingly, the government can
adopt any economic archetype to comply with the country’s public goals as long as such a model
is framed within the constitutional normativity, so there were no major problems with
implementing apertura económica.192
Until the emergence of apertura económica the internationalization of economic relations was
generally implemented in an erratic way by the Colombian governments. In particular, the idea
that the attraction of foreign investment was a convenient policy for the interests of Colombia was
subject to variable consideration by public authorities. In the context of diplomatic inter-state
relations and the constitutional protection of the rights of non-nationals, capital mobility was
depicted as a practice implicitly accepted, due to its intrinsic relation with human mobility and the
observation of the principle of reciprocity.193 Eventually, foreign investment was considered as a
regional interest in the realm of the Andean Community (CAN),194 and was addressed by domestic
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The economic analyst and academic José Antonio Ocampo support the view that, although the Constitution and
apertura share some elements, the national development plan introducing such policy refers to principles and values
embedded in the Constitution as normative justifications for the shift of the country’s economic model –, a careful
analysis indicates that they have radically different conceptions on the direction that state reform should have taken.
See OCAMPO, José Antonio. “Reforma del estado y desarrollo económico y social en Colombia.” Análisis político
Vol. 17 (1992), p. 11-12.
193
Although the implementation of incentives to immigration was not as prolific as in the case of other Latin American
countries, the conclusion of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties among Colombia and the most industrialized
countries (the European Nations, United States and Canada, between 1820-1940) facilitated the arrival of foreigners
and their capital to the country, mainly dedicated to conduct economic activities around commerce, the building of
infrastructure and the extractions of natural resources. Such agreements provided for reciprocal protection of nonnational’s personhood and property, including the assumption of certain behavioral duties by the state parties and the
possibility to settle disputes through arbitral procedures, thus reminding the current content of international investment
agreements. Likewise, Colombian constitutions generally maintained the provision for an equal treatment of nationals
and aliens by public authorities and according to domestic laws. As inter-state relations became a matter of more
technical regulation, such instruments became obsolete.
194
Established in 1969, the Andean group (later on denominated Andean Community or CAN) envisaged the entry of
foreign investment to the region as a shared interest, as annotated in art. 24 of CAN’s constitutive agreement, which
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laws dealing with technical aspects related to the management of foreign exchange and trade.195
In any case, it is clear that the flows of foreign investment never represented a substantial economic
dynamic for Colombia until the 1990s.196
The illustration of apertura económica’s main ideas provide key elements for understanding why
and under which terms the attraction of foreign investment acquired normative relevance in
Colombia. The conceptual foundation of the policy is embedded in the Colombian national
development plan 1990-1994, according to which the deep socioeconomic gaps affecting the
country were not structural issues but the consequence of a closed and inefficient economic model
that had been applied since the 1930s.197 Therefore, it was claimed that the Colombian institutional

refers to the creation of a common system for the treatment of foreign capital. In 1970, the enactment of community
decision 24 installed a restrictive regime that reflected an arguable unfriendly attitude toward USA companies assumed
by various Latin American governments. In 1987, the community abandoned such orientation through community
decision 220, which brought more flexibility to the reception of foreign investment. Finally, in 1991 community
decision 291 advocated for the liberalization of foreign investment in the region through policies such as the
elimination of any distinction between domestic and foreign investment and removal of limits to profit remittances.
See SHERMAN, Gail. “Colombian Political Bases of the Andean Pact Statute on Foreign Capital.” 1 Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Vol. 15 (1973), 111-120; DAVINOBIC, Tomislavo. “Foreign Investment
Politics and International Law.” Lawyer of the Americas Vol. 3 (1973), 10-15.
195
The issue was firstly addressed in 1951 by decree 165 –the country’s statute on foreign exchange and trade–, that
granted relative openness to the entry and establishment of foreign investment and was partially inspired in the
“Guidelines on Laws and Administrative Procedures of Host Countries”, document issued at the Third International
Bar Association Conference that took place in London, 1950. Later on, as a way to confront the 1967 crisis on the
payments balance, a new foreign exchange statute was issued (decree 444) and the scope on the hosting of foreign
capital changed through the establishment of strong controls, including the requirement of authorization by the
National Planning Department. The government’s protectionist attitude reached its highest point on 1975, when a
norm (law 75) forbidding the entry of foreign investment for the financial sector was passed by the Congress. See
LITTEL, Norman. “Improvements in Legal Climate Investments Abroad.” Virginia Law Review Vol. 38 (1952), 729745; SOLAUN, Mauricio & CEPEDA, Fernando. “Political and Legal Challenges to Foreign Direct Private
Investment in Colombia.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Vol. 15 (1973), 77-101.
196
Foreigners occasionally performed an important role in the development of certain sectors of the economy such as
transportation – fluvial navigation and air carriage, infrastructure – a number of key civil engineering projects, and
the beer industry.
197
The previous economic model was localized in the context of a number of ideas that were considered as fallacies
by the National Development Plan: the conflictual relation between capital accumulation and capital distribution; the
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economic apparatus should be “turned upside-down” through the implementation of an alternative
economic paradigm which would suppose an opening to the global realm, and an opportunity for
private actors to assume a central role in the country’s modernization and growth. This, in turn,
would require the modification of the role of the state in the governance of economic affairs and
its regulatory capacity.198 Therefore, it was pointed out that one of the actions required in
implementing this new economic approach was to develop suitable conditions for stable flows of
international trade and investment.
B. First policy outcomes associated with the attraction of foreign investment
The particular policy outcomes of apertura económica took no time to emerge. Following the
mandate of the national development plan, several public policy documents were issued. Conpes
documents 2490 and 2572 sketched a favorable domestic legal regime for the promotion and
treatment of foreign investment.199 Accordingly, capital mobility was depicted as a fundamental
element within the country’s constitutional internationalization and integration aspirations, which
were part of the Country’s Constitutional Order and promoted economic growth.200 In this regard,
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it was asserted that since the attainment of alternative financial resources and technology could
increase the internal levels of international trade and employment, the domestic market had to
become a competitive player at the global level to attract significant foreign investment. Thus, this
level of competitiveness depended on the implementation of policy and regulatory adjustments to
liberalize the rules concerning access, treatment, and protection of foreign investors, and especially
their property rights.201 Consequently, two types of norms were proposed: rules governing the
entry of transnational capital into the country,202 and rules directed at consolidating the equal
treatment of foreign investors with respect to the national industry.203
The change of the state’s economic paradigm carried out by the government in 1990 was mainly
the result of the impulse given by domestic public policies. Yet, their issuance was connected to
the adoption of a structural adjustment program by the late 1980s, mainly promoted the World
Bank and the IMF.204 Under widespread conditions of a capitalist production crisis and an
associated fiscal crisis in the region, the program sought to promote the conduct of profound
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regulatory reforms at the domestic level as a condicio sine qua non for the provision of loans,
urgently required to deal with economic turmoil.205 In this context, in 1990, Colombia concluded
an agreement with the IMF to formalize the granting of loans under the condition of implementing
a number of legal reforms including the reduction of tariffs, the relaxation of labor conditions, and
the liberalization of the capital market.206 Likewise, the agreement included a commitment to
enabling private agents to play a greater role in the economy and therefore enhance overall
efficiency and productivity.207 While it is perhaps difficult to affirm that this initiative solely and
directly conducted the attraction of foreign investment as an inexorable economic policy, it
certainly influenced the regulatory changes that were subsequently produced. Most importantly,
the agreement contributed to the creation of a proper atmosphere for the arrival and establishment
of foreign capital.
As a result of these public policy processes, the Colombian Congress passed a new foreign
exchange statute that established the foundations for the production of a drastic shift from the
erratic attitude of prior governments with respect to the entry of foreign capital in the country.208
In particular, the norm modified restrictive practices on foreign exchange through the
simplification of the procedures governing access of foreign capital to the country and their
regulation once in operation. Moreover, the new statute delegated to the executive branch the
issuance of an autonomous statute on foreign investment, which was enacted in late 1991,209
according to which a favorable scope on the mobility of capital was adopted.
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At this point, the association of a policy objective with a number of constitutional postulates –
internationalization, regional integration, and economic growth – was key in the creation of a
conviction to the identification of foreign investment as a crucial economic dynamic in Colombia.
In the context of apertura económica, this process crystallized in a domestic legal regime designed
to offer favorable conditions to foreign investors by means of granting them advantages and
operational incentives. In this regard, the state acquired particular compromises in relation to the
fostering of such benefits to foreign investors by lifting excessive controls over both the influx of
capital and the conduct of foreign exchange operations. Further, it produced regulatory actions to
guarantee equal conditions of operation to foreign investors. Yet, as will be explained in the
following section, the emergence of a domestic legal regime favorable to foreign investors should
be regarded as simply the starting point for further development of a public policy on the
systematic conclusion of IIAs.
III.

The rise of International investment agreements as a primary mechanism to attract
foreign investment.

A. The emergence of international investment agreements
At the outset of the 1990s, Colombia was one of many countries that was considering the arrival
of transnational businesses and the extraction of their resources as a feasible alternative to
invigorate its fragile economy. In fact, many states with comparable features shared this view and
similarly advanced in the modification of their domestic legal frameworks to attract foreign
investment. In this regard, the public policy documents enacted on the occasion of apertura
económica suggested that the domestic reforms that derived into the enactment of a foreign
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investment statute should be supplemented by an international diplomatic initiative to incentivise
the entry of foreign capital.210
In response, Colombia started negotiating international investment agreements in 1992 at both the
regional and international levels.211 Although the country had negotiated an IIA with Germany as
early as 1965, this agreement was never incorporated into the country’s internal legal order.
Colombia had been attentive to join early multilateral initiatives to regulate the protection of
foreign investment, such as the one sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)212, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).213 However, the
negotiations that led to the conclusion of the first group of IIAs ultimately started in the 1990s,
and were mainly conducted in the context of a regional integration process with Venezuela and
Mexico.214 On the other hand, a block of bilateral treaties were also concluded with the United
Kingdom,215 Peru,216 Cuba,217 and Spain.218 At the regional level, what was initially considered an
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integration process exclusively oriented at creating a free trade zone, was transformed into a more
complex economic initiative. Due to its experience with the NAFTA agreement, Mexico proposed
to enlarge the scope of this initiative by including provisions relative to the management of foreign
investment.219 In turn, the negotiations towards the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties were
justified by factors like, for example, the desire to advance on the process of integration with
neighbouring countries, Peru and Cuba, the existence of strong historical and cultural ties with
Spain, and the undisputable potential of bringing British capital to the country.
This policy approach was principally grounded in the perception that the massive influx of foreign
capital would increase the country’s level of economic growth. Therefore, in order to facilitate
such inflow, the country should become a competitive global economic player through the
adoption of a more aggressive internationalization strategy, that attended to the constitutional
principle of internationalization of economic relations, and was founded in the systematic
negotiation of IIAs.220 From a political economy perspective, this approach resembles the idea of
a market of scarce resources that are to be distributed among many prospective recipients, which
recognize each other as competitors in the race for assuring the optimal arrival of investment flows.
As a consequence, countries like Colombia develop competitive advantages to encourage foreign
investors to establish in their jurisdiction, and in so doing gain preferential access to capital. In this
context, the generation of effective competitive advantages depends on two elements. Firstly, the
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nature of the decision-makers: foreign investors. They are transnational private entities that are
incorporated in a certain “home country”, and whose social object is the conduct of a lucrative
economic activity in a “host country”. Secondly, transnational capital mobility is framed within
the political context of international relations, which from a legal point of view refers to
international investment law. In turn, IIAs entail the compromise that foreign investors will be
protected from the potential risks that might affect their interests, including those that might be
caused by the acts of the state. This commitment leads to the generation of expectations toward
foreign investors as to the conduct of public authorities, which should not interfere with the
economic enterprise of foreign investors. In other words, the competitive advantages that countries
like Colombia seek to acquire from the conclusion of IIAs are materialized in a stable and
predictable environment of operation, that allows foreign investors to foresee the rules and
conditions under which they conduct an economic activity. This environment is built on the
imposition of behavioral standards on the state, and is articulated and legitimized on the basis of
inter-state reciprocity.
B. Institutional adjustments to assure the effective implementation of IIAs
During the first IIA negotiations, the Colombian state faced a number of structural issues that had
to be addressed in order to allow the effective articulation of the policy. For example, the country
had conducted important regulatory reforms at the domestic level with the purpose of facilitating
the entry of foreign capital to the country. Yet, the transnational nature of the phenomenon covered
by the agreements required the implementation of further legal adjustments to enable the
effectiveness of the compromises made by Colombia, insofar as the obligations included in the
IIAs could be enforceable. On the one hand, the country had not joined the Multilateral Investment
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Guarantee Agency (hereinafter MIGA221) and the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (hereinafter ICSID222) conventions. These are legal initiatives sponsored by
the World Bank Group that set up a supranational institutional framework for the management of
a number of aspects gravitating around the relations between host states and foreign investors.
Additionally, the CCO was not in line with the legal protection of foreign investment offered by
the IIAs. A number of constitutional provisions appeared to be in conflict with certain international
standards included in the agreements negotiated. Particularly, there were inconsistencies in the
context of the protection of foreign investors’ property rights from expropriation. Thus, the
effective articulation of the compromises assumed at the inter-state level required the state closing
up to the global legal pattern of establishing supranational institutions and rules as a way to gain
legal uniformity.
With regards to the first type of legal adjustments, both international legal instruments included
elements to support the arrival of foreign investors to Colombia, and the protection of their interests
upon the occurrence of negative impacts on their rights. While MIGA provides insurance to foreign
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capital operating in a member country from non-commercial risks,

223

the ICSID convention

establishes a dispute-settlement mechanism to solve prospective disputes which occur within the
orbit of influence of the IIAs.224 As a country with a variable economic performance immersed in
a long-term armed conflict, Colombia considered the subscription to MIGA as an opportunity to
expand positive expectations on prospective investors. Therefore, the country adhered to the
convention in October 1992 and concluded the ICSID convention in May 1993 because it
increasingly assumed a central role in the enforcement of the behavioural standards embedded in
the IIAs.
In the subsequent review of the laws that incorporated these treaties into the domestic legal order,
the Constitutional Court addressed a number of issues that speak about the challenges that the
protection to foreign investment via IIAs poses to the nature of the state and its performance as a
sovereign authority. In both cases, the Court manifested that the laws that incorporated the treaties
were in accordance with the CCO because of the exceptional constitutional authorization to
transfer public attributions to supranational entities, under the basis of equity, reciprocity, and
national convenience.225 However, with regards to the ICSID convention, the Court had to address
the question of the treaty’s potential to affect the sovereignty of the state by displacing the domestic
judiciary in the settlement of disputes taking place within the country’s jurisdiction. Thus, the
Court depicted arbitration as an alternative mechanism to settle social conflicts, that was linked
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with the CCO through its identification with the aim of peaceful coexistence. It located the
convenience of adopting this mechanism in its efficiency and dynamic nature. In that regard, the
Court said that arbitration provides more equitable and reasonable decisions than the domestic
judiciary, due to the technical complexity attributed to the conflicts stemming from the relation
between the state and foreign investors.226 Yet, the Court felt compelled to develop an
argumentative position over the ambivalent implications of investor-state arbitration on the
country’s sovereignty. It considered foreign investors to be subjects of international law, with legal
capacity to appear before an international tribunal,227 and justified the need to promote a
convenient depoliticization of the investor-state legal relations by means of their dissociation from
inter-state diplomatic relations.228 These decisions cleared the path for the continuation of IIA
negotiations from 1997 onwards.
All in all, the institutional adjustments produced during the first phase of the negotiation of IIAs
by Colombia went to the heart of the Constitution. It was the result of a structural tension generated
by an incompatibility between the content of the agreements and certain portions of the CCO, as
to the social function of property.229 This stress derived from the protection of the property rights
of foreign investors from the public action of the state, in the context of direct expropriation.230 On
the occasion of the examination of the first set of IIAs entered into by the country between 1995
and 1998, and prior to their implementation in the domestic legal order, the Colombian
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Constitutional Court noted that a number of provisions included in the treaties were contrary to
the Constitution’s property clause.231 In particular, the Tribunal acknowledged that the IIAs strictly
prohibited the parties to implement a type of regulatory action that was otherwise authorized by
the Colombian Charter: the expropriation for reasons of equity, not subject to judicial review or
the payment of any compensation.232 In that respect, the Court argued that to be admitted the
treaty’s expropriation provision as a valid exception to the rule embedded in the Constitution, a
preferential treatment would be endorsed to the investors from the state with which Colombia had
concluded the treaty. As a consequence, this provision was found to be discriminatory for investors
from both Colombia and other countries.233 Therefore, the tribunal ruled that the IIAs were
partially unconstitutional since the provisions on expropriation overlooked the constitutional
authorization of expropriation without compensation.234 As a result, the definitive application of
the IIAs was left in a legal vacuum.235 According to David Schneiderman, the Colombian
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Constitutional Court undertook a decisive initiative to counter the disruptive effects of the global
economic strategy procured by the government.236
Yet, the executive branch reacted strongly to the decision issued by the Constitutional Court, since
it was the authority in charge of the IIAs negotiation policy. In November 1997, Conpes issued a
public policy document with the purpose of reiterating the strategic role of foreign investment for
the country’s economic growth. In this regard, it suggested that the constitution had to be amended
in order to eliminate the state’s prerogative to conduct non-compensated expropriations for reasons
of equity. It was argued that maintaining the regulatory warrant would prevent the country from
concluding IIAs and thus attracting transnational capital, because it would lose competitiveness in
relation to other states that had adapted their domestic legal frameworks to the international
standard, or Hull formula.237 Therefore, in 1999, the executive branch introduced an amendment
petition before the Congress, which eventually resulted in the modification of the property clause
and the removal of the regulatory prerogative from the CCO.238 With the constitutional question
solved, the IIA negotiation policy could now be consolidated.
These legal adjustments occurred on the occasion of the first set of IIAs negotiations in which
Colombia took part. They reveal the contentious nature of the process that led to the incorporation
of this policy into the CCO. Given the particular nature of the phenomenon under regulation, the
need to secure the efficient operation of the IIAs that had been negotiated required the affiliation
of the state to supranational institutions. This entailed the transfer of certain sovereign prerogatives
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and the modification of its constitutional setting. These measures were adopted to avoid
prospective normative tensions with respect to the protection of the interests of foreign investors,
and in relation to the regulatory activity of public authorities. In this process, the Constitutional
Court performed a decisive yet ambivalent role. On the one hand, it legitimized the new
supranational memberships by means of their identification with certain constitutional norms. In
contrast, the Court performed as a gendarme to deal with the irruption of international standards
that could preclude the state’s sovereign prerogatives and the validity of its social regulatory
function. In the latter case, while the Court tried to oppose resistance to the advancement of the
economic globalization project due to its apparent incompatibility with the CCO, the political
response from the executive branch was emphatic. With the acquiescence of the legislative
authorities, the Constitution was amended.
From the analysis of this stage of the process that consolidated the negotiation of IIAs as a primary
socioeconomic policy in Colombia, an important insight associated with the normative rationale
embedded in these legal instruments is unveiled. In a country that has adopted foreign investment
as a relevant factor for the success of its economic model, sovereignty can only be fully defended
through a political economy that reconciles the national needs and interests with the inexorable
tendency toward the internationalization of the economy.239 This rationale entails, in consequence,
a depiction of the state’s limited governance role. In order to consolidate a legal climate which
attracts the arrival of foreign investment, the state seems to be compelled to accept the progressive
standardization of its sovereign prerogatives for the sake of legal uniformity, predictability, and
stability.
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IV.

Consolidation the IIA negotiation policy

A. IIA negotiations, trends and policy guidelines
As a consequence of the institutional adjustments produced in the aftermath of the first IIA
negotiations entered into by Colombia, by the year 2000, this policy had been released from a
number of limitations that problematized the effective implementation of the agreement into the
country’s Constitutional Order. The conclusion of more treaties of this kind became common
practice within the context of the country’s international economic policy. Both the transference
of public prerogatives to supranational structures, and the amendment of the 1991 Constitution in
regards of the adjustment of direct expropriation to the international standards, were effective in
facilitating the operation of the system. Particularly, they promoted the routinization of the policy
practice.240
By December 2015, Colombia had entered into 22 international investment agreements; 12
bilateral investment treaties and 10 free trade agreements that include investment chapters. The
advancement of the IIAs negotiation policy reveal the country’s disposition to be identified as a
capital-importer, in the context of three negotiation pattern. The first corresponds to the aim of
attracting capital from countries such as the United States, Canada, the European Union, United
Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, Spain, and France, which have traditionally been Colombia’s main
commercial partners. The second pattern is oriented to promote the arrival of investors from
emerging economies such as China, India, Singapore, Korea, Turkey, and Israel, which have the
potential to become great sources of capital in the short term. Finally, the third pattern lies at the

Very telling of this routinization is, for instance, UNCTAD’s 2004 assessment on Colombia’s position with regards
to the promotion and protection of foreign investment: whereas the country has only one bilateral investment treaty in
effect, now that the constitutional norm on expropriation has been amended the negotiation and ratification of new
treaties should proceed. See United Nations Conference on Economic Development UNCTAD. Investment Policy
Review: Colombia. Geneva: United Nations, 2006, p. 28.
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regional level, where Colombia has successfully negotiated treaties with states sharing political
views and a compromise with economic globalization. This has taken place in the context of the
Pacific Alliance – formed by Mexico, Chile, Peru, Panama and Costa Rica – and the North
Triangle economic integration area – formed by El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.
As José Antonio Rivas, former director of the Foreign Investment Division at the Ministry of
Commerce, has noted, Colombia adopted a singular position with respect to the negotiation of IIAs
compared to the regional trend. As an emergent economy, it was one of the few states negotiating
IIAs between 2006 and 2010. This contrasts with the fact that Latin America was the region with
the highest number of investor-state arbitration cases before the ICSID in that period.241 In
contrast, countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia rejected these types of agreements by
withdrawing their membership from ICSID, or by manifesting disagreement with the scope of the
agreement after significant defeats in arbitration (for example, Argentina). For its part, Colombia
significantly increased its confidence in foreign capital as a vehicle for economic prosperity and,
consequently, on foreign investment protection via IIAs as a means to secure such resources.242
From a substantive perspective, the regularization of IIA negotiations encompassed an evolution
in the content and scope of the protection granted to foreign investors in Colombia. New public
policies on the matter promoted the advent of supplementary elements that focused on the
optimization of this safeguarding by means of the limitation of the state’s regulatory capacity. On
the other hand, concerns about social and environmental sustainability of the emerging legal
regime were progressively addressed in the context of the IIAs negotiation. In particular, three

See RIVAS, José Antonio. “Colombia”, in BROWN, Chester (Ed.) Commentaries on Selected Model Investment
Treaties. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 183.
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See MORTIMORE, Michael. Arbitraje internacional basado en cláusulas de solución de controversias entre los
inversionistas y el Estado en acuerdos internacionales de inversión: desafíos para América Latina y el Caribe. Serie
Desarrollo Productivo 188. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2009, p.8.
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legal milestones should be presented. Firstly, the introduction of safeguards from regulatory acts
of the state tantamount to expropriation. Secondly, the appearance of references, norms and
mechanisms regarding both corporate social responsibility and environmental, labor, and human
rights issues. Thirdly, the foundation of a public policy aimed at addressing prospective
international investment controversies.
B. Indirect expropriation
In the context of the first set of IIAs concluded by Colombia during the 1990s, the protection
offered to foreign investment was localized in the realm of a series of behavioral standards
provided by international law. These standards refer to either the treatment of foreign investors,
which must be fair, equitable, and competitive with respect to nationals and non-nationals from
other countries, or to their safeguard from direct expropriation, which, if produced, should be
accompanied by a prompt, adequate and effective compensation. These components were built
around the deliverance of a stable environment of operation, which is considered a site where
foreign investors can conduct their economic activity with certainty concerning both their behavior
and that of public authorities. Yet, while these standards were devoted to imposing obligations on
public authorities in order to orient their particular relation with foreign investors, they were not
strictly designed to step into the general realm of the activity of the state as a sovereign regulatory
entity. This last situation is relevant since, in fact, foreign investors may be occasionally affected
by regulatory measures. Although these measures are not directly intended to interfere with their
entitlements and expectations, they could indirectly harm their private interests while acting in the
pursuance of public goals. In response, the Colombian state followed the tendency observed
globally and started including provisions on indirect expropriation in its IIAs negotiation agenda.
These provisions address the safeguarding of foreign investors from the detrimental effects of
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public regulatory actions. Traditionally, expropriation had been visualized within IIAs as
sovereign actions comprising a formal transfer of title or outright seizure. Starting with a bilateral
investment treaty that Colombia and Chile concluded in 2000, the majority of international
investment agreements concluded by the country comprised provisions on the protection of foreign
investors from state measures that could indirectly affect their investments.243
In 2008, on the occasion of the constitutional review of the 2006 United States-Colombia free trade
agreement,244 the protection from indirect expropriation acquired connotation within the
constitutional debates around the complex interactions between the state and private economic
actors, provided that in the context of the CCO the accomplishment of the country’s political
program demanded a dynamic regulatory scheme from public authorities. 245 Unlike the broad way
in which the indirect expropriation standard was formulated in the 2000 Chile-Colombia bilateral
investment treaty (hereinafter BIT), the agreement concluded with the USA comprised a more
elaborated safeguard. Besides the inclusion of the standard, the IIA contained guidelines on the
identification of indirect expropriation cases246 and criteria for their further analysis,247 including
references to which regulatory actions of the state should not be considered as indirect takings.248
Since this agreement was formulated in a more comprehensive way, the Colombian Constitutional

243

See 2000 Chile-Colombia Bilateral Investment Treaty.
See REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-750/2008. M.P. Clara Inés Vargas
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Court found itself obliged to provide a justification concerning the validity of these type of
measures. In particular, it had to justify why a provision that could restrict the regulatory
manoeuvre of the sate, in a way that could eventually collide with the achievement of certain public
objectives, should still be considered constitutional.249 The Constitutional Court based its favorable
examination of indirect expropriation in its localization within the framework of constitutional
property clause, so as to assign normative support. In that sense, it pointed out that the provisions
on indirect expropriation should be seen as the crystallization of the private ownership safeguard,
which should be indistinctly applicable to both nationals and foreigners.250
Nevertheless, the precedent line was soon revised by the Constitutional Court. In 2009, on the
occasion of the examination of a new free trade agreement concluded between Chile and
Colombia,251 the Tribunal introduced the “legitimate expectations doctrine” to rationalize the
regulatory restrictions that public authorities might experiment by the inclusion of standards on
indirect expropriation within IIAs. Not only did the incursion of this doctrine in the constitutional
debate implied the replacement of the argumentation line that the Court had adopted in terms of
the justification of the indirect expropriation clause via the protection of property rights. It also
encompassed the crucial inclusion of the normative idea of economic freedom as a limited policy
space. The Court localized the debate around the validity of indirect expropriation in the realm of

Several interventions of different political and civil society actors, including the ones of Jorge Enrique Robledo –
a member of the Congress representing the left-oriented political party Polo Democrático – and the think tank
Dejusticia, led to the Court’s direct pronouncement on the matter, as captured by Decision C-750/08. Interestingly,
congressman Robledo was clear in signalling the disproportionate advantages that foreign investors would gain by
means of the treaty’s content and scope, particularly in case an official decision would affect their economic interests,
regardless of its public nature and purpose. Moreover, Dejusticia expressly claimed that regulatory chill might be
produced, thus undermining Colombia’s regulatory capacity and public policies on delicate issues such as access to
health service, the protection of the environment or the provision of public utilities. See REPUBLICA DE
COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-750/2008. M.P. Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, p. 53-65.
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international economic law.252 Particularly, it posed the inquiry in the context of the political
struggles between capital-importing countries adopting regulatory measures to nationalize
property owned by foreigners, and capital-exporting countries deciding to protect their citizens
from such actions by means of the development of multilateral legal initiatives.253 Additionally,
with the purpose of providing an authoritative opinion on the matter, the Court made a deferential
reference to certain famous investor-state arbitration cases to provide an illustration of certain state
regulatory measures that had been identified as indirect expropriations by these bodies.254
Having established an international economic analytical framework, the Court pointed out that any
scrutiny of indirect expropriation should transcend considerations of the protection of private
property and the primacy of general interest, as was the case with the rationale on direct
expropriation. In this case, the Court sustained that the examination had to include reflections on
the exercise of sovereign regulatory prerogatives, and the protection of legitimate interests.
Consequently, the Tribunal asserted that indirect expropriation had its constitutional foundation in

Making a rather erratic reference to Andrew Newcombe’s 1999 doctoral dissertation “When Is Government
Regulation Expropriatory and When Should Compensation Be Paid”, as well as his 2005 article “The Boundaries of
Regulatory Expropriation in International Law” (ICSID Review (2005) 20 (1): 1-57).
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COLOMBIA, Corte Constitutional. Sentencia C-031/2009. M.P. Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, p. 90-91.
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(Metalclad Corp. v. México. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97.1. Award of August 30 2001); b. the interference of a
public authority in order to cancel a contract with a foreign investor (CME v. Czech Republic. UNCITRAL Tribunal
Arbitral. Partial Award of September 13 2001.); the cancellation of a toxic waste deposit licence (Técnicas
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of excessive or arbitrary taxes carrying the impact of an investment’s economic sustainability (Revere Copper and
Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Award of August 24 1978); the annulment of a free trade
zone, generating negative spillover on importing practices (Antoine Goetz & Others and S.A. Affinage des Metaux v.
Republic of Burundi. ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2. Award of June 21 2012); the imposition of managers by the host
state (Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc., v. The Government
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the principle of legitimate expectations, which should be assimilated to a corollary of the bona fide
principle.255 The Court explained that from these principles it is derived that citizens must evolve
within a stable and predictable legal environment in which they can trust. Thus, it concluded that
the protection against indirect expropriation found its justification in the fact that public authorities
should preserve a coherent behavior in relation to their previous actions, except for the emergence
of public motivations that would encourage it to behave otherwise. In particular, it pointed out that
private economic agents should be protected from abrupt and unexpected changes produced by
regulatory actions, bearing in mind the certain and reasonable expectations they have on the
profitability of their enterprises.256
For these reasons, the Constitutional Court found that the standard of protection against indirect
expropriation included in the Chile-Colombia Free Trade Agreement did not limit in a
disproportionate way the state’s regulatory prerogatives. Yet, it warned that the eventual
application of the standard should be the result of a strict verification of its premises, due to the
fact that it could be subject to exceptions based on the protection of public interests.257 The same
position was assumed by the Court in the analysis of similar provisions that were embedded in the
IIAs that Colombia entered into with Switzerland, the North Triangle (Honduras, Guatemala and
El Salvador), Canada, China, and United Kingdom.258
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C. The emergence of social and environmental concerns
In the context of the Colombian IIA negotiation policy, the protection to foreign investment was
reinforced importantly through the inclusion of indirect expropriation standards. In parallel, the
agreements concluded by Colombia began to embed references, clauses and supplementary
accords that addressed a number of social and environmental concerns related to the type of
practices that foreign investors implemented in the development of their economic enterprise at
the signatory countries.
As explained, the logic inherent to the IIAs concluded by Colombia builds on the possibility to
establish an inter-state legal regime to provide stable and predictable conditions of operation to
foreign investors, considering the benefits that transnational capital might bring to the country’s
economy. Therefore, from the terms of the IIAs the relationship between investors and the host
state is depicted as a unilateral dynamic. While the sovereign has a number of obligations to the
foreign economic actors located within its jurisdiction, these private actors have apparently no
correlative behavioral responsibilities, beyond a generic duty to respect domestic laws. Yet, this
depiction disregards the fact that in the context of the economic activity that motivated foreign
investors to arrive in the country, adverse social and environmental impacts might be caused on
the people located within their sphere of influence and the environment itself. Under this
perspective, IIAs would seem to be unbalanced equations. While foreign investors are entitled to
occupy a privileged position in society to obtain economic profits from the execution of a
productive activity, no correlative behavioral duties are observed in relation to the social, political
and cultural surroundings.
These sort of concerns permeated the ambit of IIA negotiations worldwide. At some point, a
number of international governance fora – such as the OECD and the World Economic Forum –
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began issuing studies, policy guidelines and recommendations suggesting that states negotiating
IIAs should incorporate mechanisms to either mitigate or dissuade the occurrence of these kinds
of negative impacts within the orbit of the investor-state relationship.259 In the particular case of
Colombia, the risk around the occurrence of this kind of prospective spillovers was evident. The
country’s political instability, and the weakening of social structures that the internal armed
conflict had produced, were elements to consider as facilitators or triggers of occasional power
abuses by foreign investors. Moreover, there is evidence according to which certain foreign
investors (multinational corporations) have fomented or taken advantage of direct violence and
social inequalities to obtain territorial domination and operational privileges that materialized in
massive and systematic human rights violations.260
In this regard, in 2001 a public policy document advised the Colombian authorities involved in the
negotiation of IIAs to include labor and environmental issues in their negotiation agendas.261 As a
consequence, three of the most prominent agreements concluded by the country – the ones having
United States, Canada, and the European Union as counterparts – encompassed particular
regulatory schemes to impinge the content and scope of these international investment agreements
with this type of normative elements.

See ORTINO, Federico. “The Social Dimension of International Investment Agreements: Drafting a New BIT/MIT
Model?” OECD, VII Global Forum on International Investment, 27-28 March 2008. Retrieved from
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Lineamientos de Política Para las Negociaciones Internacionales de Acuerdos de Inversión Extranjera. Octubre 9 de
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Table 2: inclusion of social and environmental elements into international investment agreements
concluded by Colombia
International
Legal Instrument

Preamble

Institutional
Performance Duties

Colombia – USA
Free Trade
Agreement (2007)

General reference to
labor and
environmental
issues

Art. 17.6:
Cooperation activities
for promoting CSR

Colombia –
Canada Free
Trade agreement
(2008)

ColombiaEuropean Union
Free Trade
Agreement (2012)

Encourage
enterprises to
respect CSR

General reference to
sustainable
development

Art. 817: Committee
on Investment has to
promote CSR issues.

Art. 286:
Cooperation activities
for implementing
sustainable
development,
including CSR

CSR Clause

-----

Additional
mechanisms
Supplementary
agreements on
labor and
environmental
issues could be
negotiated

Art 816:
-States should
“encourage”
enterprises
-Voluntary
adoption of
internationally
recognized
standards
-On internal
policies and
practices
-Specific topics

-Side
Agreements on
labor and
environmental
issues
-Human Rights
Impact
Assessment
Mechanism

Art. 271(3) (4):
States should
“promote” CSR
through flexible
mechanisms

-Chapter on
Sustainable
Development as
integrator of
social elements
within the FTA
-Environmental
and labor clauses

Source: Direct consultation to legal instruments
In accordance with Table 2, the inclusion of social and environmental elements into the IIAs
concluded by Colombia was not uniform. Rather, it depended on the content and extent of the
measures subject to consideration, thus reflecting the contentious nature of the issue.
From the point of view of their nature, the inclusion of references in the preambles of the IIAs
suggests the intention to impinge a general influence on the interpretation and application of the
legal instruments. This can be understood as an effort to set up a tone for the interpretation of the
obligations included in the agreement. Yet, it is also clear that the effective impact of these
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references in the interpretation and application of the behavioral standards included in the IIAs
would be vague, due to the lack of specific prescriptions of the parties involved. In turn, the
agreements also encompass certain duties directed explicitly to the signatory states on two
grounds. Firstly, they request the implementation of domestic policies regarding the promotion
and protection of labor rights and the environment. Second, they command governments to
“encourage” private businesses, both national and foreign, to enact corporate social responsibility
and sustainable development practices. Whereas these actions were supposedly intended to
influence the behavior of foreign investors as to the conduct of their economic activities within the
signatory countries, the associated duties do not directly address their behavior. Therefore, it is
unclear whether they could have the capacity to influence the equation that defines the
relationships between the state and foreign investors. Not only because they are neither particular
binding commands nor directly enforceable by any kind of procedure, but also because the power
relations between the state and foreign investors seems to be unbalanced.
Prominently, in the orbit of the free trade agreement concluded between Colombia and Canada in
2008, a series of supplementary legal instruments were developed to supervise and mitigate the
potential impact of the treaty on the respective populations of the signatory countries. In this
regard, the implementation of the main international agreement was accompanied by two side
agreements on labor conditions and the protection of the environment. Likewise, an annual human
rights report mechanism was established. They reflect the continuous concerns that the
implementation of this IIA generated on both the Canadian and the Colombian social movements,
and the consequent pressure exercised on the legislative organs of the countries, with respect to
the implications of incorporating the treaty into their domestic legal orders. In the end, the eventual
inclusion of these side agreements into the realm of the Canada-Colombia FTA was the only way
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to capture the consent of the legislative bodies, responsible for its incorporation, on the occasion
of the accord’s ratification.262
D. The emergence of a system to address international investment controversies
The building of a favorable environment for the arrival of foreign investment in Colombia via the
systematic conclusion of IIAs was, at some point, acknowledged as a potential source of challenges
for Colombia at the level of its international responsibility. As explained, IIAs are structured to
guarantee investors that their entitlements and expectations will remain stable as a consequence of
the predictable behavior from the other societal actors, including public authorities. As a result,
the greatest source of enforceability of these legal instruments resides in the fact that they include
specific provisions on investor-state dispute settlement. This mechanism entitles foreign investors
to submit a case before an international arbitral tribunal when a dispute with the host country arises.
Therefore, the realization of this risk motivated the Colombian state to provide a public policy
response on the matter. Concretely, it developed a mechanism oriented towards preventing and
managing the international investment controversies which the country would incur as a
consequence of the breach of standards included in the IIAs, as to the protection of foreign
investors.
In 2010, a public policy document recognized the lack of institutional capacity to prevent and
manage the advent of international investment controversies.263 In such context, the cases
associated with the Argentinian fiscal crisis were cited as a dramatic example of what could happen

See generally, VAN HARTEN, Gus. “The Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Imbalance of the Legal Rights
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Inversión. Octubre 19 de 2010.
262

93
to Colombia from the standpoint of its financial stability and credibility within the international
community if immersed in these type of legal controversies.264 Consequently, it proposed a series
of policy guidelines to advance in the creation of an institutional mechanism to provide efficient
responses to address the legal defense of the state for these type of cases, in head of the Ministry
of Commerce. In 2011, a number of regulations on the matter established that the recently created
National Agency for the Legal Defense of the State should support the Ministry of Commerce in
the management of international investment controversies, according to the conditions included in
the international investment agreements signed by Colombia.265 However, it was not until 2012
that the issue was properly regulated. Decrees 189/2012 and 1939/2013 provided for the
objectives, principles, instances and institutional duties associated with the management of
international investment disputes. In addition, Resolution 0305/2014266 regulated the specific
procedure to be conducted by public authorities on the occasion of the emergence of controversies
of this type. As of December 2015, Colombia has never been through an investor-state arbitral
procedure. Yet, the risk of being subject to an international investment controversy is latent.
V.

Conclusions

Assuming a transnational legal approach, this chapter illustrated the process through which the
IIAs negotiation policy was adopted as a relevant mechanism for achieving socioeconomic
development in Colombia. In particular, it explored how the protection of foreign investment, as
provided by the IIAs concluded by the country, was assimilated by and incorporated into the
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Colombian Constitutional Order. In this regard, the chapter aimed to unveil the normative
rationales embedded in the emerging legal order, which is founded on the provision of conditions
of stability and predictability to foreign investors in order to promote their arrival in the country.
It was found that this legal phenomenon is in fact the consequence of complex interactions among
several actors, norms and procedures. The conjunction of particular historical, political, economic
and social elements at the domestic level, including the normative impulse of a constitutional
process, allowed a shift in the country’s economic model so as to consider foreign capital as
essential for achieving development. This led to the progressive overriding of political and
economic barriers to the arrival of foreign capital under beneficial conditions of operation. Further,
the pressure exercised by diverse transnational governance structures, compromised by the spread
of a global market economy, contributed to the depiction of foreign investors as significant agents
of economic prosperity.
This context led to the further adoption of a IIAs negotiation policy by Colombia, and the
corresponding adjustment that facilitated their effective incorporation into the CCO. Therefore,
the IIAs were presented in a way that an occasional reduction of the state’s policy space, as a
consequence of their enforcement, was assumed as a natural consequence of the application of the
constitutional principles of internationalization and integration. Moreover, the CCO was amended
in order to adapt its property clause to the nature and extent of the protection offered to foreign
investors. The resulting legal regime aims to provide a stable and predictable environment through
the protection of the rights and expectations of foreign investors from the potential harm that the
regulatory action of public authorities might cause. This includes the possibility that Colombia
could be brought before an international arbitral tribunal in order to respond to public regulatory
actions that could be amounted to direct or indirect expropriation. The eventual emergence of
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public policies oriented to address the negative effects of this transnational legal process, such as
the inclusion of references to social and environmental standards in the IIAs and the development
of a protocol for the management of investment disputes, indicate the contentious nature of this
legal phenomenon and the fragmented nature of the CCO.
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Chapter Four: The Genealogy of the Colombian Transitional Justice Project
I.

Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the nature and extent of the legal protection offered to foreign
investors in Colombia by means of the systematic conclusion of international investment
agreements, and illustrated the corresponding normative rationale. In order to continue developing
the pieces necessary for the dissertation’s analysis of the existence of a normative tension on the
grounds of access to and use of land and natural resources in the country, this chapter introduces
the transitional justice project (hereinafter TJP) that is currently being implemented in the country.
In this regard, the TJP is depicted as a transnational legal process that entails a distinctive scheme
of state regulatory activity, which is intended to achieve durable peace through the production of
profound changes within Colombian society’s socioeconomic structures, especially at the
country’s rural areas. Therefore, this chapter will first present the legal antecedents of the
Colombian transitional justice project. They indicate the progressive incorporation of a
peacebuilding function into the field, or put differently, the adoption of a preponderant role in the
creation of conditions for durable peace in a society dealing with a long-term structural conflict.
Thus, it is illustrated how this initiative acquired its distinctive features through the assimilation
of two transnational phenomena: the consolidation of an institutional human rights discourse and
the progressive embodiment of a transitional justice rationality that is in line with the state’s
normative aspirations and dynamics of intervention in relation to the resolution of the internal
armed conflict. Subsequently, the project is properly introduced through a thorough explanation
of its structure, rationale and content. The structure reflects the interaction of a series of catalyzing
forces (political background) that triggered the state’s response to the question of durable peace
(legal framework). This response includes both the proper transitional justice regulation – the
conditions required for the victims’ access to the rights to justice, truth and reparation – and the
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norms that reinforce the compromises reached by the parties in the peace process. It follows the
path of international standards in the field, but at the same time adapts to local particularities. Next,
the project’s rationale builds on the idea that both putting an end to the armed conflict and
addressing the rights of the victims, are the primary steps for a further process of reconstruction,
transformation and reconciliation, termed “post-conflict”. Finally, the content of the project echoes
the way in which the state performs as a regulatory authority to produce structural changes in
society, and a number of concluding remarks are provided.
The foremost objective of this chapter is to characterize the Colombian TJP as a prominent instance
of transnational legality that has been set up to achieve a number of objectives associated with the
country’s Constitutional Order. Importantly, this process has given birth to a distinctive scheme of
public regulatory activity that seeks to facilitate the effective intervention in social structures so as
to advance in the consecution of an effective transition towards a more just and stable society,
especially at the rural areas and with respect to the most vulnerable peoples.
II.

Legal antecedents of the Transitional Justice Project in Colombia

The transitional justice project that is currently being implemented in Colombia reflects the
evolution of the field with regard to the assumption of a more holistic understanding of conflict
dynamics. Consequently, it has distinctive characteristics compared to prior similar processes –
such as the ones in Central America, Eastern Europe and South Africa – with respect to the way
in which past human rights violations are addressed while looking forward to promote sustainable
peace.267 However, its configuration and consolidation is neither a fortuitous outcome nor an
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isolated event. The content and extent of the project has been fashioned by the spread of an
institutional discourse around the promotion, protection and respect of human rights, as well as by
the embodiment of a transitional justice rationale within the public action of state authorities. These
antecedents emerged and crystallized through the development of a specialized legal framework.
The antecedents of the Colombian transitional justice project are thus centered along two paths.
The first is the internalization and operationalization of a human rights discourse within certain
institutions with political and adjudicatory functions within the country’s governance spectre.
These actors included the victims of the conflict within their mandate and scope of intervention,
so they assumed specific roles in the promotion and protection of their rights. As such, these
institutions indirectly influenced the building of the transitional justice project. The second path
corresponds to a number of preliminary attempts to enact a legal framework to articulate a proper
transitional justice regime. In the context of the peace negotiations between the Colombian
government and a number of insurgent armed groups, these initiatives evolved from the
incorporation of disarmament, demobilization and reincorporation mechanisms, to the
development of legal devices that addressed the victim’s right to justice, truth and reparation.
A. Indirect antecedents: the influence of the human rights discourse on the recognition of the
victims and their specificities
Although it is not possible to infer a specific causal relation between human rights and transitional
justice, the consolidation of the former at the institutional discourse and practices of Colombia’s
public authorities is connected to the development of the latter. The progressive recognition of
human rights issues by several domestic and supranational fora, part of the country’s governance
spectre, contributed to making the situation of the victims of the conflict more visible and sent a
normative message to the authorities in charge of safeguarding their entitlements. In this regard,

99
two processes, in particular, should be considered; the role of the Colombian Constitutional Court
in interpreting and developing the 1991 Constitution, and the activity of the Inter-American
Human Rights System in relation to the occurrence of human rights violations in the context of the
country’s armed conflict.
1. The work of the Constitutional Court towards the enforcement of the 1991 Constitution
In 1991, a new Constitution with an aspirational character was enacted in Colombia and one of its
greatest achievements was the creation of a Constitutional Court. Under a context of political
instability and exacerbated violence, the Court undertook the task of protecting the integrity of the
new political charter and its ambitious aims. In particular, it assumed the supervision of the SRLS
formula, a programmatic principle that establishes the type of political community that Colombia
wishes to be as a nation: a social and democratic state subject to the rule of law.268
In order to make that supervision operative, since its creation in 1991 the Court embarked in a
phase of judicial activism. It systematically assumed cases stemming from the massive use of the
acción de tutela, a constitutional judicial action specifically established for the protection of
people’s human rights in Colombia.269 Further, this process made possible the production of a solid
jurisprudential block that enlightened the content and scope of the bill of rights that the 1991
Constitution had adopted. This way, the situation of the country is connected and contrasted with
the normative principles and entitlements included within the political charter.
The Court’s judicial activity concerning the situation of people internally displaced on the occasion
of the conflict has been, perhaps, the most remarkable example of the abovementioned judicial
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activism. The massive exodus of people from the rural areas to the urban settlements, produced by
the violence generated within the confrontation and motivated by a handful of strategic incentives,
led to a humanitarian emergency and a massive and systematic violation of human rights.
Particularly, a great amount of land and productive means were dispossessed.270 Although in 1997
the Congress had passed Law 387 to address the precarious situation of the victims of forced
displacement in Colombia, by 2004 this social phenomenon spun out of control, to a large extent
because of the lack of effective response from authorities. Evidencing the structural nature of the
problem, the Constitutional Court aggregated 1150 constitutional complaints and issued its most
ambitious ruling in its two decades of existence: Judgment T-025.271 This decision, and its
subsequent follow-up, should be considered a fundamental source of inspiration for the
development of the Colombian transitional justice project.
Two reasons support the previous assessment. First, Judgment T-025 contributed to making the
situation of internally displaced people visible and the relevance of the land question in rural areas.
It depicted them as victims of an armed conflict whose most basic entitlements had been affected.
In that regard, through this decision the tribunal implemented the transitional justice discourse to
characterize the situation of those affected by forced displacement.272 But more importantly, it
argued in favor of an instrumental relation between violence, displacement and land dispossession.
It claimed that forced displacement should be not be acknowledged as a consequence of massive
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and systematic human rights violations on the occasion of the conflict, but as an instrument for the
accumulation of lands and resources. Thus, the Court suggested the existence of economic motives
behind the massive exodus of people. In addition to the labor of elucidation, Judgment T-025
introduced an innovative scheme of public intervention to address the situation of internally
displaced people in Colombia. The tribunal declared the existence of an “unconstitutional state of
affairs”, whereby internal displacement was assessed as a massive and systematic violation of
human rights that required structural interventions by the authorities in charge in order to be
remedied. Consequently, the Court took on policy-making functions, which in a conventional
model of separation of powers would pertain to the legislative branch, and proceeded to allocate
resources to make effective the economic and social rights of internally displaced people. 273 This
scheme of intervention has been framed by scholarship as a case of structural injunctive
remedies.274 Given the systemic failures verified in the action of state authorities, the
Constitutional Court not only laid down a series of orders intended to produce tangible changes in
the conduct of public authorities, but formulated policies aimed at producing particular regulatory
responses.275
2. The contribution of the Inter-American Human Rights System
In the regional context, the Inter-American Human Rights System has conducted a similar task to
the one of the Constitutional Court as to the characterization of the victims of the conflict and the
implementation of structural legal remedies to address their situation. The system is a
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supranational mechanism that was established within the framework of the Organization of
American States.276 It is intended to supervise the promotion and protection of human rights in the
region. Although the system is subsidiary to the results provided by the domestic jurisdictions, it
is well established as a relevant judicial platform in the region. Particularly, the reports of the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights have contributed to shape the Colombian transitional justice project. As
supranational governance structures in the field of human rights, they have introduced valuable
insights with regard to the role of the state in guaranteeing due redress to the people whose
entitlements have been affected in the context of the conflict.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is a political and diplomatic-oriented body in
charge of monitoring the state’s performance in the promotion and protection of human rights in
the region. Several reports have addressed the situation of the victims in Colombia and pointed out
the country’s obligation to implement transformative responses to attend such circumstances. For
instance, in its 1999 report on the country, the Commission acknowledged the efforts of the
national government to address the complex and challenging reality of the internal armed conflict
by commencing a peace process with the guerrilla groups. Moreover, in reference to the peace
initiative it pointed out that its effectiveness was linked to investigating, judging, and making
reparations for human rights violations. Consequently, the Commission requested particular legal
developments to respond to violations of fundamental rights occurred in the context of the armed
conflict.277 Likewise, in its 2011 report the Commission made reference to the adoption of the
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current transitional justice initiative in Colombia. In particular, it identified the state’s recognition
of the existence of an armed conflict as the starting point of an effective process of victims’
reparation, especially towards the restitution of the lands forcibly dispossessed by the insurgent
actors. Correspondingly, it assumed the task of monitoring the implementation of both the legal
measures stemming from the TJP and the outcomes of the peace process with FARC.278
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the system’s adjudicatory organ. Therefore, it is in
charge of reviewing the conduct of the states in relation to the 1969 American Convention on
Human Rights and other regional legal instruments.279 By 2014, the Court´s jurisprudence on
Colombia had addressed 14 cases, all of them in connection with the armed conflict, in which the
state failed to protect the human rights of the people within its jurisdiction. In this regard, not only
has the regional tribunal taken the opportunity to trace important connections between the
dynamics of the conflict and human rights infringements in the country, but it has also reviewed
the transitional justice project’s accordance with its own precedent line in the grounds of victim’s
integral reparation. In a number of cases associated with massacres committed by paramilitary
forces with the acquiescence of the Government, the Court identified a causal relation between the
armed conflict and internal displacement in Colombia.280 It pointed out that the latter phenomenon
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was a source of massive and systematic infringements often associated with the economic and
social condition of the population, including their property.281 Similarly, in a 2013 case, the Court
established that Colombia’s domestic policies on reparation could be articulated as effective
substitutes to the measures that it was supposed to order as a consequence of the declaration of
state responsibility and in regards to the redress of victims.282 Further, certain collective measures
taken in the context of the transitional justice project were presented as a valid way for the state to
comply with the reparatory obligations towards the victims of the case.283
As illustrated above, the Colombian Constitutional Court and the Inter-American System of
Human Rights play an important role in the articulation of the structural causes of the country’s
internal conflict and the elucidation of the situation of the victims. Their decisions confirm the
notable influence that these institutions had in the shaping of the Colombian transitional justice
project. They contributed to the consolidation of a human rights discourse in the country’s
domestic and regional governance spheres. Furthermore, they led to the internalization of the
structural need to implement sustainable remedies which produce conditions for durable peace.
They represent a tendency related to the establishment of connections between different legal fields
and processes when a particular context requires the production of effective and innovative
answers from public authorities.
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B. Direct antecedents: towards the articulation of a transitional justice scheme
The previous section illustrates how the consolidation of the human rights discourse in the country
was fundamental in raising a greater institutional awareness around the situation of the victims of
the armed conflict and their particular needs. Equally relevant for the configuration of the
Colombian transitional justice project was the proliferation of legal devices, aimed to facilitate
peace negotiations between the government and the insurgent actors of the conflict. They promoted
the development of normative and structural elements to recognize and enforce the victim’s rights
to justice, truth and reparation, which were subsequently incorporated by the current project.
Although in principle these legal frameworks focused on offering incentives for the reincorporation of the insurgent actors to civil life, they progressively appropriated the discourse and
the objectives of transitional justice so as to articulate the rights of the victims. These legal devices
can be grouped in two milestones. The first is identified around the early attempts to introduce the
discourse associated with the protection and assistance of the people affected by the conflict, and
especially Law 418 of 1997. The second device is the enactment of Law 975 of 2005, commonly
identified as the Justice and Peace Law (hereinafter JPL), which is considered the first conscious
attempt at producing a transitional justice instrument in Colombia.
1. Early attempts to introduce the transitional justice discourse: from general amnesties to
Law 418 of 1997
By the 1980s, the armed conflict in Colombia transformed, from being considered an isolated
matter of public order in the rural areas, to becoming a serious concern for national authorities.
While guerrilla groups were gaining presence across the national territory, the nascent paramilitary
forces consolidated as major actors of the conflict due to the malicious amalgam of territorial
pretentions and drug trafficking. In this context, the achievement of peace became a central aim
for the government and an attractive launching platform for politicians.
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As a consequence, from 1982 to 1997 a series of governmental initiatives aimed to end the
hostilities between the parties of the conflict, while encouraging the demobilization of insurgents,
and establishing peace dialogues.284 These had variable results. A number of norms were enacted
between 1981 and 1985 to confer amnesties for political crimes (sedition, rebellion and riot) to the
members of the insurgency who decided to lay down arms.285 However, the fact that the granting
of amnesties did not require the disarmament of guerrillas led to the failure of prospective peace
processes, even though they initially appeared to hold enormous potential.286 On the other hand,
in 1990 the government and the M-19 guerrilla signed a comprehensive peace accord known as
the Political Pact for Peace and Democracy. The guerrilla group committed to disarmament and
reintegration into society.287 This event served as a catalyst for the promulgation of other legal
instruments that allowed the demobilization of smaller rebel groups in the following years.288
Although these primary attempts to regulate the surroundings of peace negotiations in Colombia
were conceived to respond to the need to end the conflict and provide stability, they did not directly
include components of justice, truth and reparation, proper of transitional justice. Moreover, as
proposed by Laplante and Theidon, they entailed similarities with the Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reinsertion programs (DDR289) developed by the United Nations in the
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context of peacekeeping operations.290 In that sense, the main goal of the government was to
address the concerns associated with the maintenance of public order within the country, and not
to directly secure lasting peace after the finalization of the conflict, or to address the situation of
the victims of the armed conflict.
As a result of the variable outcomes produced by these legal instruments, the considerable
expansion of the armed conflict by the mid-nineties, and the increasing presence of the human
rights discourse at several institutional scenarios, the legal initiatives to achieve peace and stability
in the country experienced a shift in their design and scope. Evidence of this was the enactment of
Law 418 in 1997. Although this norm continued addressing the armed conflict as a strict matter of
public order, it introduced an alternative perspective with regards to the normative meaning of
peace for Colombian society. In other words, law 418 established that its regulatory aim was the
provision of valuable tools to ensure the validity of the SRLS, as well as the effective observation
of the rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by the Constitution and the international
treaties approved by Colombia. It authorized the government to conduct dialogues and conclude
peace accords with insurgent groups in order to obtain definitive solutions to the armed conflict,
ensure the effective implementation of international humanitarian law and human rights, and
encourage a ceasefire and a subsequent demobilization.291 In addition, the norm was designed to
grant amnesties from all criminal investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of political crimes
to the members of the insurgent groups who chose to participate in individual or collective
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demobilizations.292 In this regard, it shared the scope of the norms previously enacted to develop
alternative criminal-oriented mechanisms to facilitate the end of conflict.293 Yet, Law 418
recognized the situation of the victims as one of the key factors to address in order to achieve peace
and stability in the country. Unlike the legal instruments that were previously enacted to address
the termination of the armed conflict, this norm went beyond the setting of DDR-oriented
measures. It sent specific instructions to several national authorities as to their duties on the
assistance of people affected by the violence occurred with the occasion of hostilities between the
actors of the internal confrontation.
In order to determine the addressees of public assistance, Law 418 included a definition of victim
that accounts for the civilian population whose life, personal integrity and property were affected
as a consequence of actions which occurred in the context of the armed conflict.294 Further, the
law indicated that the state was obliged to provide humanitarian assistance, education, and
healthcare to the victims; create housing programs directed to meet their specific requirements;
and provide financial assistance for the replacement of belongings affected by violent actions.295
In this regard, while Law 418 mostly created incentives to induce the end of the conflict, the
incorporation of the victims’ assistance component indicated the rise of a concern for the need to
balance the criminal attribution component with the requirements of justice in its retributive,
restorative, and distributive versions.
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Given their content and extent, the institutional obligations introduced by Law 418 were supported
by the application of the principle of social solidarity.296 In that regard, the Colombian
Constitutional Court has pointed out that when a person is under a situation of manifest
vulnerability and can not provide for himself, an exceptional obligation is grounded in head of the
state.297 Therefore, the role in the state in the assistance of the victims of the conflict by means of
Law 418 was not a formal recognition of the victims’ rights to justice, truth, and reparation, proper
of transitional justice. Nor did it imply the recognition of any sort of responsibility by the state,
but the plain application of the principle of social solidarity. However, it introduced the idea that
any institutional scheme to achieve durable peace should consider the situation of the victims of
the conflict, and thus altered previous considerations around the role of the state in guaranteeing
order and stability within its territory. While this norm did not include express references to
transitional justice, it certainly incorporated a number of discursive elements that resemble the
field’s normative foundations.298
2. The Justice and Peace Law: recognition of transitional justice in Colombia
Law 418 was recognized for having incorporated the victims’ rights discourse within the
Colombian legal framework on conflict resolution and peace. Yet, it is fair to acknowledge that
Law 975 of 2005 (JPL) introduced the rationality and structure proper of transitional justice,
including its transformative potential. The rise and development of the JPL is directly related to
the negotiation and dismantling of paramilitary groups that occurred under the Uribe Velez
administration, between 2002 and 2008. During the corresponding demobilization process, it
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became clear to the authorities that the nature and magnitude of the crimes committed by the
paramilitary groups exceeded the possibilities of Law 418, which was devoted to grant amnesty
for political crimes. In August 2003, The Uribe administration submitted to Congress a first draft
law, 299 which received strong critiques as to the legal instrument’s systematic unawareness of the
rights of the victims.300 In response, the government introduced a new proposal in which these
rights were included as part of the strategy to finalize the conflict and achieve peace, so the JPL
was approved by the Colombian Congress in July 2005.301
The JPL’s aim to incorporate a transitional justice scheme in Colombia was produced under a
major challenge; the continuation of hostilities in the country was accompanied by a systematic
denial by the government as to the existence of an armed conflict.302 In this context, the legal
instrument embodied, as its predecessor, a tension between the state’s political need to promote
DDR and the obligation to respect the rights of those who were harmed on the occasion of the
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armed conflict.303 The JPL sought to compensate the granting of generous exceptions for
punishment to those who committed atrocious crimes with the recognition of the rights of the
victims.304 However, compared with Law 418, the JPL brings about important new ideas regarding
the role of the state in the achievement of durable peace, and particularly on the assumption of its
obligations regarding the situation of the people affected by the conflict.
The incorporation of an extended definition of victim reflected a more comprehensive account of
the context and dynamics of the conflict. It expanded the constellation of assistance, and enlarged
particular obligations of public authorities.305 Consequently, the formal recognition of the victims’
rights to justice, truth, and reparation entailed the inclusion of a rationality of transitional justice
within the realm of institutional action.306 In this respect, the expansion of the role occurred not
only in terms of the number of people to be attended to, but also the nature of the measures to be
implemented. Notably, the JPL established a formula to conduct reparations; when it was not
possible to undertake actions oriented at returning to the situation prior to the victim’s injury
(restitution), authorities were responsible for providing monetary compensation for the damages
caused to the victim. In parallel, actions towards the re-establishment of the victim’s dignity had
to be conducted and guarantees of non-repetition should be provided.307 These components were
supplemented by collective reparation programs, oriented at recovering the institutional stability
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of the SRLS in the areas of the country that had suffered the greatest injuries and where most of
the vulnerable communities were originally located.308
However, the JPL fell short in achieving its aspiration of providing integral reparation, and
achieving restitution. In spite of the inclusion of a sophisticated rationality that determined the role
the state in ensuring the rights of the victims, the mechanisms designed to crystallize the normative
pretentions of transitional justice were either incomplete or inoperative.309 A generous formulation
of the reparatory principle contrasted with a precarious institutional design that had severe
logistical and procedural problems.310 Although the victims’ right to reparation was thoroughly
recognized, the JPL restricted its scope to the obligation that the insurgent actors had on redressing
the victims.311 Therefore, reparation was projected as a procedural incident in the context of the
alternative criminal procedure rather than an independent transitional justice component, for which
many persons were prevented from receiving redress.312 Moreover, reparation – including the
restitution of lands – rested on the surrendering of goods proceeding from illicit activities
conducted by the armed actors, and was exceptionally placed on the public budget.313 This ignored
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the dynamics of appropriation used by the insurgent groups, which included legal manoeuvres to
cleanse the illicit origin of the goods.314 In addition, the government’s denial of the existence of
an armed conflict comprised the inherent minimization of its own responsibility in addressing the
harm produced in this context.315
In the following years the gaps left by the precedent legal instruments were subject to concern by
the Colombian state. In particular, the Congress addressed the critics of the transitional justice
initiatives that had been elevated by different societal actors. In 2007, a number of congressmen
from different political movements registered a draft that intended to formulate a truly public
policy to enforce the rights of the victims.316 This proposal was not only aimed at compiling the
dispersed domestic legal instruments on the protection of victims, but included new dispositions
concerning the effective reparation of the people affected by the conflict.317 The projected bill
followed the ideological path introduced by the JPL with respect to the rights of the victims, and
intended to recognize the complexities of the Colombian conflict. Consequently, it planned to
extend protection to people affected by any of the actors of the confrontation, including the state.
Likewise, the proposal introduced mechanisms identified with the principle of patrimonial
reintegration, which aimed to guarantee the material restitution of goods whose dispossession was
a consequence of the conflict.318 Yet, in spite of the great support that the proposal had among
different sectors of Colombian society and other international actors, in July 2009, the draft was
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taken down due to both budgetary constraints manifested by the economic authorities, and the
reluctance of the Uribe administration to accept the potential attribution of state responsibility on
the grounds of transitional justice.319
The account of the early attempts to develop legal responses to the problem of violence in
Colombia revealed how the country’s national project – the establishment of a social rule of law
state – became progressively intertwined with the specific objectives of transitional justice. Under
the clear influence of the human rights discourse, transitional justice evolved from the plain
implementation of DDR strategies to the recognition of the rights of the victims as fundamental
preconditions for the achievement of durable peace. The participation of a variety of actors,
including different sectors of civil society, the international community, and other transnational
governance bodies, was transcendental to the materialization of this shift. They had a decisive
influence on the inclusion of a proper transitional justice rationality whereby the victim’s rights to
justice, truth, and reparation progressively acquired tools to become effective entitlements.
Restitution was progressively identified as the most desirable way to redress the victims, which is
explained by the fact that in the context of the Colombian conflict land and natural resources have
strategic value. Yet, the very ambitious objectives incorporated within these early legal
instruments lacked effective mechanisms to fill such expectations. The Colombian background
was not integrally depicted, to the extent that the government denied the existence of an armed
conflict for many years. Additionally, these laws lacked the ability to turn actions leading to the
enforcement of victim’s entitlements into operative measures. Thus, transitional justice still
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required the refinement of certain components and the inclusion of others to obtain a distinctive
transformative nature.
III.

The Colombian Transitional Justice Project: structure, rationale and content.

As mentioned above, in 2009 a legislative initiative that sought the enactment of domestic
regulation on the rights of the victims of the armed conflict was defeated at the Colombian
Congress. Although this outcome was attributed to budgetary restraints, the reluctance of the
government to accept the existence of an armed conflict was decisive in the voting of the initiative.
Although by that time the paramilitary groups had apparently demobilized and the guerrillas
weakened by means of strategic military actions, the conflict was far from being resolved and the
situation of the victims remained largely unattended, in spite of the application of the JPL.
After the 2010 presidential elections, Juan Manuel Santos inherited the task of finding a solution
to the armed conflict and set the foundations for durable peace. Whilst Santos was expected to
follow Uribe’s radical postulates as to the non-existence of an armed conflict and the reluctance to
find a negotiated solution, the governmental policies in that respect experienced a substantial shift.
A peace process with the guerrilla group FARC was initiated in Cuba, and a new transitional justice
law draft was presented by the government before the Congress. Unlike the past transitional justice
initiatives that either relegated the rights of the victims to the periphery or were unable to provide
effective enforcement mechanisms, this new attempt gravitated around the idea of finalizing
conflict through a negotiation so as to start a phase of reconstruction, transformation, and
reconciliation. In other words, while the enforcement of the victim’s rights to justice, truth, and
reparation was depicted as a precondition for the conduct of a legitimate peace process, the success
of the negotiations would in turn guarantee an effective transition towards a more just and stable
society.
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The significant departure from the ideological convictions and the strategic actions fiercely
defended by the Uribe government is grounded in a particular political backdrop, which triggered
the production of a legal framework. This legal ensemble turned into a comprehensive project that
brought new approaches to the strategy chosen by the government to achieve peace. The new
Colombian transitional justice initiative was oriented to emphasize the content and extent of the
rights of the victims in order to produce structural transformations in society. In doing so, the state
acquired a preponderant role in the issuance of regulatory measures to effectively enforce these
entitlements, and eventually adjust social relations with respect to the distribution of scarce
resources. The following sections will map out the Colombian transitional justice project’s
structure, corresponding rationale, and content. In order to illustrate the distinctive character of the
project, the current enterprise is depicted as a mechanism that genuinely places the victims at the
center of institutional concern through the regulatory action of the state.
A. Structure of the project
1. Political background
From a political standpoint, the Colombian TJP is founded on a number of events: the arrival of
Juan Manuel Santos to the presidency in 2010; the acceptance of the existence of an armed conflict
in Colombia by the government; and the initiation of a peace process with the guerrilla group
FARC. These elements occurred progressively and are intrinsically related. They should be
regarded as the catalyzing forces that triggered a legal response to the question of durable peace.
The election of Santos resulted in an unexpected ideological turn that promoted an alternative
acknowledgement of the country’s problems and their possible solutions. The acknowledgement
of an intrinsic relation between the conflict and socioeconomic marginalization in the country’s
national development plan sent a message that reinvigorated the role of the state in the procurement
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of the aspirational demands embedded in the country’s Constitutional Order.320 In turn, the public
recognition of the existence of an armed conflict allowed the enlargement of the transitional justice
spectrum and the legitimization of the forthcoming peace process.321 The internalization of the
structural complexities behind the conflict’s root causes led to the design of a system which was
sensitive to certain elements that were previously peripheral, such as economic violence. Also, it
exposed rural areas as the principal spaces of transitional intervention, where most of the injury to
victims took place and social imbalances were configured. Finally, the commencement of a peace
process with FARC in September 2012 led to the conclusion of a series of accords that contain
structural reform proposals, which are directly associated with the overcoming of the conflict’s
structural causes. These accords are primarily intended to produce transformations in certain social
structures to facilitate the resolution of the historical confrontation in Colombia, and assure the
circumstances necessary for durable peace. Yet, they also have an undisputable impact on the
situation of the victims. In particular, the Agrarian Accord enacted in May 2013 contains a set of
normative objectives that are expected to create the conditions for an effective reparation process.
2. Legal framework
The legal framework of the Colombian TJP can be framed in two categories. The first corresponds
to the proper regulation of transitional justice, and is particularly concerned with the design and
implementation of the victims’ rights to justice, truth, and reparation. The second aims to provide
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the peace process with a normative basis to reinforce the compromises reached by all parties, and
in particular the ones associated with the implementation of structural reforms to remedy the
conflict’s root causes. As will be illustrated, these legal components are permanently interrelated
due to the particularities of the Colombian transition, so they facilitate each other’s legitimation
and instrumentalization.
i.

Transitional justice regulation

In September 2010 the government introduced a new transitional justice initiative before the
Colombian Congress, which incorporated some features of the bill that was defeated in 2009. The
proposal considered both the establishment of a general framework to address the rights of the
victims of the conflict, and the creation of an exceptional land restitution regime to conduct
reparations. In June 2011, Law 1448 – commonly known as the Victims Law – was passed by the
Congress. This legal instrument was designed as a general framework that recognizes victims as
subjects of special protection, and consequently provides for their right to be appropriately
redressed. Land restitution was placed as the primary component for the reparation provision,
given the specificities of the harm suffered by those affected and the particular territorial dynamics
of the conflict.322 In turn, the general character of the Victims Law encompassed the need to
produce a number of supplementary norms to provide supporting regulation to comply with its
mandate, and develop the conditions for its coherent articulation within the CCO.
The first group of supporting norms is formed by a number of decrees that supplement Law 1448.
They provide operative mechanisms, new institutions and differential criteria to meet the
objectives of the transitional justice project. In particular, the victims’ right to reparation was
regulated comprehensively, as these norms address the processes required to conduct land
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restitution, and to protect the property rights of the victims over abandoned and looted lands.323 In
addition, a number of institutions were created to facilitate these processes. These are the
Administrative Unit for Victim Reparation, which performs as the coordinator of the reparation
component, and the Administrative Unit for Land Restitution, which is in charge of the material
accomplishment of this task.324 Finally, attending a differential approach coming from the
consolidation of the human rights discourse within the CCO, specific reparation measures were
provided for ethnic groups, including indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities
mostly located in rural areas.325 On the other hand, the second group of supporting norms formulate
the public policies that are required to assure the fiscal and operational effectiveness of the TJP.
In particular, these policies set the guidelines, processes and standards required for the viability of
the project’s regulatory actions, which involve the coordinated articulation of different public
authorities and the execution of a significant amount of resources.326
ii.

The Peace process regulation

Alongside the aim to recognize and make effective the victims’ rights to justice, truth, and
reparation, the Santos administration had in sight the intention to find a negotiated exit to the armed
conflict and thus, lead the country to a post-conflict peace-building phase. Therefore, the
government started a preliminary rapprochement with FARC that was facilitated by Cuba, Norway
and Venezuela, representing the international community. The exploratory process concluded with

323

See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Decreto 4800/2011; Decreto 4829/2011.
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Decreto 4802/2011; Decreto 4801/2011; Decreto
4803/2011.
325
See r REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Decreto-Ley 4633/2011; Decreto-Ley 4634/2011;
Decreto-Ley 4635/2011.
326
Particularly, Decreto 175/2012 compiles a number of public policy documents that, taken as a whole, constitute
the National Development Plan on Victims.
324

120
the signature of a preliminary framework accord in August 2012 – the Havana Accord.327 In
general terms, this document is a programmatic instrument that imposes a best-efforts-to-negotiate
obligation on all of the parties. As expected, it endorses the ideological line assumed by the Victims
Law to address the conflict’s root causes in order to account for the conditions of social
reconciliation and durable peace. Therefore, it includes a number of guiding principles to conduct
the process: the respect for human rights should permeate the negotiations; the territorial
dimension of the conflict must permeate what is accorded by the parties; the structural aspects of
negotiation must rely on the idea of economic development with social justice and respect for the
environment; peace and stability will bring to the country a leading role in the regional and global
landscapes.328 Within this normative context, the international community was invited to endorse
the process and understand its particular conditions.329
In addition, to express the intention to start formal negotiations – which effectively occurred in
October 2012 – and set the rules of the game, the accord proposed a 6-points discussion agenda.
Not surprisingly, the first point in concerned with the implementation of a new scheme of rural
development that supports local integration and the achievement of more equitable socioeconomic
conditions.330 In May 2013, the parties announced the conclusion of an accord establishing
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programmatic elements towards the implementation of a prospective agrarian reform.331
According to the parties, the accord was the first step in a structural transformation of the country’s
rural and agrarian background. This was the case because it focused on the interests of small-scale
farmers, access to and redistribution of lands, the fight against poverty, the encouragement of
agriculture in the country, and the reactivation of the rural economy.332 Likewise, it was considered
that the accord aimed to reverse the effects of the conflict by adopting restitutive actions in favor
of the victims of land dispossession and forced displacement. Finally, it was pointed out that the
country’s Constitutional Order – including respect for accrued private property rights – would not
be altered as a consequence of the accords concluded between the government and FARC.
In sum, the peace process regulation reveals a structural orientation. Provided the causes
underlying the Colombian conflict, both the principles that serve as drivers of the negotiation and
the content being discussed, legitimize the eventual state intervention in social structures and
relations as a mechanism to achieve durable peace. In particular, land ownership and rural
development appear to be the primary subjects of concern. In this regard, the initial findings
extracted from the content of the Agrarian Accord point to the eventual enactment of state
regulation entailing either structural reforms to existent structures or novel developments with a
distributive character. There is evidence of a great complementarity between the peace process and
the regulation on the promotion and protection of the victims’ rights to justice, truth and reparation.
Thus, the latter is considered to be not only a precondition for the peace process, but a fundamental
instrument of the post-conflict peace-building agenda.
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B. Rationale of the project
As a project, the current Colombian transitional justice initiative has a distinctive rationale: it has
a set of founding arguments that justify its content and scope, which evidence a coordinated
structure, and which in turn function to achieve a specific goal. In order to illustrate this rationale,
this section will analyze the content and scope of three different types of documents that collect
the principles and premises that inspired the design and articulation of the corresponding legal
framework. First, the explanatory statements of the legal instruments produced on the occasion of
the Victims Law.333 Second, the project’s financial and action plans, which intended to make it
operative and sustainable over time.334 And third, a series of public keynotes and reports that
contain relevant ideological statements for the transitional justice project: the statement by the
President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the United Nations General Assembly in its
68th session;335 the speeches given by the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio
Jaramillo, at different universities;336 and the First Joint Report of the peace process.337 Therefore,
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the illustration of the project’s rationale is done through the formulation of three inquiries. First,
what is the meaning and the implications of Colombian transition. Second, which are the types of
justice operating in Colombian transition. And third, what is the relation between Colombian
transition and the international community.
1. The meaning and implications of transition
The current transitional justice initiative in Colombia is considered a political event with
considerable socio-legal effects, which represents a “once-in-a-generation opportunity”.338 In that
regard, the decision to change the political direction with respect to the strategy to finalize the
armed conflict was not an easy choice and implied a risk.339 Moreover, the strategy chosen to
address the effects of 50 years of conflict involves a number of significant complexities. Not only
is ordinary justice considered ill-equipped to address a phenomenon of this magnitude,340 but
traditional peace-building schemes such as DDR are insufficient in achieving durable peace in
Colombia.341 Thus, there appears to be a consensus as to the reasons for which the previous
attempts at introducing a transitional justice initiative in Colombia were not effective.342
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Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the Colombian project does not fit within the classic transitional
justice model, which focuses on moves form authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies. In this
case, there is a transition from an internal conflict grounded in structural issues to peace. As such,
this phenomenon entails additional considerations to the traditional understandings of the field. In
that respect, the explanatory statement of the Victims Law pointed out that a first “transitional
moment” took place in 1991 with the enactment of a new Constitution. In the same direction, the
Constitutional Court had depicted the political charter as a symbol of a real transit to democracy
and as a true peace agreement. Thus, it is considered that the current transition intends to create
the instruments necessary to address the obstacles that had impeded the full realization of the
constitutional aspirations.343 Following the Colombian High Commissioner of Peace, the country’s
transition does not imply a shift in the constitutional model of the state, but its redirection in order
to comply with the primary objectives and aspirations.344
This transitional justice project is a complex structure involving various political and legal
elements which, put together under a determined configuration, seek to serve the ultimate objective
of durable peace in the country. In that regard, the logic behind this arrangement suggests that the
design of transition involved a series of steps that supposed a process: the acceptance of the
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existence of an armed conflict; the enactment of the Victims Law; the creation of a favorable
international environment for the completion of post-conflict peace-building actions; and the
design of a methodical process to start peace dialogues with the insurgency.345
The norms for regulating the protection and enforcement of the victim’s rights to justice, truth, and
reparation were designed to start operating before the materialization of a peace process with
FARC, and they will continue acting regardless of the final result of the dialogues. However, these
norms are intricately connected with the success of the peace initiative. They perform as an ethical
base to legitimize the negotiations, and they contribute to creating the material conditions for the
long-term implementation of the prospective agreements. In other words, due to its instrumental
nature, transitional justice is depicted as a peace-building mechanism.346 Thus, the whole process
gravitates around the idea of putting an end to the conflict in order to properly commence
transition, which is assumed as a peace-building policy space.347 This is the way in which the
“transitional justice without transition” paradox is justified in the Colombian case 348, since the
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See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“Once the final peace agreement is signed everything will change, since we will enter into a phase of peacebuilding
without the pressure and coercion exercised by direct violence. We properly enter into the transitional phase.” See
JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University. May 9
2013, p. 1. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%20e
n%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“One could say that the post-conflict scenario is the real starting point of the peace process, not its final point.” See
JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University. May 9
2013, p. 1. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%20e
n%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“The foundations of transition will be the accords reached at Havana. There are five substantive points that have
to do with the termination of conflict, which constitute the hard core issues that are to be solved in order to achieve
peace, independently of anyone´s political affiliation or ideology.” See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en
Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University. May 9 2013, p. 1. Retrieved from
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%20en%20Colombia.pdf (last
accessed March 20 2016.)
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effective protection of the rights of the victims is both an end and a means to achieve the ultimate
objective of peace.349
In the context of Colombian transition, peacebuilding has been identified with three instrumental
actions that have a structural character: reconstruction, transformation, and reconciliation.350
Moreover, it is assumed that the country’s rural areas has to be rebuilt, provided that it was the
zone where the armed conflict had the greatest impact.351 Thus, since the Colombian state has
encompassed an institutional failure to deliver and enforce goods and services at the territorial
level, it is necessary to set up particular institutions to guarantee the production and deliverance of
these elements in the form of rights. In doing so, it is expected to stabilize the country’s social life
through the corresponding deployment of regulatory actions.352 In that regard, it is suggested that
the transformation of rural areas requires not only a pragmatic recognition of what has to be done
and how it should be implemented, but a symbolic action associated with the enforcement of the
rights of the people that had traditionally lived in the periphery of institutional concern.353 Finally,
while the raison d´etre of the Victims Law is the institutionalization of a public policy on the

“The materialization of the rights of the victims is an intermediate goal itself and a yardstick to measure the
affectivity of the ultimate goal, which is national reconciliation and the consolidation of democracy” REPÚBICA DE
COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Exposición de Motivos Marco Jurídico para la Paz, p. 2. Retrieved from
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/1326/Anexo%208.pdf?sequence=9 (last accessed March 20
2016.)
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See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013, p. 1. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3
n%20en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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See JARAMILLO, Sergio. “The Transition in Colombia and the Process to Build a Territorial Peace.” Conference
given at Harvard Kennedy School – Carr Center for Human Right Policy. March 13 2014. Retrieved from
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/news-events/carr-center-events/event-details/2014/sergio-jaramillocaro(last
accessed March 20 2016).
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See JARAMILLO, Sergio. “The Transition in Colombia and the Process to Build a Territorial Peace.” Conference
given at Harvard Kennedy School – Carr Center for Human Right Policy. March 13 2014. Retrieved from
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/news-events/carr-center-events/event-details/2014/sergio-jaramillocaro(last
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promotion and protection of the rights of the victims, its ultimate objective is national
reconciliation.354 The latter is depicted as a social setting where the rules of the game are accepted
by everyone, and everyone is working towards the consolidation of peace and stability.355
Alongside the latter characteristics, the Colombian transition is shaped by a series of operational
elements that determine the way in which the project’s normative devices and institutional
mechanisms must be articulated in order to serve the objective of durable peace. These elements
include temporality, exceptionality, territoriality and participation. They have been set up to
indicate how the authorities should implement the transitional justice project in order to comply
with the reconstructive and transformative aspirations. The first element, temporality, represents
the need to impose a specific time frame to achieve the transitional objective, so as to consider,
with reasonable expectation, when the tasks will be completed.356 In turn, the exceptional character
of transition relies on the fact that the application of regular legal instruments would be ineffective
to reconstruct and transform Colombian society.357 In this regard, it has been said that the state has
to conceive and put forward all the possible resources to comply with the objectives of transition,

“This project aims to institutionalize a truly state policy on the assistance, attention, protection and reparation of
victims. It is the result of a consensus between the government and different sectors of society. Only the realization
of this aim will enable the materialization of Colombian transitional justice´s ultimate objective: national
reconciliation.” See REPÚBICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Exposición de Motivos Marco
Jurídico para la Paz. Retrieved from http://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10336/1326/Anexo%208.pdf
?sequence=9 (last accessed March 20 2016).
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See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“We have to set a time limit –for instance, ten years– to materialize everything that is being discussed and accorded”
See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“The purpose of a transitional framework as the one here envisaged is, precisely, to create exceptional mechanisms
to repair and assist victims, and not replace the regular ordinary tools the state has to protect people within its
jurisdiction.” See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia
University. May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%
C3%B3n%20en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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including temporary legal measures, extraordinary resources, and new local institutions.358
Territoriality makes reference to the fundamental character of the local dimension of peace.359
Since most of the conflict’s impact took place at the local level and had a structural character, a
great challenge for the project is to build institutions to effectively intervene peripheral social
structures that own distinctive features and have traditionally been relegated.360 Finally,
participation implies that the design of the measures implementing the content of the peace
agreements should count with the active involvement of the addressees. This is, that transformation
must be produced “from bellow”, based on the power and organizational capacities of local
communities.361 As a result, individuals and communities become self-aware of their role as agents
of change, and the regulatory measures enacted in the context of the project have a high
participatory nature.362
2. The dimensions of justice involved in the Colombian transition
As has been illustrated, the Colombian transitional justice project has a normative dimension. Its
aim to produce transformations within the political organization originates from an allegation of
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See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“In Colombia, so far there has been no real peace process as such. Although there were successful processes with
the former guerrillas, no peace process at the local side has taken place. This is why the conflict has not been properly
finalized”. See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia
University. May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%
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“In order to put an end to conflict we need a veritable social mobilization at the local background, and a collective
act of imagination regarding how would transition look like.” See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en
Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University. May 9 2013. Retrieved from
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%20en%20Colombia.pdf (last
accessed March 20 2016.)
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discontent with respect to certain elements in the social setting, and it encompasses the use of law
and regulation to produce the corresponding changes. Thus, the diffusion of justice through
regulatory actions is fundamental for the accomplishment of the purposes of reconstruction,
transformation and reconciliation, since the state might be required to intervene in societal
structures and relations in an effective way to produce the expected changes.
As a political event with a distinct normative character, the Colombian transitional justice project
incorporates a vision of justice. With respect to the relation between the demands of justice and
the project’s scope of intervention, the scope of the victims’ rights enforcement is ample. Although
the Colombian transition is principally committed to address the situation of those who were
affected by the conflict, it is also configured as a mechanism to prevent the resurgence of personal
and structural violence. Thus, the transitional justice project incorporates both backward-looking
and forward-looking perspectives of justice, which results in a broader configuration of victims.363
Thus, from an implementation perspective, the project assumes three particular dimensions of
justice that have been coined to respond to the particularities of the conflict/post-conflict scenario.
These dimensions are territorial justice, distributive justice and the proper satisfaction of the rights
of the victims. The Colombian High Commissioner of Peace has defined each dimension in the
following way:

“Our commitment goes beyond serving the victims of the past; our commitment is eliminating the possibility of
having new victims as a result of this conflict.” See UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly. Statement by The
President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in its
68th Session. New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/6
8/CO_en_0.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016).
363
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-

Territorial justice. It entails the implementation of actions at the local level. They are
intended both to return the material possession of lands and to protect the property rights
of the people affected by the conflict.364

-

Distributive justice. This dimension subscribes to the idea that peace must be inclusive and
must transcend the needs of victims impacted directly by the conflict to a vision much
broader in scope, which attends to the needs of all. As a consequence, the state undertakes
this transitional process as an opportunity to generate structural transformations.365

-

Satisfaction of the rights of the victims. This corresponds to the promotion and protection
of the victims’ rights to justice, truth and reparation, which are formally recognized through
the enactment of the Victims Law. Although their implementation takes place prior to the
proper transitional phase, it is believed that once a peace agreement is signed, the effects
of such an anticipatory justice exercise will be amplified through post-conflict peacebuilding actions.366

These dimensions of justice reflect the state’s intention to introduce a pioneer scheme towards the
achievement of durable peace, which has been nourished from both the past experiences in other

“Along with corruption, the conflict was used as an instrument to make possible the acquisition of the country´s
most productive lands with money coming from illegal activities. Thus, the effects of the conflict on the territory and
land ownership must be reversed through the implementation of exceptional, effective and time-framed mechanisms.”
See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“After 50 years of conflict, not only direct victims should be attended, but also the ones who were affected by the
conflict; although they did not displace, they got impoverished. We have to conduct distributive-oriented actions, and
mostly distribute lands along with the assets and capacities required to make proper use of them.” See JARAMILLO,
Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University. May 9 2013. Retrieved
from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%20en%20Colombia.pdf
(last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“Even if the government already started to implement this justice component through the enactment of the victims
and land restitution law, something different could be achieved if peace is signed. It would be an opportunity to carry
out an integral strategy, a truly transition.” See UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly. Statement by The President
of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 68th
Session. New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/C
O_en_0.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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countries and the country’s own early attempts.367 The integration of a comprehensive view of the
conflict’s causes and dynamics into the legal elements of the project goes along with the political
decision to conduct a transition, transformative in character, rather than a restrictive understanding
of the superficial effects of violence. Therefore, from the official documents analyzed it is possible
to infer the Colombian authorities’ self-awareness of the crucial role they have in the execution of
different tasks associated with the transition, as well as the implications of these actions on the
future configuration of social relations, especially with regards to the distribution of public goods
in rural areas.
3. The relation between the Transitional Justice Project and the International Community
As highlighted by the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace, one of the fundamental steps to
build a transitional justice project was the creation of a favorable international environment for
peace. In that regard, the government developed a strategy to engage the international community
with the current Colombian enterprise. This approach considers not only the strategic importance
of including the support of states, international institutions and other non-state entities, but the
need to assure a consistent attitude from these actors with respect to their expectations around the
results of the process. Notable for the elucidation of this strategy is a statement given by President
Santos before the United Nations General Assembly during its 68th period of sessions in September
2013.
The first element of the strategy is the provision of a global perspective on the conflict.
Traditionally, states that deal with an internal confrontation have claimed that by virtue of their

“We have pioneered the implementation of transitional justice measures amidst the conflict, prioritizing the
satisfaction of the victim´s rights.” See UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly. Statement by The President of the
Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 68th Session.
New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CO_en_0.p
df (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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sovereignty, the settlement of this confrontation is as an internal affair, thereby preventing any
external intervention. This attitude, however, has become less common in light of the increasing
interdependence within the international community and the consolidation of a “shared-interests”
doctrine within international relations. In that regard, President Santos affirmed before the General
Assembly that Colombia was not the only state affected by its internal conflict, and thus it had an
intrinsic responsibility to find effective durable solutions due to its particular compromises with
international peace and security. Therefore, he called upon the international community to remain
attentive to different situations taking place during the course of the transitional justice project.
Following this line of reasoning, the Colombian government acknowledged the fundamental role
of international governance structures in the configuration and legitimization of the transitional
justice project.368 Since the early stages of the process, the country has encouraged the presence of
international authorities to transmit a message of general commitment to the path assumed to
achieve durable peace.369 Further influence of the international community on the process includes
not only the accompaniment to the peace negotiations in Havana,370 but the adoption of
international standards by the regulation produced in the realm of the protection on the rights of

“Today, before the Assembly, we Colombians want to thank the international community for the support we have
received in the endeavour of achieving the end of our conflict through the dialogue.” See UNITED NATIONS, General
Assembly. Statement by The President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly
of the United Nations in its 68th Session. New York, September 24 2013.
Retrieved from
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CO_en_0.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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“My government promoted an ambitious bill to recognize and repair victims amidst a conflict, a bill I had the
honour to enact in the presence of the honorable Secretary-General of the Organization.” See UNITED NATIONS,
General Assembly. Statement by The President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General
Assembly of the United Nations in its 68th Session. New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CO_en_0.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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Since the exploratory phase of the peace process, countries like Norway, Venezuela and Cuba have performed as
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the victims.371 There is evidence of deference to an “international consensus on the justice, truth
and reparation criteria”.372
However, this deference to the international community of state’s political will and standards is
shaped by the vindication of the country’s right to achieve peace in accordance with the specific
conditions and variables of its context.373 As a consequence, the President requested the
international community to respect Colombia’s right to pursue peace in the way it considers best.374
While the reference to the duty of respect might be seen as a request to non-intervention, it also
assumes a specific position towards the further effects of the implementation process, which
reminds a self-determination discourse. Thus, the discussion engages with a recognized
entitlement, such as peace. Moreover, the use of a normative-oriented discourse indicates an
intention to anticipate occasional responsibility issues at the international level.375

“The standards on the protection of victims that have been considered by the government and the Congress
throughout this legislative process are the ones included in several international hard law and soft law instruments.”
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. “Exposición de Motivos al Proyecto de Ley por la cual se dictan medidas de
atención y reparación integral a las víctimas de violaciones a los derechos humanos e infracciones al derecho
internacional humanitario”, p. 8. September 27 2010. Retrieved from http://static.elespectador.com/especiales/2010/
09/e05bfb29d4d932369f6f7008779fd07f/index.html (last accessed March 2016.)
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“According to contemporary international law, the right to reparation has both individual and collective dimensions.
The first encompasses the impairment of the victim´s rights and requires the adoption of individual measures such as
restitution. Whenever possible, restitution actions intend to place the victims into the original situation it was before
the injury was produced.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. “Exposición de Motivos al Proyecto de Ley por la cual
se dictan medidas de atención y reparación integral a las víctimas de violaciones a los derechos humanos e infracciones
al derecho internacional humanitario”, p. 14. September 27 2010. Retrieved from http://static.elespectador.com/espe
ciales/2010/09/e05bfb29d4d932369f6f7008779fd07f/index.html (last accessed March 2016.)
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“And with the world as our witness, we would like to vindicate our right to achieving the peace.”
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“What we are asking from the UN and the international community is to respect Colombia´s right, and the right of
every nation, to pursuing peace.” See UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly. Statement by The President of the
Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 68th Session.
New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CO_en_0.p
df (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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that our decisions have never been against the international community´s needs.” UNITED NATIONS, General
Assembly. Statement by The President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly
of the United Nations in its 68th Session. New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CO_en_0.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016).
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In addition, the recognition and subsequent incorporation of a series of international standards –
such as democracy and the rule of law – within the transitional justice project is also evidence of
a particular connection between this process and the compromises made in the realm of the
international community.376 In sum, it is possible to affirm that Colombia adopted a transitional
justice project with a strong international orientation, which is informed by a series of elements
and standards produced at the international sphere.377 Due to this framing of the conflict as a global
problem, the government has insisted on the need for feedback from a great variety of actors in
order to arrive at global solutions.378
C. Content of the transitional justice project
The content of the transitional justice project is elucidated through an analysis of the reasons and
dynamics behind both the scheme of victims’ reparation – particularly land restitution – and the
prospective rural development reform proposed in the context of the peace negotiations between
the government and FARC, which intends to bring structural transformations at the territorial level.

“We will stop this conflict now, to ensure our democratic tradition, the Rule of Law, and attending our duties with
the international community.” UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly. Statement by The President of the Republic
of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 68th Session. New York,
September 24 2013. Retrieved from http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CO_en_0.pdf (last
accessed March 20 2016.)
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“Indeed, we have adopted an international strategy for transitional justice. The strategy addresses the principles of
truth, justice and reparation, which we hope will enable us to make transition towards peace.” UNITED NATIONS,
General Assembly. Statement by The President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General
Assembly of the United Nations in its 68th Session. New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from
http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CO_en_0.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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discussions at all universities and think tanks, and in different scenarios, not just from America but from the whole
world, because this is a global problem and requires a global solution.” UNITED NATIONS, General Assembly.
Statement by The President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, before the General Assembly of the
United Nations in its 68th Session. New York, September 24 2013. Retrieved from http://gadebate.un.org/sites/defaul
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1. The transformative character of reparations
The enactment and implementation of the Victims Law in 2011, including its supplementary
regulation, was crucial for launching the Colombian transitional justice project. Nevertheless, it is
also expected to have a transcendental role in the post-conflict scenario, once peace has been
reached with the insurgent armed actors, due to its transformative character. As a result, restorative
justice was conceived as a transitional-justice-oriented component which, by addressing the
complex causality around the conflict, goes beyond merely addressing past human rights
violations. It also performs a supportive role in the reconfiguration of the country’s future. Thus,
independently of – and in parallel to – the resolution of the confrontation with the belligerent
actors, the state is compelled to intervene in certain social relations to establish the conditions for
stability and development. This way, the norms and regulations embedded in the transitional
justice project provide reflexive answers to social needs.379
For that reason, the regulation addressing the rights of the victims was designed to produce tangible
changes in society, including the possibility to distribute – or redistribute – economic entitlements
and affect expectations. Particularly, the victims’s right to reparation is expected to be achieved
through a massive and systematic land restitution program.380 Furthermore, this restorative justice
initiative is expected to work in tandem with the outcomes of the peace process, since the agrarian
and rural issues are fundamental points in the negotiation agenda.381 Thus, an individual measure

See MOORE, Sally Falk. “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject
of Study” 4 Law & Society Review Vol. 7 (1973), 719-746.
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Continuing with the aspirations of Ley 975/05, land restitution is designated as the preferred alternative to restore
the rights of the victims. According to Conpes 3135, it is seen as a way to rebuild people´s “life project” and dignity,
whether individual or collective, depending on their specific ethnic and social characteristics and affiliations. See
REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social. Documento Conpes 3135.
Lineamientos de Política Para las Negociaciones Internacionales de Acuerdos de Inversión Extranjera. Octubre 9 de
2001.
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“The purpose of reparation is to restore victims with their rights and in consequence, allow them reintegrate to
society as citizens. Reparations own a transformative potential on the victim´s life conditions, which in most of the
cases have been marginalized. Not only they are useful means to deal with the harm directly suffered as a consequence
379
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enacted in this context has different dimensions: not only does it constitute an act of individual
reparation intended to reconstitute the situation of the victim but it is also a peacebuilding
measure.382 As a result, the implementation of transformative reparations encompasses the exercise
of structural regulatory actions by the state, and particularly by its legislative, executive and
judicial authorities.383
Finally, it is important to bear in mind two specific issues around the operative possibilities of
victims’ reparation. First, although social welfare measures are based on the state’s general
obligation to provide for its citizens and do not intend to substitute reparations, in the case of the
victims of the armed conflict these measures are imbued with an intrinsic reparatory effect and
should be recognized as such.384 And second, the authorities must perform in a way that the
implementation of the transitional justice scheme will not compromise the country’s fiscal

of violence, but they transcend to reset citizenship by means of the provision of essential welfare components they did
not have before being victimized.” See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. “Exposición de Motivos al Proyecto de Ley
por la cual se dictan medidas de atención y reparación integral a las víctimas de violaciones a los derechos humanos
e infracciones al derecho internacional humanitario”, September 27 2010, p. 28. Retrieved from
http://static.elespectador.com/especiales/2010/09/e05bfb29d4d932369f6f7008779fd07f/index.html (last accessed
March 20 2016.)
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“The approach to peace is a rights-based approach; although victims should be redressed, the peace process is also
intended to extend its capacity to protect the rights of all Colombians.” See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en
Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University. May 9 2013. Retrieved from
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%20en%20Colombia.pdf (last
accessed March 20 2016.)
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institutional design to ensure that public authorities can count with exceptional administrative and adjudicatory
models. This, to complement the existing ones under the framework of transitional rules and to address the challenge
of fiscal sustainability. To meet such purpose, certain conditions must be generated for all the branches of government
to commit with a coordinated and harmonious performance while implementing this law.” See REPUBLICA DE
COLOMBIA, Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social. Documento Conpes 3726. Lineamientos, Plan de
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sustainability, since the further aim of development could be compromised due to the reality of a
country with limited resources.385
2. Land restitution and structural transformations at the territorial level
According to the Victims Law’s explanatory statement, in the past two decades 750,000 peasant
households were forcibly displaced from their lands, of which 460,000 abandoned around three
million hectares. In some cases, the abandoned land remains so, while in others, it is cared for by
relatives or neighbors. It may have been repopulated by farmers to which both guerrilla and
paramilitary armed chiefs awarded the plundered lands, and the rest was transferred de facto or
through ordinary legal procedures to third parties, usually people with no apparent connection to
the offenders.386 From this explicit depiction of the current distribution of the land that was
abandoned or dispossessed, it becomes clear why the reconstruction and transformation of the rural
area is considered a primary concern for the country’s transitional justice project. Behind this
concern is the conviction that a profound transformation of the rural sector is necessary to
guarantee durable peace. In this regard, such transformation can only be achieved by breaking the
vicious cycle of violence and poverty, which is responsible for the historical social marginalization
of a great part of the Colombian population.387 Thus, rural transformation requires the conjunction
of two types of state intervention actions; the massive and systematic restoration of land ownership
to those who were directly affected by forced displacement or deliberate dispossession on the
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occasion of the conflict, and the formulation of land and agrarian development policies to generate
profound structural changes in the rural areas is essential.
The land restitution program included in the Victims Law is a fundamental part of the transitional
justice initiative, since it intends to expeditiously realize and secure the victims’ right to reparation
by means of the restitution of the lands that were denuded by widespread acts of illegal violence
on occasion of the conflict.388 Not only is it a restorative measure, but an effective structural driver
under the prospective scenario of post-conflict peace-building. Thus, the challenge for the state is
to redress the extensive damage suffered by more than half a million farm households, most of
which are mired in poverty. Under the irregular and massive circumstances of land dispossession,
the success of restitution depends on the design of a system capable of restoring the usurped rights
in a fast and effective way.389 To achieve this, the system requires the incorporation of exceptional
standards, appropriate in addressing the particularities of plundering. In this regard, the situation
is not acknowledged as a regular civil law disputes between private individuals, in which the
ownership of property rights is to be determined in accordance with ordinary legislation. Rather,
the land restitution procedures address the impact of the armed conflict according to the territorial
stability of the peasantry, for which a law incorporating restorative justice is required.390 This type
of intervention is supported by the establishment of special land dispossession areas, within which
a system of registration of stripped land is created so as to establish the tenancy, possession and
ownership conditions over looted goods.391 Finally, since violence is a social process that radiates

See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. “Exposición de Motivos al Proyecto de Ley por la cual se establecen normas
transicionales para la restitución de tierras.” September 2010, p.7. Retrieved from http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Pren
sa/2010/Septiembre/Documents/20100907_MotivosTierras.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
389
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. “Exposición de Motivos al Proyecto de Ley por la cual se establecen normas
transicionales para la restitución de tierras.” September 2010, p.2. Retrieved from http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Pren
sa/2010/Septiembre/Documents/20100907_MotivosTierras.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
390
See Ibid., p. 3.
391
See Ibid., p. 7.
388

139
its effects beyond direct victims to collaterally affect other persons, collective reparations are also
considered.392
In turn, the Agrarian Accord signed in Havana between the government and FARC in May 2013
contains the basis of a comprehensive rural reform.393 In this regard, the Colombian High
Commissioner of Peace has added that this initiative intends to supplement the land restitution
program introduced by the Victims Law in order carry out a truly structural transformation of the
rural scenario.394 The Agrarian Accord has certain particularities around its nature, including its
endorsement pending a final agreement on all the points of the negotiation agenda. Likewise, due
to its general character further regulation – new laws, legal reforms, acts of the administration and
judicial decisions – is required towards its effective implementation. While this suggests a certain
degree of uncertainty regarding the final outcome of the peace process, both the favorable political
atmosphere around the process and the expected achievement of basic socioeconomic conditions
for its execution via the adoption of the Victims Law invite to think that it will become an effective
policy.
As a process centered on the improvement of the situation of historically marginalized people, the
envisioned rural reform aims to create the environment and the material conditions to guarantee
the welfare and wellbeing of the people in the country’s rural areas. Therefore, it is believed that
allowing regional integration, the reactivation of the rural economy – particularly the peasant,

392

See Ibid., p. 3.
“The Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR or RRI for its Spanish acronym) should be the start-up of structural
transformations in Colombia’s rural and agrarian reality with equity and democracy, thus contributing to avoid
repeating the conflict and to the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace.” See “First joint report of the dialogue
table between the government of the republic of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –
people’s army, FARC – EP”. Havana, June 21 2013, p. 7.
394
See JARAMILLO, Sergio. "La Transición en Colombia." Conference given at Externado de Colombia University.
May 9 2013. Retrieved from http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Documents/La%20transici%C3%B3n%2
0en%20Colombia.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
393

140
family and community economies–, and the eradication of poverty through the promotion of
equality measures, will result in the protection and enjoyment of people’s rights.395 Unlike
previous agrarian reforms that were unsuccessfully carried out in Colombia during the twentieth
century, the formulation of the Agrarian Accord indicates the aim of going beyond a scheme of
land distribution by introducing a number of supplementary elements. The first element is the
creation of a land trust fund whose operation will be complemented by additional mechanisms
such as the provision of subsidies for land purchasing and special lines of credit. The second
element is the implementation of an integral access strategy, according to which land access has
to be accompanied by the building of means and capacities to make good use of them and the
provision of public goods and services to set an environment conducive to productivity. The third
aspect is the enactment of measures instrumental in formalizing rural property titles, which seek
to regularize land ownership and bring predictability in economic transactions. The fourth element
is the enactment of new regulations on the use of land, the delimitation of the agricultural border,
and the participation of communities in the configuration of the rural development strategies.
Finally, the fifth component corresponds to the expansion of infrastructure in the countryside.
Although the government has been emphatic in dismissing the idea that the implementation of the
latter policies might change the country’s economic model, it is impossible to ignore that the
Agrarian Accord presupposes the formulation of a supplementary vision of development. In this
regard, it is expected that the social structures in rural areas will be reconstructed or reformulated
in order to achieve real transformations. In that respect, the agreements acknowledge and focus on
the fundamental role of the peasant, family and community economies in the development of the
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countryside; on the promotion of different forms of association and cooperation; on income and
employment generation; on the advancement and formalization of work; on the production of food
supplies; and on the preservation of the environment.396 However, further examination of the
Accord indicates that the latter should be considered along with its necessary articulation with the
conventional forms of agricultural and livestock production. Moreover, rural reform should be
carried out within a context of globalization and the insertion policies that the state has agreed to
incorporate within its legal order.397
IV.

Conclusions

This chapter aimed to introduce the transitional justice project that is currently being implemented
in Colombia. The illustration of its antecedents, content and rationale led to its characterization as
a distinctive scheme of regulation with a transnational nature. It represents an evolution from the
traditional transitional justice paradigm since it adopts a more holistic approach to the resolution
of the conflict. Therefore, a practical outcome of the Colombian state’s commitment to materialize
its aspirational constitutional mandate is the attainment of sustainable social peace and stability in
the country. In this regard, the transitional justice project is assimilated as a peace-building
mechanism as long as it has the capacity to address the conflict’s root causes and thus to produce
profound changes within Colombian society’s socioeconomic structures, especially in the
country’s rural areas.
An account of the antecedents of the Colombian TJP showed that in the context of a long-term
armed conflict, the adoption of a human rights discourse and the field’s particular rationale by the
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country’s Constitutional Order contributed to the progressive enactment of legal instruments to
find durable solutions to this phenomenon. These legal responses to the problem of internal
violence went from simple strategies of disarmament, demobilization and reincorporation to the
production of a comprehensive transitional scheme of public action that is focused on the
satisfaction of the victims’ rights to justice, truth and reparation, as reflected in the project’s
structure. Subsequently, the introduction of TJP’s rationale revealed a highly politicized and
globalized field, which has entrusted public authorities the production of profound transformations
within Colombian society in order both to correct past dynamics of violence and social exclusion
and to promote prospective actions towards a more democratic and inclusive society.
These objectives are confirmed through the presentation of the project’s content, which focuses on
the undertaking of regulatory interventions to adjust the relations between the public and private
spheres at the country’s rural areas by means of the implementation of initiatives such as a land
restitution program. In this context, the international community has a significant role; while it
actively supports the project, and encompasses global public interests, it is called to respect the
implementation and specific outcomes of Colombian transition. This includes not only the nonintervention in certain aspects of political negotiation and adoption of the TJP, but also the
exceptional consideration of the effects of certain regulatory actions oriented to the latter’s
implementation that might generate the impact of external interests or even the breaching of
international enforceable obligations.
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Chapter Five: The regulatory challenge
I.

Introduction

In order to highlight the main argument of the dissertation, this chapter articulates the theoretical,
analytical, and substantive elements introduced to date in this dissertation, with the purpose of
enlighten its main argument. This argument addresses the existence of a normative tension
between two transnational legal processes within the specific regulatory realm of access to and use
of land and natural resources in Colombia. In particular, it is argued that the legal protection of
foreign investment offered by international investment agreements has the potential to affect the
implementation of a transitional justice project that is driven by transformative considerations.
Although these processes are both seemingly in line with the country’s Constitutional Order, it is
argued that they present contentious visions of the direction the Colombian state should take in
order to attain its national project. In that regard, this chapter intends to characterize and contrast
these transnational legal processes, in order to illustrate the regulatory challenges that this tension
poses on the state’s ability to exercise democratic choices and to comply with its public objectives
in a coherent fashion.
The previous chapters served to place the theoretical, analytical and substantive pieces of this
puzzle. Chapter one provided the theoretical foundations for articulating the content and extent of
the interaction among the transnational legal processes under consideration. Chapter two
introduced the Colombian Constitutional Order, which is acknowledged as an analytical tool and
a normative reference point since it is the particular scenario where the transnational legal
processes under consideration encounter and enter into tension. Subsequently, chapters three and
four provided in-depth genealogical accounts of each of these transnational projects, and focusing,
in particular, on the way in which they were incorporated into the country’s Constitutional Order,
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in order to unveil their respective intellectual histories and normative rationales. Thus, the
following step entails two tasks: 1) to characterize the transnational legal processes under study in
light of the corresponding roles within the context of the normative tension, and 2) to carry on a
proper analysis by means of a set of analytical criteria and the formulation of the eventual
regulatory outcomes that this tension would provide.
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first section outlines the tension between the two
transnational legal processes. The legal protection of foreign investment through international
investment agreements is portrayed as a particular regime of judicial review and liability, which
has the potential to restrict the legitimate activity of public authorities in order to safeguard the
interests and expectations of global economic actors. On the other hand, the Colombian transitional
justice project is depicted as an instance of social resistance and emancipation that encompasses a
distinctive scheme of regulatory activity with a prospective orientation and a transformative
function. Section two articulates these characterizations and contrasts the transnational legal
processes under study, in order to provide explanations for the regulatory implications arising from
this tension, from the standpoint of political economy and socio-legal studies. Finally, a number
of concluding remarks are provided.
Overall, this section illustrates the crucial role of the state in the legalization and legitimation of a
transnational legality, which is characterized by the conflictual dynamics between diverse
political/legal processes in order to retain power over the distribution of scarce resources. Thus,
the main contention of this chapter is that from a public regulatory perspective, the protection of
foreign investors via international investment agreements has a real potential to constrain the
effective implementation of prospective-transformative transitional justice regulation in
Colombia. Particularly, the articulation of both the behavioral standards and the dispute-settlement
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mechanism embedded in international investment agreements might freeze or roll back the
regulatory measures that are oriented at generating structural changes within society around issues
of access to and use of land and natural resources.
II.

Characterization of the transnational legal processes under analysis

Considering the theoretical and analytical frameworks formulated in chapters one and two, this
section characterizes the transnational legal processes that were introduced in chapters three and
four. These processes include the legal protection offered to foreign investment via international
investment agreements, and the implementation of a transformative transitional justice project.
A. The legal protection offered to foreign investment via international investment agreements
(IIAs) and new constitutionalism
The process through which Colombia has been implementing a legal regime for the protection of
foreign investment upon the negotiation of international investment agreements will be considered
as a case of new constitutionalism. In this regard, it is argued that this transnational legal process
is a constitutive element of a global political project that aims to introduce neoliberal market
democracy as the predominant socioeconomic model. The Colombian state has gone through
profound transformations in its domestic institutional structure and legal order, which are intended
to internalize a number of rules and values to insulate the interests of foreign investors from public
control or public-induced changes. As a result, the country’s policy choices are diminished due to
the potential that this process has to restrict the regulatory capacity of national public authorities.
In practice, the alleged constraint may take place in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the IIAs
concluded by the country may result in the slowing down of political/legal projects at the domestic
level as a result of the fear of public authorities on the consequences their actions can bring to the
country on the grounds of responsibility – a phenomenon known as “regulatory chill”. The second
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scenario is that these agreements might generate an effective challenge to the legality and
sustainability of particular regulatory measures in the realm of investor-state arbitration.
Although the first international investment agreement (in its modern form) was concluded between
Germany and Pakistan as early as 1959, the general consolidation of a transnational legal regime
for the protection of foreign investment only came to be at the outset of the 1980s. At that time,
the United States, Canada, and European countries started to enter into these types of treaties,
which eventually acquired sufficient substantial uniformity to be considered global governance
devices.398 Progressively, a network of treaties composed of investment and free trade agreements,
bilateral or regional, have reached global coverage. Nowadays, there are more than 2500 IIAs in
force, as well as negotiations around the creation of great multilateral blocks that embrace this sort
of legal mechanism (e.g. the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Transpacific
Partnership). In line with this tendency, and with the great exception of Brazil, Latin American
countries initially expressed general acceptance of the possibility of concluding IIAs with the
major capital-exporting countries and with each other. The great penetration of neoliberal ideology
into national governments and their technocratic elites allowed a friendly reception for this
international policy scheme, which came to propose alternatives to a rather exhausted protectionist
socioeconomic model. However, as soon as Latin America started to deal with deep economic
crises, such as the one in Argentina in the early 2000s, the IIAs proved to be blunt artifacts that
foreign investors could effectively use to defer the risks associated with the measures that states
had implemented for facing the public predicaments. This prejudicial outcome, combined with a
political shift by means of the emergence of socialist-oriented governments in countries like
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Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, led to a distinctive wave of rejection of international investment
law. This attitude materialized in the denunciation of some treaties, as well as in the noncompliance of a number of awards issued in the context of investor-state arbitration.
The case of Colombia is rather exceptional. As explained in chapter three, in comparison with its
neighbours – which had started negotiating agreements of this kind by the late-1980s – the country
experienced a late reception of this policy. It was not until 1994 that it concluded the first IIAs in
the context of a regional integration initiative with Mexico, which in turn was connected to the
latter’s participation in NAFTA. Following a global trend, this type of reception took place through
a pronounced ideological turn in the country’s development strategy. This turn derived from the
pressure exercised by the international economic institutions on the adoption of the apertura
económica policy: the enactment of a new constitution that included “freedom of enterprise” and
“internationalization” as paramount principles for the definition of the corresponding economic
model, and the implementation of a structural adjustment program. The rejection of the precedent
model – depicted as protectionist and associated with poverty, inefficiency and authoritarianism –
contributed to the generation of a “common sense” concerning the inherent benefits and
inevitability of the new scheme. This led to the systematic adoption of profound legal and
institutional reforms that aimed to lift the existing barriers for the liberalization of Colombian
economy, and particularly to create a favorable environment for the entry and operation of foreign
investors in the country. Further, the prominent role of the state in creating the structures of
economic globalization is notorious, since the spread of the market and its institutions – such as
the ones allowing unrestricted capital mobility – was not a spontaneous dynamic but required
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deliberate planning and intervention.399 In that regard, the role of the law and regulation was
fundamental in effectively internalizing the rules and values which legitimized the idea that the
attraction of foreign investment is conducive to economic growth and prosperity. In this context,
the legal phenomenon appears to be not merely an external mechanism of control but a constituent
way in which social relations are lived and experienced.400
The resulting atmosphere cleared the path for the commencement of negotiations at both regional
and international levels, but also unveiled the existence of a number of obstacles for IIAs to
effectively function within the country’s jurisdiction. The first obstacle was the lack of
membership in supranational institutions such as the MIGA and ICSID which were key for the
operation of the treaties’ substantive and procedural safeguards. The second obstacle was the
existence of important contradictions between the content of the treaties and the Colombian
constitution with respect to public-utility expropriation. Once again, this transnational legal
process showed its great transformative capacity so the impediments were duly addressed by the
state through the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives. Thus, the country adhered to the
abovementioned international governance structures and deployed multi-level regulatory actions
that resulted in the amendment of the constitution. Yet, the role of the country’s Constitutional
Court was somehow ambivalent. In the first case, it performed as an agent of the global economic
project through the favorable judicial review of the MIGA and ICSID treaties, which brought with
it the ultimate legitimization of the associated transnational legality. This signifies their effective
insertion into the Colombian Constitutional Order through a politically-oriented interpretative
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exercise. Importantly, the arguments raised by the judicial body relied on the constitutional
principles of internationalization, integration and – curiously – peaceful coexistence, to justify both
the convenience of trading-off sovereign prerogatives and the depoliticization of investor-state
dispute settlement for the sake of the achieving of technically-oriented decisions. On the other
hand, the Court was responsible of the elucidation of the collision between the provisions
embedded in the IIAs and the national Constitutional Order. In this regard, it declared the partial
invalidity of the treaties with respect to the requirement of compensation for any expropriation
conducted by public authorities. In any case, the Colombian executive and legislative organs were
quick to amend the constitution, so the resistance interposed by the judicial organ was finally
neutralized by the pressures generated by the regime of transnational rules for the protection of
foreign investment. Following Schneiderman, this instance shows that economic globalization’s
structures are articulated not only outside of states, but are also being internalized, with different
branches of the state responding differently to these exigencies.401
The outcome produced by the systematization of the Colombian IIAs negotiation policy and
internal adjustments that were carried out to facilitate the operation of rules included in the treaties
a legal regime with a unique configuration. In the first place, the fact that it is embodied in binding
inter-national agreements secures its formal legitimacy and enforceability under the basis of state
consent, equality and reciprocity. Further, its structure resembles a private/commercial law
instrument in which the parties assume a sort of contractual relationship founded in the allocation
of rights and obligations, including a mechanism to award damages arising from the interpretation
and application of the pre-committed rules. Finally, the legal regime has undeniable public law
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effects. The inclusion of both behavioral standards and a dispute-settlement mechanism within the
agreements entails the potential to conduct judicial review over the regulatory conduct of public
authorities. In sum, this extraordinary legal amalgam provides foreign investors with exorbitant
safeguard for their property rights and other economic interests as compared with the general
protection granted by the state to any individual within its jurisdiction. Moreover, it establishes a
series of expectations with respect to the degree of consistency that state agents must observe while
exercising their functions, which inevitably generates binding constraints on the autonomous
exercise of public authority.402
From an international legal perspective, these agreements could be regarded at first glance as not
contravening any of the paradigmatic foundations of the field. However, an analysis of the political
and social consequences of the juridical commitments therein reveal important challenges for the
capacity of the Colombian state to comply with its public objectives, especially in the context of a
diverse and unequal society under a profound multifaceted conflict. In this regard, the
constitutional debates that emerged on the occasion of the review of the treaties concluded with
United States and Canada, with regards to the inclusion of legal standards on indirect
expropriation, provide clear insights on the potential of this legal regime to insulate Colombia’s
public choices. At an early stage of judicial review, the Court justified these behavioral rules on
the constitutional protection of the right to property. Yet, it soon had to introduce alternative
arguments as to the apparent existence of a “legitimate expectations” principle with a constitutional
pedigree, according to which the regulatory state intervention should generally depend on the
maintenance of a stable and predictable environment in favor of foreign investors and the
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profitability of their enterprises. Since the Court made no distinction nor identified the type of
regulatory conduct that could be scrutinized through the indirect expropriation standard, it
somehow validated the chance that any act of the state affecting the interests of a foreign investor
could potentially be reviewed by an arbitral tribunal, as long as it fit within the wide description
provided by the source treaty. Moreover, the further implementation of a supplementary legalstability-contracts regime contributed to enlarging the possibility of cloistering transnational
capital from political power – represented in major legal changes – especially in the realm of
socioeconomic policies.403
In addition, the inclusion of social and environmental elements into the orbit of the IIAs concluded
by Colombia – notably, the side agreements and the human rights report system enacted on the
occasion of the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement – helped to strengthen the substantial
legitimacy of the resulting legal regime. Originally, this inclusion was the result of massive
pressures exercised by different sectors of civil society – including trade unions, human rights
coalitions and organizations representing the interests of ethnic groups from both countries – as to
the negative effects that these agreements would convey to the people located within the respective
jurisdictions. Yet, the policy move ended up serving the very interests of the transnational legal
project. Though they were intended to provide answers to the problems raised by the opponents,
they turned out to be deceptive since they hardly addressed the core questions regarding the social
and environmental risks that accompanied the liberalization of foreign investment. Instead, they
promoted a set of broad and voluntary standards whose achievement would merely be subject to
ineffective encouragement by state parties on the foreign investors. They were simply used to
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dissuade the critics in order to accelerate the domestic legal incorporation processes.404 The result
is an unbalanced equation in which the host states have a wide range of obligations with foreign
investors, while the latter owe no other duty than to comply with domestic law, which in any case
has been adapted to their nature and primary objective: the maximization of scarce resources.
Considering the previous depiction, the constraints on the regulatory capacity of the Colombian
state that may be produced by the crystallization of a legal regime for the promotion and protection
of foreign investment could be found in two well-defined scenarios. The first is the possibility that
the content and scope of IIAs could influence the conduct of public authorities so that particular
regulatory measures oriented to generate structural changes are frozen or rolled back –
phenomenon known as regulatory chill. In turn, the second situation is the actual challenge to
particular regulatory measures in the context of investor-state arbitration.
In the context of the debates around the legitimacy of international investment agreements, and
particularly on the fairness and sustainability of investor-state arbitration, it has been suggested
that international investment law – as an institution – may influence the course of public policy
development. In that regard, a hypothesis concerning the regulatory effects of this legal institution
has been outlined: in some circumstances, public authorities will respond to a high (perceived)
threat of investment arbitration by failing to enact or enforce bona fide regulatory measures, or by
modifying measures to such an extent that their original intent is undermined or their effectiveness
is severely diminished.405 The latter formulation is identified as regulatory chill. The very idea of
the potential occurrence of regulatory chill in the context of international investment agreements
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comes from interdisciplinary literature that seeks to transcend a purely legal comprehension of the
relation between law and transnational capital mobility, and builds on the internalization of the
state’s prerogatives as a sovereign entity. It is not only considered to have the right to regulate so
as to comply with its public aims, but also to be given the duty to enact regulations in order to
protect certain interests as demanded by its constitutional order.406 Thus, as the resulting policy
space is eventually confronted by restrictions coming from the obligations imposed by
international investment agreements, public authorities might react to a perceived threat of
investor-state arbitration by modifying their behavior from what is reasonably expected from them,
as provided by their jurisdiction and mandate. In other words, it is possible to infer that the set of
rules contained in the IIAs have the potential to tip the balance of negotiating power away from
domestic governments and towards foreign investors, resulting in a contraction in the power of
states to regulate.407
In 2001, as a great number of concerns on the conclusion of the NAFTA agreement between
Canada, Mexico and United States spread, particularly chapter 11 on investment, the regulatory
chill hypothesis started to be used to indicate the legitimacy setbacks that the integration treaty
would entail on the signing countries’ sovereign prerogatives. Howard Mann commented that one
of the most notable outcomes of this agreement was the potential negative impact of its investment
provisions on governmental decision-making in relation to the public interest. Concretely, as a
result of the obligations and the dispute-settlement mechanism included in the agreement, many
regulatory agencies in the government would become increasingly reluctant to act, because of the
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risks associated with the legal uncertainties in the interpretation of these treaties and the
corresponding potential claims for compensation.408
In that regard, as many indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment claims grow out of
investor expectations that are supposedly affected by changes in the host country’s regulatory
environment, just the threat of such liability would lead countries to forego needed public-purpose
regulation that might negatively affect the value of foreign investment, rather than risk potential
liability.409 Moreover, concerns about regulatory chill might arise not just from the outcome of
investment cases, but also from the acknowledgement of the inconsistent legal conclusions and
reasoning found in arbitral awards.410
Investment treaties could undermine the sovereign right of states to regulate activities within their
jurisdiction, but also their duty to do so411. For instance, in the context of human rights protection
from business interference John Ruggie has commented on the specific conflict between the
respect of investment obligations and the implementation of human rights policies. Thus, some
investment treaty guarantees and contract provisions might unduly constrain the host
Government’s ability to achieve its legitimate policy objectives, including its international human
rights obligations, because under threat of binding international arbitration, a foreign investor may
be able to insulate its business venture from new laws and regulations, or seek compensation from
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the Government for the cost of compliance.412 Moreover, it has been suggested that in the realm
of the extractive industry arbitration might be used as an offensive weapon to harass or
intimidate.413
The second scenario in which the autonomy of Colombia’s democratic policy choices might be
challenged is the challenge to particular regulatory measures in the context of investor-state
arbitration. Although so far Colombia has not been publicly called to appear before an arbitral
tribunal to respond for potential breaches of investment treaty provisions, the chance that the
country could be sued by a foreign investor is possible due to the very existence of a great number
of IIAs in force. In this regard, certain recent political decisions on a number of issues – such as
the delimitation of natural reserves that had been previously adjudicated for mining exploitation414
or the issuance of measures on the price control of essential medications 415 – have affected the
economic interests of certain multinational corporations. As such, foreign investors occasionally
manifested their disagreement with the decisions made by public authorities and have been
reminded of the compromises assumed by the country as to the protection of foreign investment.
It is not for nothing that Colombia’s Ministry of Commerce has been implementing a
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comprehensive policy on the prevention and management of international investment
controversies since 2010. The awareness of the prospective consequences of the systematic
negotiation of IIAs and particularly, of the risks that the latter entail at the level of international
responsibility, particularly from the experience of neighbour states, led the country to develop a
system to address the advancement of these types of disputes.
B. The Colombian transitional justice project as an instance of subaltern cosmopolitan legality
In turn, it is argued that the Colombian Transitional Justice Project (TJP) should be characterized
as a particular instance of subaltern cosmopolitan legality that entails a distinctive scheme of
regulatory action. This enterprise has an undeniable political nature, and is part of a transnational
initiative that aims to diffuse a liberal peacebuilding model during the conduct of transitions in
postconflict and post-authoritarian societies.416 However, it also has a number of particular features
that evidence a shift in the field’s traditional paradigm. Consequently, this move points towards
the assumption of a more holistic approach towards both the understanding of the causes of the
conflict and in addressing of the corresponding solutions. Thus, this normative move has the
purpose of resisting the negative effects of certain socioeconomic setbacks that are connected with
the internal conflict itself.
As Dustin Sharp explains, since it first took the global stage in the 1980s and 1990s, transitional
justice has mainly acted as a vehicle for delivering liberal goods such as democracy, the rule of
law, the respect for human rights, and economic freedom, through a market-oriented economy.417
Moreover, it has become progressively aligned to a parallel initiative around the maintenance of
international peace and security, whose aim has been acknowledged as a shared interest within the
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international community.418 In that regard, the field acquired its main features through the
development of principles, norms, institutions and processes that have been diffused through
international legal and non-legal instruments – notably in the fields of human rights and good
governance,419 as well as upon the incipient consolidation of an epistemic community around the
subject.420 Ultimately, this transnational legal process encompasses a shaping of the state’s
structure and patterns of governance, which has influenced the activity of public authorities. As
such, the antecedents of the current Colombian enterprise revealed that the global discourse and
rationale on transitional justice were progressively received and internalized at the domestic level
by means of preliminary attempts to develop legal responses to the problems arising from the
country’s armed conflict. Specifically, these responses went from a broad DDL framework to the
specific adoption of a set of rights – justice, truth, and reparation – in favor of the victims, though
always inserted within the liberal matrix.
However, the Colombian formula for peace must be regarded as a distinctive project. It represents
an evolution from the preliminary attempts that were deployed to bring sustainable solutions to the
problems arising from the country’s violent and unstable background. Additionally, it entails an
obvious move from the global transitional justice paradigm. This is because it adopted a more
holistic understanding of the conflict’s nature and dynamics and assumed a prospectivetransformative approach in the formulation and implementation of the policies conducive to
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guaranteeing durable peace. Politically speaking, crucial to this shift was the diametrically opposed
perspective, adopted by the Colombian government since 2011, towards the understanding of the
country’s struggle. From being narrowly considered as an instance of terrorism, drug trafficking
and organized crime, it came to be acknowledged as an armed conflict grounded in structural
causes. Therefore, the state was compelled to develop legal responses to adequately deal with the
particular needs of the victims on the grounds of responsibility and not as a matter of mere
solidarity or good-will, as was previously considered.
The Colombian TJP should be considered as a “second constitutional moment” in relation to the
country’s Constitution. As previously explained, the latter assumed a social peace function
whereby various and even contradictory normative visions of society were articulated around a
single national project, founded upon aspirational (a normative idea of progress in which diversity
is embraced and gross social injustices are remedied) and transformative (breaking with the past
and looking to an alternative future) considerations. However, for different reasons – attached to
the very dynamics of the conflict – these aims could not be originally crystallized. Therefore, the
TJP was consciously configured to supplement the Colombian Constitutional Order with the task
of ensuring durable peace and stability –one if its paramount mandates. The project is thus an
enterprise that intends to induce large-scale social changes by means of the proper addressing of
the structural problems that are considered to be both the root causes of the country’s long-term
internal conflict and the main obstacles for the full realization of the Constitution. As a
consequence, the TJP pursues the effective adjustment of the social relationships and structures
that have traditionally been shaped by patterns of inequality and discrimination, especially in rural
areas, where they have produced the greatest spillovers. All in all, as its eventual outcome is the
redirection of the country’s constitutional framework, the Colombian project encompasses a
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conscious re-politicization of transitional justice, a field whose recent progression had been
characterized by the opposite. That is, becoming more of a bureaucratized site and a highly
technical enterprise rather than a political/legal process.
The abovementioned holistic approach comprises a turn from the narrow and reductionist
viewpoint according to which transitional justice’s objective was limited to the deliverance of
liberal public goods – free markets and western-style democracy – as a means of stabilizing a
society affected by authoritarianism or unrest. Rather, the Colombian model is a tool of
peacebuilding.421 In this regard, and following the theoretical underpinnings developed by Johan
Galtung, while an instrument to achieve positive peace, transitional justice should be concerned
with addressing proper responses to personal and structural violence.422 Whereas the former refers
to individualized actions that occur on the occasion of a conflict, the latter is related to its root
causes and the negative spillover effects that cannot be directly attributed to a subject or a
collectivity. Thus, whilst the Colombian transitional justice project is mainly designed to promote
and protect the rights of the victims to justice, truth and reparation, it also aims to introduce a more
egalitarian distribution of power and resources in society by means of the effective adjustment of
social relations.
In this context, both the land restitution component included in the Victims Law and the agrarian
reform proposed in the realm of the negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC
are notable instances of the regulatory activity of the state for the procurement of positive peace
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in the country. They represent the articulation of the dimensions of justice that support the TJP:
territorial justice by means of the preferential implementation of actions in rural areas; distributive
justice projected in the intervention of social structures to deal with the conflict’s root causes; and
the actual satisfaction of the rights of the victims through the enactment of regulatory measures
and the activation of particular-exceptional executive and adjudicatory procedures. In fact, they
denote the implementation of a distinctive scheme of regulation with prospective and
transformative implications.
With regards to the prospective implications of the TJP, its regulatory measures have adopted a
forward-looking vision of justice that confronts the past. This confrontation does not primarily
intend to correct a transaction – a particularized action that affected a person or a collectivity – but
rather to adjust the parties’ relations so that their onward interactions take place on a sound
foundation. Accordingly, the respective remedies are not necessarily determined by an exact
amount of loss but rather by the balance of social relations that have historically been unequal.
Thus, it is possible that these measures could impact actors that were not directly involved in the
production of harm, but that due to the elapse of time and possibly a certain degree of negligence,
ended up occupying a position in relation to the interests to be intervened.423 On the other hand,
these measures have transformative implications in that they should produce effective and tangible
changes in society, under the foundational assumption of the inadequacy – and perhaps illegality
– of the social setting that intends to be altered. In this regard, the tools of transformation must rely
on the historical context of the conflict to be resolved, be driven by the particular and diverse
understandings within Colombian society, and comprise a range of policies and approaches that
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can successfully impact on the social, political and economic status of a large range of
stakeholders.424 In sum, the desired transformation entails a distributional function,425 emphasizes
local agency and resources, and challenges unequal and intersecting power relationships and
structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level.
The latter analysis allows the Colombian transitional justice project to be characterized as an
instance of subaltern cosmopolitan legality. Although it was essentially founded on international
standards and configured within a liberal matrix that tends to deliver a homogeneous version of
society, this enterprise is also directly informed by an alternative normative model. This alternative
model seeks to confront the patterns of discrimination and social exclusion associated with the
country’s conflict, including economic violence. Prior to addressing the question “What kind of
society do we want after transition?”, the Colombian project refers to one in which the equality of
differences is accepted as an ethical and political maxim. Therefore, the TJP adopted a “bottomup” orientation where there is reliance on local visions of reconstruction, transformation and
reconciliation on the design and implementation of transitional justice measures. On the occasion
of the implementation of the corresponding measures, this includes both the respect for cultural
and social diversity, and the active participation of the members of the affected communities –
peasants, ethnic groups, women, children and the poor in general – in the definition of the
problematic issues associated with the distributional effects of the regulatory activity of public
authorities.426
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Finally, the Colombian transitional enterprise recognizes the realities of power but aspires to
cosmopolitan aspirations and positive peace. There is an undisputable interest by the international
community to resolve the Colombian conflict because of the shared concern with the associated
transnational criminal activities, the evident trans-boundary effects produced by its particular
dynamics, as well as the expectation by global economic actors to conduct profitable activities in
the country without any setbacks. Yet, it is very telling that in his dialogue with the international
community of states, president Santos had celebrated the external support given by facilitator states
and international governance bodies but also requested respect for the country’s particular way of
conducting the transition. Not only does this signify that international standards can not be
considered as a “strait jacket upon independent thought” towards the design and implementation
of the project, but that potential collisions between the Colombian TJP and other international
obligations should be treated exceptionally. For instance, the tensions with the interests and
expectations of private parties protected by international economic regulation.
III.

Contrasting the transnational legal processes

To conclude this chapter, this section intends to articulate the argued normative tension between
the transnational legal processes under scrutiny from two different perspectives. The first
perspective is a political economy account of the battle around the commodification of land and
natural resources. The second is a socio-legal view of the regulatory implications of the protection
of foreign investors via international investment agreements on the effective implementation of
the Colombian transitional justice project. And particularly on the latter point, the probable
constraint of the state’s public choices to achieve durable peace in the country.
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A. The political economy version: the battle around the commodification of lands and natural
resources
From a political economy perspective, the tension between the legal protection of foreign
investment in Colombia and the country’s transitional justice project is explained by the existence
of conflictual approaches as to the identity and consequent destination of the country's lands and
natural resources (LNR) within their respective normative frameworks. International investment
agreements regard LNR as tradeable commodities whose attached property rights – in head of a
foreign investor – should be protected in the context of a stable and predictable market. On the
other hand, while transitional justice also identifies LNR as commodities, it enlightens a pattern
of economic violence – accumulation by dispossession – that has partly determined their current
configuration and allocation, and which must consequently be corrected so as to adjust the affected
social relations and thus achieve durable peace. Thus, this tension is reproduced in the mutual
contestation among their respective supporting legal regimes.
The historical trajectory of violence in Colombia can be seen through the lens of social relations
entrenched in the struggles over the dispossession of lands and resources, which are embedded in
the multiple players at local, regional, national and global scales.427 Accordingly, after a period of
systematic denial, the Colombian internal conflict was not only acknowledged by the government
but characterized as a phenomenon rooted in socioeconomic causes. In this regard, it is nowadays
accepted that various dynamics of direct violence – such as forced displacement, massacres and
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forced disappearances – that occurred in the context of the conflict were more than a detrimental
consequence of the strife between the involved armed actors. In fact, they were also an
instrumental part of a conscious strategy to acquire unrestricted access to lands and natural
resources located at the rural areas – which is where the confrontations have historically had the
greatest impact – by means of the uprooting of population and the misallocation of property
rights428. By applying David Harvey’s analysis of “accumulation by dispossession”,429 it is evident
that in the case of Colombia the indiscriminate use of force was used as a means of incorporating
land and peoples into capitalist structures rooted in the concepts of private property and profit
generation.430 In other words, capital accumulation was greatly achieved by violently depriving
rural populations from their commonly held lands – and consequently, their capability of
determining the conditions for access to and use of natural resources – towards the further
enclosing of that land for the benefit of certain economic agents.431 Additionally, these dynamics
of direct violence allowed for the commodification of natural entities and processes that were
previously absent from logic of the market economy, such as land and natural resources that
traditionally belonged to the country’s ethnic groups – particularly, indigenous peoples and AfroColombian communities.
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The violent process of accumulation was followed by the commodification of the dispossessed
LNR. That is, they were transformed into tradeable objects in the market by means of their
privatization – the assignment of legal title that gives exclusive rights to a person over a thing –
and individuation – the placing of legal and material boundaries around things so they can be
bought, sold and used. Not only were these preconditions for their exchange, but they also
contributed to “cleanse” the obscure origin of the LNR in question.432 As a result, the allocation
of property rights in rural areas acquired a particular arrangement: high concentrations of land in
the hands of a few. In this regard, a development model was established according to which both
resource extraction licenses and infrastructure concessions were systematically granted to a
handful of companies, often associated with foreign capital. Therefore, the very configuration of
social relations was shaped. It is not necessarily that the whole socioeconomic pattern of
Colombia’s rural areas is the product of the conveyance of dynamics of accumulation by
dispossession, but to a great extent it was moulded by the distributional outcomes of violence.433
It is in this context that foreign investors have arrived in Colombia, so although they have generally
not contributed to the spreading of war in the country, they somehow encountered beneficial
conditions for their establishment and operation as economic enterprises, including the possibility
of accessing LNR that had previously been subject of dispossession.
The decision to implement a policy of systematic negotiation of international investment
agreements aimed to incentivize the massive influx of transnational capital, under the rationale
that they would bring economic growth to the country. In this regard, the agreements were
designed to perform as determinants in the investors’ choice by means of the provision of a
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competitive “business climate” in the country. This environment would offer stable conditions of
operation founded on an equal and efficient protection of property rights, as well as on the
possibility to cover the expectations of foreign investors with respect to the regulatory conduct of
state authorities that could obstruct their economic maximization interests. Thus, in order to ensure
this type of predictability, the agreements included binding behavioral obligations on the states
that would be accompanied by a very effective dispute settlement mechanism for foreign investors
to claim compensation from the host state in case of eventual negative impacts. Although it was
not the only relevant factor, this institution of extensive legal protection was crucial to allow access
of transnational capital to a great variety of commodities (for example, land and natural resources
in rural areas) necessary for their economic enterprise and the ultimate reason for which they
arrived in Colombia. In sum, IIAs offer a very powerful promise: they guarantee the immutability
and stability of social configuration, and consequently the allocation of rights and other economic
interests, on territories in which foreign investors are primary actors due to their enterprise. In fact,
it can be argued that the resulting legal regime which supplements the process of commodification
of LNR that have been taking place in Colombia which, as explained beforehand, was informed
by actions of accumulation by dispossession that took place on the occasion of the country’s
internal conflict.434
In turn, while the Colombian transitional justice project also conceives LNR as commodities, this
depiction is produced in the context of the prospective correction of socioeconomic injustices to
achieve durable peace. As previously mentioned, the project has been designed to produce
structural transformations in the country’s society by implementing a dynamic scheme of
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regulatory intervention that principally focuses on addressing the conflict’s root causes and their
prejudicial outcomes. Therefore, based on the recognition of a set of individual and collective
entitlements to the people affected by the spread of – personal and structural – violence, the project
includes particular mechanisms to adjust the social relations that were either altered or arose on
the occasion of the conflict. Particularly, the land restitution program aims to ensure the material
and juridical restoration of the lands that were coercively dispossessed to individuals and
communities and their temporal extraction from the market, even if these regulatory actions affect
consolidated private interests, such as the property rights and economic expectations of foreign
investors at the rural areas. Moreover, in the case of collective restitution in favor of ethnic
communities, the project contemplates the possibility of conducting a judicial review of the public
acts that granted concessions, licenses or titles to conduct extractive activities within the territories
affected by the dynamics of the conflict.
In sum, whereas the IIAs are intended to reinforce the commodification of LNR by means of the
provision of stronger protection to the property rights and expectations in head of foreign investors,
the TJP’s regulatory measures have the potential to promote their – at least partial –
decommodification, with the latter understood as the process through which commodities are
depicted as entitlements, so their dependence on the market is rendered.435 It is in this context that
IIAs may restrict the effective implementation of the Colombian transitional justice project.436
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B. The socio-legal version: pushing the state – and its regulatory capacity – towards opposite
directions within the same Constitutional Order
Having presented the political economy analysis of the tension that is arguably taking place in
Colombia between the protection of foreign investment via IIAs and the implementation of a
transformative-oriented transitional justice project, this section illustrates the content and scope of
this normative stress from a socio-legal perspective. Consequently, it draws on the Colombian
Constitutional Order to explain how these manifestations of transnational legality encountered and
entered into an intense dialogue in the realm of the state, which is the natural agency of
incorporation and guarantor of these processes. Thus, in the context of this particular encounter,
the IIAs concluded by the country have the potential to place severe constraints to the operation of
the Colombian Constitutional Order, which due to its social peace function is founded on a “Social
Rule of Law” principle that seeks to harmonize diverse and often contingent social interests.
Moreover, the particular incorporation of the transitional justice project in the country and the
tension consequently generated with the protection of foreign investment made visible the process
of depoliticization of the LNR regulatory field that the latter legal framework aspires to
materialize. In this regard, the TJP constitutes itself a source of resistance to the indiscriminate
advancement of economic globalization in the realm of the Colombian Constitutional Order,
resulted in the legal conflict. Therefore, the state faces a great challenge towards the
accomplishment of its public choices.
As it was advanced in chapter one, the CCO reflects the normative image of the state. It was
configured as a democratic amplification pact to accomplish social peace that is translated in the
objective of materializing the varied political aspirations of the diverse social actors that conform
the country’s social base. As such, it encompasses a formula – the Social Rule of Law – that aims
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to work as a compass, orienting the exercise of public power towards both the achievement of the
constitutional socioeconomic objectives and the settlement of the daily disputes that could often
arise between multiple and competing interests. In other words, it finds a balance between
juxtaposing normative forces, making a sustainable use of limited means, and accordingly
coordinating the activity of public authorities. Therefore, the relations between public and private
spheres have been shaped by means of the inclusion of two symbiotic dynamics: economic
freedom and state intervention. While the former advocates for the consolidation of a free market
economy that is based on the encouragement of free enterprise and the protection of property
rights, the latter seeks to promote social justice by means of the regulatory activity of public
authorities in order to eventually adjust inequality and discrimination around social relations. Thus,
the resulting scheme of identities and social interactions envisages private property as an economic
entitlement that has a social function; this entails the individual enjoyment of economic benefits
and the satisfaction of particular needs in the context of social solidarity. It was within this
normative landscape that these transnational legal processes were assimilated in Colombia.
The global projection of the country’s Constitutional Order was crucial for the effective
incorporation of the IIAs negotiated by the country. Particularly, the way in which the country’s
Constitutional Court interpreted the constitutional principles of internationalization and integration
as legitimate avenues to limit state sovereignty served the purposes of both opening the domestic
market to foreign investors and the establishment of a legal regime for the safeguarding of their
rights and expectations from the potential interference of public regulation. In this regard, the
placement of binding constraints on the authority of domestic public authorities – the new
constitutionalism dynamic – extracted the economic interests and expectations of foreign investors
from the rationalization typical of the SRL formula. Thus, any social function – including the
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solidarity-based duties and restrictions – is uprooted from the property rights of foreign investors
and rather, they are deemed as absolute and somehow unassailable. In practical terms, the
protection offered by IIAs is founded in binding and enforceable behavioral standards that
condition the regulatory action of the state to the non-alteration of economic profits obtained
through these entitlements, regardless of the reasons or purposes sought through public conduct.
They are thus decontextualized and depoliticised for the sake of guaranteeing a stable and
predictable investment climate.
The emergence of the transitional justice project – an instance of subaltern cosmopolitan legality
– came to make visible the constraints that the IIAs concluded with capital-exporting countries
had placed on Colombia’s democratic choices, including the aim to achieve durable peace. As the
TJP assumed the role of being a “second constitutional moment” towards the crystallization of
certain aspirations included in the 1991 Constitution, a strong scheme of regulatory action intended
to produce significant transformations in the country was included in the project. In particular, the
implementation of a rights-based land restitution program and an agrarian reform grounded in a
“bottom-up” perspective is intended to produce the adjustment of social relations in the country’s
rural areas. Thus, these distributive-oriented policies will eventually intersect with private interests
and expectations, such as those of foreign investors. The latter, provided with extensive protection
by virtue of their special status, could accordingly pose a threat or effectively resort to investorstate arbitration in order to neutralize the impact of their property rights and claim compensation
for the harms produced. From a public standpoint, this signifies that the prerogative to identify
controversies between the state and foreign investors is extracted from the sphere of the domestic
judiciary to be assigned to a transnational body – an ad hoc arbitral tribunal – which will actually
be reviewing the acts of domestic public authorities in accordance with the broad and imprecise
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standards embedded in the investment treaties. In principle, this seems to be contrary to public law
principles, such as democracy, accountability and the rule of law.
IV.

Conclusions

This chapter aimed to articulate the analytical framework, genealogical descriptions and
theoretical elements included in this research so far to demonstrate the existence of an essential
normative tension around two transnational legal processes that present alternative visions on the
attainment of Colombia’s socioeconomic objectives. Likewise, it intended to project the regulatory
implications of the encounter of these colliding vernaculars in the realm of the Colombian
Constitutional Order. In this regard, the chapter highlighted that the legal protection of foreign
investors via international investment agreements has the potential to constrain the effective
implementation of the transitional justice project in Colombia. This is so because it has the
potential to freeze or roll back the regulatory measures oriented at generating structural changes
in the realm of access to and use of land and natural resources. Moreover, it could even challenge
these measures before an investment arbitration tribunal. Therefore, the capacity of the state to
enforce certain legitimate public objectives – such as the attainment of durable peace after a longterm armed conflict grounded in social inequalities – might be restrained in case they collide with
certain private interests and expectations, such as those of foreign investors.
This political and legal phenomenon poses a tremendous challenge to the Colombian state, which
is consciously – and legally – committed to the implementation of a neoliberal market democracy
within its jurisdiction, including the observation of very demanding standards as to the protection
of the economic interests and expectations of foreign investors. However, the polity has the
paramount duty of materializing the social peace aspirations that support its Constitutional Order,
including the correction of historical inequalities and the prospective and equitable distribution of
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opportunities among the population. Thus, it is possible to identify a conflictual dialogue between
a hegemonic political project and an emancipatory alternative that has chosen to follow the realm
of the law to go by. What remains to be seen is whether this set of arguments and connections can
be verified in real life, for which conducting a case study is necessary.
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Chapter Six: Case Study. Collective Territorial Restitution to Ethnic Communities Located
within the Sphere of Influence of Mining Projects Operated by Foreign Investors (Chocó,
Colombia)
I.

Introduction

The previous chapters aimed to introduce and characterize a normative tension between the legal
protection offered to foreign investment through international investment agreements and the
implementation of a transitional justice project in Colombia. The result of this exercise was the
identification of the challenges that the country would face, as a consequence of this normative
tension, from the standpoint of its capacity to perform as a governance authority towards the
attainment of public goals. This chapter aims to provide an in-depth illustration of this
phenomenon through a case study. Its purpose is twofold: first, to demonstrate that the intellectual
formulations elaborated in the previous chapters materialize in real-life situations; and second, to
explore the particular implications of this normative collision on the regulatory capacity of public
authorities in Colombia.
The case selected is paradigmatic as it comprises the first collective restitutions that took place on
the occasion of the Colombian transitional justice project, which were conducted in favor of two
ethnic communities of the Alto Atrato Region (Chocó Department, Colombia). This zone is a rural
enclave that was progressively abandoned by these populations as a consequence of the country’s
internal conflict. It is also part of the sphere of influence for a number of mining concessions that
had been assigned to foreign-owned companies when the restitution process commenced.
Therefore, a conflict of interests was created between the economic interests of the mining
companies and the right to restitution in head of the ethnic groups. In particular, this case study
focuses on the situation of two communities: The Emberá Katío indigenous people of the Alto
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Andágueda reservation, and an Afro-Colombian community denominated Consejo Comunitario
Mayor de la Organización Campesina y Popular del Alto Atrato - Cocomopoca.
The question here is whether and to what extent the protection of foreign investors granted by
certain international investment agreements concluded between Colombia and capital-exporting
countries has the potential to constrain the effective implementation of transitional justice.
Particularly, whether it can affect or shape the regulatory measures that are oriented to redress
victims and produce structural transformations in the country, such as land restitution. Therefore,
the analysis concentrates on the content and outcomes of the territorial restitution procedures that
were activated in favor of the Emberá Katío and Cocomopoca communities. Specifically, this case
is examined from the standpoint of a legal phenomenon: the judicial suspension of a number of
concession contracts that have been concluded between the state and particular multinational
mining corporations, in order to ensure the effective consolidation of these ethnic peoples’
collective rights over the lands which are overlapping the corresponding mining projects. These
processes have been assumed by the Colombian authorities in accordance with the formula
provided by the Victims Law and its supplementary norms on the redress of ethnic groups.437
Since the case study principally deals with judicial procedures, the principal source of information
is the record corresponding to the territorial restitution processes in favor of the Emberá Katío and
Cocomopoca communities.438 Supplementary to this documentation, the factual and contextual
part of the case builds on selected press articles and secondary literature, which were in part
provided by a number of organizations involved in the litigation of the territorial restitution
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See Chapter Three.
Clarifying that by March 2016, a final decision on the latter case had not been issued by the entrusted tribunal.
Nevertheless, the information collected by that time was sufficient to reconstruct the case and trace the conduct of
public authorities with reference to the Emberá Katío case.
438
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procedures. The multinational companies responded poorly to an information request, so
information form them is limited. The study aims to contrast the way in which public authorities
performed in each of the instances so as to detect particularities and eventual variations in their
conduct. In this regard, these situations share most factual and contextual elements and are being
addressed by the same decision-makers, the only difference being the moment when the territorial
restitution was requested.
This chapter is organized in three sections. Section I introduces the case’s background. This
includes an account of the social, economic and geopolitical context of the region; the
characterization of the actors – public and private, domestic and international – involved in the
controversy; and the description of the legal foundations of the controversy from the standpoint of
both the legal protection of the mining industry’s foreign investors and the regulation in favor of
ethnic communities. Section II focuses on corresponding territorial restitution processes. It
emphasises the illustration and analysis of the conflicts emerging from the effective recognition of
the ethnic communities’ restitution rights in relation to the interests and expectations of the mining
companies. In this regard, the study seeks to unearth the rationales and argumentative schemes
embedded in the position of the relevant actors throughout the legal processes, as well as establish
possible interconnections between the outcomes of the Emberá Katío case and the conduct of the
Cocomopoca case. Finally, Section III collects the results of the previous observation and reflects
on the likelihood of the alleged normative collision between the legal protection of foreign
investors via international investment agreements and the implementation of the Colombian
transitional justice project. In this regard, it addresses the eventual consequences of the strain on
the conduct of public authorities.
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II.

Background

Following the aim of producing a case study that exemplifies the tension between the legal
protection offered to foreign investment via IIAs and the implementation of a transitional justice
project in Colombia, this section introduces the particular elements that will be considered to
articulate the claimed normative conflict, and produce the corresponding analysis concerning the
regulatory implications of this type of stress. This background highlights the economic, social,
cultural, and ecological conditions that contextualize the facts of the case; the characterization of
the relevant actors involved in the controversy; and, the legal foundations that support the
crystallization of the encounter between these colliding vernaculars.
A. Context
The Alto Atrato region is located in the Chocó department, in the North-West of Colombia, and
includes the Atrato, Bagadó, Cértegui, and Lloró municipalities. Historically, the zone’s
governability has been conditioned by the lack of effective presence of state authorities. This is
evidenced by the fact that it is one of the poorest and least developed enclaves of the country. This
might be explained by its isolation from the main urban centers, as well as by the structural
discriminatory practices that have characterized Colombian society. In this regard, most of its
population have an ethnic origin – indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombian communities and
peasants.
The region has a privileged geostrategic location, since it adjoins with Panama and has access to
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. This condition has led the zone to be one of the main scenarios of
the country’s internal armed conflict. The major armed actors (guerrillas, paramilitary groups,
criminal bands, etc.) have permanently disputed the chance to use the region to conduct
illegal/profitable activities, especially the ones associated with drug trafficking, smuggling,
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kidnapping and extortion. In this context, the high intensity of the warfare between the country’s
armed forces and the illegal armed actors has deeply impacted civilian population. On the other
hand, the zone is recognized by its biodiversity, fertile lands and great amount of valuable mineral
resources that lie unexploited. Therefore, not only has it become subject to economic interest by
the state for its development objectives, but the abovementioned actors of the conflict have sought
their appropriation as a means of financing the belligerent actions.
B. Relevant actors
The characterization of the – public, private, national, and international – actors involved in the
case study’s controversy constituted a preliminary step for the further account of the alleged
normative tension between the adoption of the Colombian transitional justice project and the
interests of certain foreign investors. This explanation is not only instrumental to the understanding
of the particularities of the territorial restitution processes under consideration. It also contributes
to the unveiling of certain features that are relevant for the account of occasional variations in the
conduct of public authorities, which motivated the introduction of a hypothesis concerning the
obstructive potential of IIAs on the country’s sovereign choices as to the implementation of
transitional justice.
1. Victims - ethnic communities and accompanying organizations
i.

The Emberá Katío People

The Emberá Katío people have inhabited North-west Colombia – particularly the Chocó
Department and the Darién region, which borders with Panama – since immemorial times. As a
consequence of the contact with European conquerors, and later with contemporary westernized
Colombians, they had to adapt to the territorial demands of the country’s national project. They
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are grouped around resguardos (reservations)439 to gain recognition and protection from the
Colombian state and preserve a relative degree of self-determination. In accordance with their
ancestral traditions and culture, the Emberá Katío people have developed a unique relationship
with territory and nature that builds on interdependence and survival, and surpasses the common
occidental understandings around private ownership and economic exploitation.
In particular, the Emberá Katío people’s Alto Andágueda reservation, mostly located within the
Bagadó municipality at the Chocó Department, was recognized and constituted in 1979 by means
of a resolution issued by the country’s agrarian authority (Instituto Colombiano de Reforma
Agraria – INCORA), which was then the institution in charge of these matters.440 By 2012 the
resguardo was formed by 31 communities, 1454 families and around 7.000 individuals, living on
50.000 hectares of land. Due to its location and particular features, the area where the resguardo is
located has been one of the most affected by Colombia’s internal armed conflict. Since the year
2000 a great number of indigenous leaders have been assassinated and the community’s property
has been affected by the belligerent actions. This has produced massive waves of forced
displacement that have deeply touched the very physical and cultural survival of the Emberá Katío
people’s Alto Andágueda reservation.
ii.

Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian community

Like the indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombians have inhabited this area for hundreds of years.
Upon their arrival in America in the context of slavery, some were able to escape from the urban
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These are indigenous reservations, established by Colombian law so as to delimit the zones where indigenous
peoples live and develop themselves as social groups with certain level of autonomy, based on their right to selfdetermination. According to the 1991 Constitution, reservations are territorial entities, and the authorities of the
indigenous peoples may exercise their jurisdictional functions within such territorial jurisdiction in accordance with
their own laws and procedures as long as these are not contrary to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic. See
REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 246 and 286.
440
Nowadays the public entity in charge of Colombia’s rural development public policies is Incoder, which inherited
Incora’s mandate regarding the constitution of reservations.
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centers and settled along the Pacific coast, including the Alto Atrato Region. Cocomopoca is an
association composed of 43 communities, which group 3200 families that have traditionally
occupied around 172.000 hectares by the basin of the Andágueda, Capá, and Tumutunendo Rivers.
In this context, they conduct ancestral survival practices with regards to agriculture, fishing, and
hunting. They act as natural care-givers of the tropical forest which they inhabit.
Cocomopoca has as antecedent the Afro-Colombian National Cimarron Movement that was
formed during the 1970s, and formalized as an independent organization in 1982. In the context
of the enactment of the 1991 constitution, the protection of the collective rights of AfroColombians increased, and consolidated with the enactment of law 70 of 1993. After 11 years of
negotiations with the government, in September 2011 the Cocomopoca community was officially
recognized by the national agrarian authority. They received a collective title of 73.000 hectares
within the Atrato, Bagadó, Lloró and Cértegui municipalities, in the Department of Chocó.
2. Foreign investors – mining companies
In accordance with the facts of the case, three multinational mining companies acquired particular
economic interests around the “Dojurá Project” over time: AngloGold Ashanti, Continental Gold
Ltd, and Glencore. By virtue of their transnational nature and the nationality of their shareholders,
they are accounted as foreign investors in light of the safeguards offered by the IIAs concluded by
Colombia with a number of capital-exporting states (Canada, UK, Switzerland, and Peru).
Particularly, they enjoy the protection granted by these agreements, including the possibility to
claim damages against Colombia, before an investor-state arbitration tribunal. As will be
illustrated, they perform a contentious role on the occasion of the Colombian transitional justice
project’s territorial restitution procedures.
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iii.

AngloGold Ashanti (South Africa and United Kingdom)

AngloGold Ashanti (hereinafter AGA) is one of the world’s largest mining companies and
concentrates most of its activity in the extraction of gold. It was formed in 2004 by the merger of
two chief businesses: AngloGold, a company majority-owned by the British Anglo American plc;
and the Ghana-based Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, founded by the British citizen Edwin Cade
during colonial occupation.441 The consolidated AGA now forms the second largest gold producer
in the globe with prospective interests in 7 countries – one of which is Colombia – and 20 effective
projects in 10 countries.442 The company mainly belongs to investors from the United States,
Canada and South Africa, and while it was legally incorporated in the latter, it is also listed in the
New York, Euronext, and Australian stock exchanges.443 AGA has been accused of being involved
in environmental damage and human rights abuses. For instance, in 2011, the company was
accused by several NGOs of irresponsible behavior that ended in the contamination of land and
poisoning of people in Ghana.444
AGA showed initial interest in Colombia in 1999, when its predecessor AngloGold acquired 50%
of Corona Goldfields through an exploration agreement with its parent, Conquistador Mines Ltd.,
a Canadian Corporation dedicated to the extraction of gold in the Antioquia and South Bolivar
regions.445 However, after it was established that Conquistador Mines had apparently been

See DUMETT, Raymond E. “Edwin Cade and Frederick Gordon: British Imperialism and the Foundation of the
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, West Africa”, in DUMETT, Raymond E. (Ed.), Mining Tycoons in the Age of Empire
1870-1945. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009, p. 64.
442
See ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI, “Lo que usted debe saber sobre AngloGold Ashanti 2014,” p. 48. Retrieved from
http://www.anglogoldashanticolombia.com/todo-lo-debes-saber-sobre-anglogold-ashanti/ (last accessed March 20
2016).
443
See ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI. “Delisting and cancellation of securities from the London Stock Exchange.”
Retrieved from http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/en/Media/news/Pages/20140926_Delisting.aspx (last accessed
Marco 20 2016).
444
See GREEN PEACE. “South African Company 'Wins' Public Eye Award.” January 31 2011. Retrieved from
http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/News/news/South-African-Corp-Wins-Public-Eye-Award/
(last
accessed
March 20 2016).
445
See ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI. “Conquistador Mines Ltd. and AngloGold South America Limited enter into
Colombian Exploration Agreement.” November 19 1999. Retrieved from http://www.infomine.com/index/pr/Pa033
441
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involved in human rights abuses associated with the presence of paramilitary groups at the Simití
municipality, AngloGold decided not to continue with the agreement.446 At a later date, in February
2003, the companies Kedahda Ltd. and Kedahda Segunda Ltd were created in Virgin British
Islands with AGA capital,447 in order to prepare their arrival in Colombia by the end of that year.448
In effect, AGA initially entered in the country as Sociedad Kedahda Ltd.,449 created in September
2003 and whose object was performing exploration, exploitation, and commercialization activities,
in areas subject to concession contracts concluded with the Colombian government.
While the new subsidiary started submitting proposals beginning in 2004, it was only in 2006 that
it celebrated its first concession contracts with Colombia’s mining authorities. By 2007, it acquired
exploration rights and initiated prospecting activities over a zone known as “La Colosa” in the
Tolima department. Along with the “Gramalote” project, “La Colosa” is AGA’s main interest in
Colombia.450 In 2008, the company changed its name to AngloGold Ashanti in order to consolidate
the global commercial brand in their businesses in Colombia.451 By July 2015, AGA had invested
around 350 million dollars in Colombia. It has acquired 504 mining titles and expects the resolution

051.PDF. REVISTA DINERO “Minería Colombiana, Diamante en Bruto.” Revista Dinero, March 14 2008. Retrieved
from http://www.dinero.com/edicion-impresa/negocios/articulo/mineria-colombiana-diamante-bruto (last accessed
March 20 2016.)
446
See COUMANS, Catherine. “A sample of Canadian mining companies operating in developing countries accused
of human rights and environmental abuses”. Mining Watch Canada, June 7 2007, p. 3. Retrieved from
http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/www.miningwatch.ca/files/Problematic_Canadian_Mining_Cases_0.pdf (last acce
ssed March 20 2016)
447
By means of this territory’s “International Business Companies Act”, which allows the incorporation of such type
of businesses, in exchange of favorable fiscal conditions with regards to tax and other duties exemptions.
448
See MOLANO, Jorge. “AngloGold Ashanti: la Voracidad de las Multinacionales de la Muerte, el Saqueo y la
Destrucción.” Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos (TPP) Capítulo Colombia, 2006. Retrieved from
http://www.omal.info/IMG/doc/documento_final_tpp.doc (last accessed March 20 2016.)
449
See PULIDO, Alejo. “Las preguntas detrás de AngloGold Ashanti.” La Silla Vacía, June 30 2011. Retrieved from
http://lasillavacia.com/historia/las-preguntas-detras-de-anglogold-ashanti-25503 (last accessed March 20 2016.)
450
See ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI, “Lo que usted debe saber sobre AngloGold Ashanti 2014”, p. 48. Retrieved from
http://www.anglogoldashanticolombia.com/todo-lo-debes-saber-sobre-anglogold-ashanti/ (last accessed March 20
2016.)
451
See ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI, “Lo que usted debe saber sobre AngloGold Ashanti 2014”, p. 9. Retrieved from
http://www.anglogoldashanticolombia.com/todo-lo-debes-saber-sobre-anglogold-ashanti/ (last accessed March 20
2016.)

182
of 3074 pending requests, which are distributed in 21 departments of the country, including
Chocó.452
AGA’s modus operandi goes through the constitution of commercial societies for each of its
projects – such as Exploration’s Chocó Colombia S.A.S. in the case under study – and joint venture
contracts with other mining companies, so as to diversify the associated risks. Yet, these private
entities belong to the multinational corporation.453 AGA claims to have a strong corporate social
responsibility scheme. In that regard, it recalls its affiliation to social and environmental standardsetting initiatives, such as IFC’s Environmental and Social Performance Standards, Global Pact’s
Voluntary Principles, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, and the UN Principles on
Business and Human Rights.454
After Antioquia and Tolima, Chocó is the department with the most hectares which have been
entitled in favor of AGA, notwithstanding the numerous solicitudes that are still under study.455
According to the latest available data and not including the concession contracts previously
concluded with the Colombian government, while in 2012 the company was granted 3 mining
titles in the region, by 2013 it acquired 5 more.456

See EBUS. Bram. “Los lunares de AngloGold Ashanti”. Las Dos Orillas, October 23 2014,
http://www.las2orillas.co/los-lunares-de-anglogold-ashanti/ (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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Particularidades en el Departamento del Chocó. El Caso del Proyecto Dojurá”. Centro de Estudios para la Justicia
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In the context of the case under analysis, AGA submitted a concession bid with regards to the
territory under dispute as early as 2005. Since 2008, Colombian mining authorities granted mining
titles as follows:
Table 3: Mining titles owned by AGA which overlap with the Alto Andágueda indigenous
reservation

Year

Concession
Contract

Mining
Title

2008

Titleholder

Municipalities
included

Extension
within
indigenous
reservation
(Hct.)

Ratio of
title within
indigenous
reservation
(%)

Period

State

Pueblo Rico /
Bagadó

122,4

34,4

-

Under
study

2.272

96,3

2038

Granted

9,8

2,36

2039

Granted

5,7

1,5

2039

Granted

3.143

40, 7

2039

Granted

800,2

67,3

2039

Granted

612,9

54,7

2039

Granted

2.516

59,7

2041

Granted

GEQBagadó
09Q
GEBBagadó
09F
GEBAngloGold
Bagadó
09G
Ashanti
L 685
Colombia
GEBPueblo Rico /
2009
S.A.
09B
Bagadó / Tadó
HJNBagadó
15231
HJNBagadó
15251
GEQ2011
Bagadó
105
Total of (requested and granted) titles’ hectares within the
indigenous reservation

9.482

Source: Legal File, AGA Submission answering the complaint in the Alto Andágueda Case, p. 3.
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Table 4: Mining titles owned by AGA overlapping with the Cocomopoca collective territory

Year

Concession
Contract

Mining
Title

Titleholder

Municipalities
included

GEB09A
GEBBagadó
09B
GEBBagadó
09F
GEBPueblo Rico /
2009
09G
Bagadó / Tadó
IDAAngloGold
16081
Ashanti
L 685
Colombia
HJNBagadó
S.A.
15231
HJNBagadó
15251
IDA16121
2010
GEB09H
GEQ2011
Bagadó
105
Total of (requested and granted) titles’ hectares within the
Afro-Colombian territory

Extension
within
indigenous
reservation
(Hct.)

Ratio of
title within
indigenous
reservation
(%)

Period

State

76,6

100

2039

Granted

2.891

37,5

2039

Granted

418,26

100

2039

Granted

365,8

96

2039

Granted

921,2

100

2039

Granted

1.187

99,9

2039

Granted

1.119,7

100

2039

Granted

1.520,3

90,8

2040

Granted

1.621,4

99

2040

Granted

1.711,5

40,7

2041

Granted

10.832,76

Source: Legal File, AGA Submission answering the complaint in the Alto Andágueda Case, p. 3.
In the context of Concession contract L685, between 2008 and 2011 AngloGold Ashanti received
11 mining titles, which overlap the region's ethnic territories by around 20.000 hectares. With
regards to the lands collectively owned by the Emberá Katío community, 6 mining titles overlap
9.842 hectares of the area of the Alto Andágueda indigenous reservation, with additional title
requests which are still pending. In turn, 10 mining titles overlap 10.832,76 hectares of the
territories of the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian community.

185
iv.

Continental Gold Ltd (Canada)

Continental Gold Limited (herein CGL) is an advanced-stage exploration and development
company focused on becoming the leading gold producer in Colombia.457 It was incorporated in
Bermuda in April 2007 under the Companies Act 1981,458 and carries out its operations through a
corporate office in Toronto (Canada) and a foreign company branch office in Medellín (Colombia).
In March 2010, it amalgamated with the Canadian company Cronus Resources Ltd. through a
venture exchange and is currently listed in the Toronto stock exchange.459 The company was
founded by Robert W. Allen, a citizen of the United States that arrived in Colombia during the
1980s looking for investment opportunities in the extractive sector. Allen initiated a world-wide
business in the industry with a domestic company named “The Bullet Group” in 1994, after
discovering gold mines in Antioquia department.460
According to the company’s 2015 annual information report, its corporate social responsibility
model is aligned with international performance standards. The company aims to protect the
environment, deliver effective and sustainable community development, and improve the quality
of life for its employees and contractors, their families, and the immediate community.461 The
company’s signature project, named “Buriticá” and located in the Antioquia department, is its only
operative property interest so far, and has been told to be one of Colombia’s greatest extractive

See THE GOLD REPORT “Continental Gold Inc.” Retrieved from http://www.theaureport.com/pub/co/cnl-tsx
(last accessed March 20 2016.)
458
See SEDAR. “Continental Gold Inc.” Retrieved from www.sedar.com/DisplayProfile.do?lang=EN&issuerType=
03&issuerNo=00004532. (last accessed March 20 2016.)
459
See CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD. “Annual Information Form for the Year ended December 31, 2014”, March 6
2015, p.3. Retrieved from www.conti/files/doc_financials/2014/Q4/CNL-_-YE-2014AIF_Final[1]_v001_l1tc91.pdf
(last accessed March 20 2016.)
460
See JIMÉNEZ MORALES, Germán. “Un paisa sentó a Mr. Allen en una montaña de oro”. El
Colombiano, September 11 2010. Retrieved from http://www.elcolombiano.com/un_paisa_sento_a_mr_allen_en_un
a_montana_de_oro-LEEC_103989 (last accessed March 20 2016.)
461
CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD. “Annual Information Form for the Year ended December 31, 2014”, March 6 2015,
p. 10. Retrieved from www.continentalgold.com/files/doc_financials/2014/Q4/CNL-_-YE-2014AIF_Final[1]_v001_
(last accessed March 20 2016.)
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prospects, because of a rare combination of factors: size, grade, growth-potential, and excellent
metallurgy.462 On the other hand, its portfolio includes three early-stage projects for which it has
received mining titles: Berlin, Dominical, and Dojurá.463 The latter is the one subject of
consideration in this study.
In the context of the case under examination, in 2011, the company created a subsidiary in
Bermuda (CGL Dojura Holdings Limited), which in turn constituted a commercial society in
Colombia (CGL Dojura S.A.S.) to comply with that country’s domestic mining legislation for the
eventual conclusion of concession contracts.464 In October 2006, CGL entered into an assignment
agreement with AngloGold Ashanti in respect of the Dojura property, with the purpose of
transferring 51% of the former company’s interests in the project in exchange for the latter’s
assuming exploration expenditures and other payments from the date it began exploration. While
CGL received payments from AGA in 2011 and 2012, these payments stopped in 2013, due to the
emergence of apparent uncertainty as to whether the project would stay on track, given the increase
of armed conflict in the zone. In 2014, AGA announced that it no longer wished to pursue a joint
venture,465 so Continental Gold Ltd maintained economic interests over the Dojura project.
In the context of the case under analysis, Continental Gold entered into a concession contract with
the Colombian mining authorities in 2010, obtaining one mining title as follows:

See CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD. “Buriticá Project.” Retrieved from http://www.continentalgold.com/en/projec
ts-2/projects/ (last accessed March 20 2016).
463
See CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD, “Annual Information Form for the Year ended December 31, 2014”, March 6
2015, p.6. Retrieved from www.continentalgold.com/files/doc_financials/2014/Q4/CNL (last accessed March 20
2016).
464
See CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD, “Annual Information Form for the Year ended December 31, 2014”, March 6
2015, p.3. Retrieved from www.continentalgold.com/files/doc_financials/2014/Q4/CNL (last accessed March 20
2016.)
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See CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD, “Annual Information Form for the Year ended December 31, 2013”, p.23.
Retrieved from www.continentalgold.com/files/doc_financials/2013/CNL_2013%20Annual%20Financial%20State
ments_Final_v001_i05b6c.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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Table 5: Mining titles owned by Continental Gold overlapping the Alto Andágueda indigenous
reservation

Concession
Contract

Year

Mining
Title

Titleholder

Municipalities
included

Continen
tal Gold
Ltd.
2010
L 685
FHK-148
Bagadó / Lloró
(Capricor
nio
SOM)466
Total of (requested and granted) titles’ hectares within the
indigenous reservation

Extension
within
indigenous
reservation
(Hct.)

Ratio of title
within
indigenous
reservation
(%)

Period

State

2.322,1

30%

2040

Granted

2.322,1

Source: Legal File, AGA Submission answering the complaint in the Alto Andágueda Case, p. 3.
Table 6: Mining titles owned by Continental Gold overlapping the Cocomopoca collective
territory

Concession
Contract

Year

Mining
Title

Titleholder

Municipalities
included

Continental
Gold Ltd.
2010
L 685
Bagadó / Lloró
(Capricornio
SOM)
Total of (requested and granted) titles’ hectares within the
Afro-Colombian territory
FHK148

Extension
within
indigenous
reservation
(Hct.)

Ratio of title
within
indigenous
reservation
(%)

Period

State

2.189

28,3%

2040

Granted

2.189

Source: Legal File, AGA Submission answering the complaint in the Alto Andágueda Case, p. 3.
In the context of Concession contract L685, in the year 2010, Continental Gold Ltd. received 2
mining titles, which are overlapping the region's ethnic territories by around 2,500 hectares. With
regards to the lands collectively owned by the Emberá Katío community, 1 mining title
superimposes 2.322,1 hectares of the area of the Alto Andágueda indigenous reservation. In turn,

According to Continental Gold’s submission in the Alto Andágueda case (p. 12), although Capricornio SOM
appears as the concessionary in contract FHK-148, the corresponding mining titles were ceded to the former company.
466
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1 mining title overlaps 2.189 hectares of the territories of the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian
community.
v.

Glencore (Switzerland and Peru)

Glencore Plc is an Anglo-Swiss mining company, created through a merger between Glencore and
Xtrata in 2003, two companies involved in the extractive and energy sectors.467 Currently, the
company is considered a leading producer and marketer of commodities operating worldwide. It
has operations around the world spanning a network of more than 90 offices located in over 50
countries.468 It arrived in Colombia in 1995 as it acquired CI Prodeco, a business dedicated to
operating several open-pit coal mines in the country (Calenturitas and La Jagua).469 In this
context, the company was accused of paying the associates of paramilitary killers to incite the
forced displacement of people, in order to occupy their lands near the project.470 In 2000, Glencore
acquired 33% of the state-owned coal mine “El Cerrejón”, which is considered one of the largest
mines of its kind in the world.471
Glencore’s interests over the Dojura project developed in a different way. Empresa Minera los
Quenuales (EMQ), a Peruvian subsidiary of Glencore International (Glencore Finance,
incorporated in Bermuda), was created in 2006 as the result of the amalgamation of two mining

467

See BLAS, Javier. "Glencore finishes takeover of Xstrata". Financial Times, 2 May 2013. Retrieved from
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9d355d82-b31a-11e2-95b3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3fFgxqOVS (last accessed March 20
2016).
468
See GLENCORE, “Annual Report 2014”, p. 38, Retrieved from www.glencore.com/assets/investors/doc/reports_and_results/2014/GLEN-2014-AnnualReport.pdf
(last accessed March 20 2016.)
469
See PRODECO. “Our History”. Retrieved from http://www.prodeco.com.co/index.php/en/company/our-history/
(last accessed March 20 2016.)
470
See SWEENY, John. “Panorama questions over Glencore mines.” BBC, 16 April 2012. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.com/news/17702487 (last accessed March 20 2016.)
471
See CERREJON. “Nuestra Empresa”. Retrieved from http://www.cerrejon.com/site/nuestraempresa/historia/nues
tra-historia-2000.aspx (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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companies that had exploited old deposits of different minerals in this country.472 One of EMQ’s
subsidiaries, Dowea S.A.S.,473 constituted in turn a subsidiary in Colombia in 2010.474 In 2013,
Dowea S.A.S. acquired 51% of the Colombian company Exploraciones Chocó Colombia S.A.S.475
While the latter was originally created by AngloGold Ashanti Colombia,476 a joint venture
agreement entailing the transfer of the operation’s direct management was accorded with “another
Company”,477 which turned out to be Dowea. A report issued by the Colombian Superintendence
of Industry and Commerce established that an economic integration process was conducted
between AngloGold Ashanti and Dowea according to which the latter acquired indirect control of
Exploraciones Chocó Colombia, property of the former South African company, by means of the
acquisition of 51% of the corresponding shares.478
In the context of the case under analysis, Exploraciones Chocó Colombia (Glencore) formulated a
concession bid with regards to the disputed territory in 2008. Thus, Colombian mining authorities
granted mining titles as follows:

See GLENCORE. “Operaciones en Perú”. Retrieved from www.glencoreperu.pe/ES/QuienesSomos/Paginas/Divi
si%C3%B3nSurdelPer%C3%BA.aspx; BNAMERICAS. “Empresa Minera los Quenuales.” Retrieved from http://w
ww.bnamericas.com/company-profile/en/empresa-minera-los-quenuales-sa-minera-los-quenuales (last accessed 20
2016.)
473
See BLOOMEBERG BUSINESS. “Company Overview of Dowea SAS”, Retrieved from www.bloomberg.com/r
esearch/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=236768417 (last accessed March 20 2016.)
474
See GRUPOGIA. “Dowea SAS.” Retrieved from http://www.grupogia.com/en/nit/900387269 (last accessed
March 20 2016.)
475
See PORTAFOLIO. “Las movidas del 2013 que ‘menos ruido’ hicieron.” Portafolio, January 2 2014. Retrieved
from http://www.portafolio.co/negocios/movidas-empresariales-del-2013 (last accessed March 20 2016.)
476
See UNIDAD INVESTIGATIVA EL TIEMPO. “Los dueños de las minas”. El Tiempo, November 30 2012.
Retrieved from www.eltiempo.com (last accessed March 20 2016.)
477
See ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI, “Lo que usted debe saber sobre AngloGold Ashanti 2014”, p. 10. Retrieved from
http://www.anglogoldashanticolombia.com/todo-lo-debes-saber-sobre-anglogold-ashanti/ (last accessed March 20
2016.)
478
See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE INDUSTRIA Y COMERCIO. March 11 2013. Retrieved from http://www.sic.g
ov.co/recursos_user/documentos/Competencia/Integraciones/Resoluciones/Integraciones/2013/Marzo/13-0352233.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
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Table 7: Mining titles owned by Glencore overlapping the Alto Andágueda indigenous reservation

Year

Concession
Contract

Mining
Title

Titleholder

Municipal
ities
included

GEQ –
Bagadó /
Explorac
09C
Lloró
iones
GEQ –
Bagadó /
2008
L 685
Chocó
09D
Lloró
Colombi
GEQ –
Bagadó –
a SAS
O9K
El Camren
Total of (requested and granted) titles’ hectares within
the indigenous reservation

Extension
within
indigenous
reservation
(Hct.)

Ratio of
title within
indigenous
reservation
(%)

Period

State

199,9

4

2038

Granted

1.208,8

59,7

2038

Granted

0,6

0,1

2038

Granted

1.409,3

Source: Legal File, AGA Submission answering the complaint in the Alto Andágueda Case, p. 3.
Table 8: Mining titles owned by Glencore overlapping the Cocomopoca collective territory

Year

Concession
Contract

Mining
Title

Titleholder

Municipal
ities
included

GEB –
Bagadó
Explorac
09I
iones
GEQ –
Bagadó /
2008
L 685
Chocó
09C
Lloró
Colombi
GEQ –
Bagadó –
a SAS
O9D
Lloró
Total of (requested and granted) titles’ hectares within
the indigenous reservation

Extension
within
indigenous
reservation
(Hct.)

Ratio of
title within
indigenous
reservation
(%)

17,26

100

1.095,3

21,9

2038

Granted

90,06

4,5

2038

Granted

Period

State

Granted

1.202,62

Source: Legal File, AGA Submission answering the complaint in the Alto Andágueda Case, p. 3.
In the context of Concession contract L685, in the year 2008 Exploraciones Chocó Colombia SAS
(Glencore) received 4 mining titles, which are overlapping the region's ethnic territories in around
2.600 hectares. With regards to the lands collectively owned by the Emberá Katío community, 3
mining titles overlap 1.409,3 hectares of the area of the Alto Andágueda indigenous reservation.
In turn, 1 mining title overlaps 1.202,62 hectares of the territories of the Cocomopoca AfroColombian community.
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3. Public authorities involved in the conflict and its solution
The third group of relevant actors is perhaps the most representative for the purpose of identifying
eventual regulatory setbacks in the effective implementation of transitional justice’s land
restitution measures within the spectrum of foreign investment protection. Public authorities are
in charge of implementing the state’s Constitutional Order. As a result, they have taken an active
part in several public actions related to the case: the conclusion of international investment
agreements; the attraction of the multinational mining companies involved in the extractive
enterprise that overlaps the lands of the ethnic groups beneficiaries of transitional justice; and, the
carrying out of the territorial restitution processes that entered into conflict with the economic
interests arising from the conclusion of concession contracts around the multinational mining
companies.
vi.

Public authorities associated with the promotion of foreign investment and the
regulation of the extractive sector

As provided by the country’s Constitution, the ministries are the heads of public administration on
their respective issues, which correspond to diverse public policy areas. Under the direction of the
president of the republic, it is their responsibility to formulate policies pertaining to their portfolio,
direct the administrative operations, and execute the law.479
-

Ministry of Mining and adjunct mining authorities

The Ministry of Mining is the executive head of the mining-energy sector. It is in charge of the
articulation of the related public policies, including the adoption of general plans on the economic
aspects of mining, the designation of special mining areas, and the regulation of concrete aspects
of the exploration and extraction of natural resources.480 The Ministry has a series of adjunct public

479
480

See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 208.
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Decreto 381/2012, art. 1-2.
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entities that perform specialized functions in accordance with the requirements of the field.481
Principally, the National Mining Agency was created to administer the mining resources owned
by the state, promote their optimal and sustainable use, and follow-up on private titles in case they
have been granted to private parties.482 In this regard, the Agency is entrusted to enter into
concession agreements for the purpose of exploration and extraction activities upon the granting
of mining titles.483
-

Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and adjunct investment-promotion entities

The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism came into being after the fusion of the Ministry
of Economic Development and the Ministry of International Trade in 2002.484 As an executive
authority, the Ministry is in charge of formulating, adopting and coordinating the policies on
economic development related to competitiveness, integration and the expansion of productive
sectors, including the promotion of international trade and investment.485 As a result, the
Ministry’s Foreign Investment Division represents the country in the conclusion of international
trade and investment agreements. The Division must design the corresponding negotiation
strategy and eventually assume the defense of the nation in the settlement of disputes with foreign
investors.486
vii.

Public authorities associated with the implementation of Colombian transitional justice

The implementation of the reparation component of the Colombian transitional justice project
principally lies in a number of entities created by the Victims Law and its supplementary regulation
– the Land Restitution Unit and the Land Restitution judiciary. Likewise, this task is partly

481

See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Decreto 381/2012, art. 3.
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Decreto 4134/2011, art. 3.
483
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Decreto 4134/2011, art. 4.
484
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 790/2002, art. 4.
485
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Decreto 210/2003, art. 1.
486
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Decreto 210/2003, art. 14 and 17.
482
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entrusted to the entities that form the Public Ministry, which in turn are in charge of effectively
overseeing the inspection, vigilance and control of public authorities, as well as the promotion and
protection of human rights.487
-

Land Restitution Unit

Along with the Victims Unit, the Land Restitution Unit is one of the main institutions that was
created on the occasion of the releasing of the Colombian transitional justice project. It is
subscribed to the Ministry of Agriculture and serves as the executive authority, materializing the
land restitution component in the context of the victims’ right to reparation.488 The Unit, on behalf
of the victims, is in charge of activating the individual and collective land restitution procedures,
which include both administrative and judicial stages.489
-

Land Restitution Judiciary

In order to conduct the judicial portion of the individual and collective land restitution processes,
the Victims Law provided for the creation of an interim land restitution judiciary. It is composed
of First-instance Judges (Jueces Civiles del Circuito especializados en restitución de tierras) and
Second-instance Tribunals (Tribunales Superiores especializados en restitución de tierras). They
are mandated to study precautionary measure requests linked to a potential land restitution process,
and to make a final decision regarding these redress claims.490
-

Public Ministry (Office of the Ombudsman, Human Rights Bureau)

The Public Ministry is an autonomous group of authorities whose responsibility is the defense and
promotion of human rights, the protection the public interest and overseeing the country’s fiscal
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See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 275-284.
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 1448/2011, art. 103-104.
489
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 1448/2011, art. 82.
490
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 1448/2011, art. 119.
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management and the official conduct of those who perform public interests, in accordance with
the constitutional mandate.491 It is composed by three organs: The Human Rights Bureau
(Procuraduría General), the People’s Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), and the Comptroller
General (Contraloría General). In the particular context of the judiciary, as the representative of
the interests of society, the agents of the Public Ministry take on an active role in the conduct of
the judicial processes as they are in charge of verifying the observance of due process and the
respect of judicial guarantees.492 The Victims Law contemplates that a representative of the Human
Rights Bureau must follow-up every land restitution process, and must eventually intervene so as
to safeguard the respect of public interests.493
III.

Legal foundations of the controversy

As explained in the preceding chapters, the tension that is here analyzed takes place within the
Colombian Constitutional Order (CCO). The CCO is envisaged as a normative site where the
transnational legal processes – the protection offered to foreign investment via international
investment agreements, and the implementation of a transitional justice project – encounter one
another. As a result, these instances of transnational legality push the state, the regulatory
authority, to act in two opposite directions: preservation vs. transformation. Therefore, since this
case study occurs within a particular normative context, it is necessary to properly introduce the
legal foundations involved in the controversy. On the one side of the spectrum one finds the norms
produced to encourage the arrival of and secure protection to the multinational mining companies
whose interests were apparently affected. On the other side, there is the public regulation that has
supposedly infringed the rights and expectations of foreign investors. These legal references are

491

See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 118.
See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Constitución Política, 1991, art. 275-284.
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See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 1448/2011, art. 119.
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valuable in understanding the following sections, which address the illustration and the socio-legal
analysis of this normative collision, in search of specific patterns.
A. Promotion and legal protection of foreign investment and mining regulation
The legal basis for the promotion and protection of multinational mining companies that take part
in this case is composed of two elements. The first element is comprised of the international
investment agreements by which Colombia – and particularly the state’s public authorities –
acquired particular behavioral obligations with regards to the entitlements and expectations of the
aforementioned foreign investors, whose legal constitution took place in Canada, Peru,
Switzerland and the UK. Further, the second element corresponds to the mining regulation
according to which the involved companies concluded concession contracts with the country and
thus acquired a number of mining titles and an associated prospect of profit. Jointly considered,
these norms are the source of the interests that were supposedly affected by the territorial
restitution processes in favor of the Emberá Katío and Cocomopoca communities.
1. International Investment Agreements concluded between Colombia and Canada, USA,
Switzerland and Peru
As explained in chapter three, the international investment agreements (IIAs) concluded between
Colombia and capital-exporting countries were designed to confer abundant protection to the
foreign investors of a country establishing in the other’s jurisdiction. This safeguard includes the
inclusion of two complementary elements: a series of behavioral standards that host governments
must observe in their relations with foreign investors, and a dispute-settlement mechanism that the
latter can use to request damages and other redressing measures upon the breach of the obligations
included in the IIAs. In turn, it was contended that based on these safeguards, multinational
companies – such as the ones involved in the case under analysis – may have decided to arrive in
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Colombia upon the promise of a stable and predictable operational environment. Therefore, it is
necessary to introduce the international investment agreements that purportedly contributed to
attracting the mining corporations whose titles are superimposed on the collective territories of the
ethnic communities of the case. These IIAs offer an alternative to review the governmental
regulatory actions that affected their interests.
Provided the nature, structure and background of the multinational mining companies involved in
the case (AngloGold Ashanti, Continental Gold Ltd and Glencore), the following chart introduces
the IIAs that are alleged to be the source of obligations for Colombian authorities and correlative
protection in favor of foreign investors:
Table 9: international investment agreements with relevance in the case
Country

Canada

Peru

Type of treaty
Free Trade
Agreement
(investment
chapter)
Bilateral
Investment
Treaty

Signature

Legal
incorporation

Constitutional
revision

Foreign
investor
covered

November 2008

Law 1363 of
2009

Decision C-608
of 2010

Continental
Gold Ltd

December 2007

Law 1342 of
2009

Decision C-377
of 2010

Switzerland

Bilateral
Investment
Treaty

May 2006

Law 1198 of
2008

Decision C-150
of 2009

United
Kingdom

Bilateral
Investment
Treaty

March 2010

Law 1464 of
2011

Decision C-169
of 2012

EMQ –
Dowea
(ExploChoco)
Glencore –
EMQ –
Dowea
(ExploChoco)
AngloGold
Ashanti

Source: direct consultation to the legal instruments.
These agreements include similar provisions with regards to the extent of protection to foreign
investors: fair and equitable treatment; protection against direct and indirect expropriations without
compensation; and a mechanism to settle disputes between investors and host states through
international arbitration.
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With regards to the extent of protection, the treaties provide very similar definitions of investor
and investment. In general terms, investors are deemed as natural persons, nationals of a party, and
legal entities incorporated in or organized under the law of a party that have seat, and substantial
economic activities within the jurisdiction of this country, which seem to make, are making, or
have made an investment.494 In turn, investment is defined as the economic assets that are property
of the investor. The latter include contracts, and particularly concession agreements granted by
administrative acts on the search, extraction and exploitation of natural resources.495 Concerning
the IIAs’ scope of application, the agreements are effective on investments made prior to or after
their entry into force. However, they do not bind a party in relation to acts or facts, source of claims
or disputes, that took place prior to the treaties’ entry into force.496
The fair and equitable treatment standard, included in all the agreements, provides for the
obligation not to impair by unreasonable and discriminatory measures the management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension, sale, and liquidation of investments. While the
agreements entered into with Switzerland and the UK exclusively refer to this safeguard, the
accords signed with Peru and Canada include additional references to full protection and security,
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See Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (2006), art. 1; Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of Colombia (2010), art.
I; Canada – Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2008), art. 838; Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la República Del Perú y
el Gobierno de la República de Colombia sobre Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones (2007), art. 42.
495
See Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (2006), art. 1 (e); Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of Colombia
(2010), art. I (v); Canada – Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2008), art. 838 (j); Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la
República Del Perú y el Gobierno de la República de Colombia sobre Promoción y Protección Recíproca de
Inversiones (2007), art. 42 (e).
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See Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (2006), art. 2; Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of Colombia (2010), art.
XIII; Canada – Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2008), art. 801; Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la República Del Perú
y el Gobierno de la República de Colombia sobre Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones (2007), art. 1 (3).
496
See Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (2006), art. 1 (2) (c).
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and minimum treatment. Importantly, the agreements clarify that this standard entails the
obligation not to deny justice in administrative proceedings, in accordance with the principle of
due process.497
In turn, the non-expropriation without compensation standard was included in all the agreements,
and provides for protection against both the direct taking of the investors’ property and the indirect
impact on their economic interests through measures which have the same effect. In the latter case,
measures taken for reasons of public interest, in a non-discriminatory manner, in accordance with
due process of law, and accompanied by prompt, effective, and adequate compensation are
permitted.498 In addition, all the treaties except for the one with Switzerland include a detailed
explanation of the content and extent of indirect expropriation (measures which have an equivalent
effect as direct expropriation without entailing the formal transfer of a title or seizure). In that
regard, the determination of indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case fact-based inquiry,
which should consider the economic impact of the measure, the degree of interference with distinct
and reasonable expectations, as well as its character. Thus, non-discriminatory measures, taken for
reasons of public interest (including public health, safety, and the protection of the environment),
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See Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (2006), art. 4 (1) and (2); Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of
Colombia (2010), art. II (2) and (3); Canada – Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2008), art. 805; Acuerdo entre el
Gobierno de la República Del Perú y el Gobierno de la República de Colombia sobre Promoción y Protección
Recíproca de Inversiones (2007), art. 4.
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See Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (2006), art. 6; Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of Colombia (2010), art.
VI; Canada – Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2008), art. 811; Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la República Del Perú
y el Gobierno de la República de Colombia sobre Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones (2007), art. 11.
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proportionate, not arbitrary, and taken with good faith, are not considered tantamount to indirect
expropriation.499
Further, all the IIAs include similar provisions regarding the settlement of disputes between states
and foreign investors through international arbitration. When a dispute arises between a party and
an investor of the other party, in connection with the interpretation or application of the agreement,
the matter can be differed to either the country’s administrative courts or to international
arbitration. While the law governing the arbitration procedure is considered international law, the
tribunal may take into consideration the law of the disputing party. Yet, it has no jurisdiction to
determine the legality of the measure alleged to be in breach of the agreement under the domestic
law of the disputing party. Additionally, in the case when the acts of public authorities are
involved, local remedies must be exhausted. The dispute settlement choice is final, as is the award
in the case of international arbitration, which binds the parties and should be immediately
executed.500
2. Mining regulation: Law 685 of 2001
The current mining code – Law 685 of 2001 – was passed in the context of the expansion of
economic liberalization in Colombia, and around the time the country started concluding the
majority of IIAs with capital-exporting countries.501 The emerging norm compiled the principal
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See Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of Colombia (2010), art. VI; Canada – Colombia Free
Trade Agreement (2008), annex 811; Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la República Del Perú y el Gobierno de la
República de Colombia sobre Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones (2007), annex C.
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See Agreement between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments (2006), art. 11 and Protocol, ad. art.11; See Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
Republic of Colombia (2010), art. IX; See Canada – Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2008), art. 818-838; Acuerdo
entre el Gobierno de la República Del Perú y el Gobierno de la República de Colombia sobre Promoción y Protección
Recíproca de Inversiones (2007), art. 18-33.
501
Law 685 was enacted after a failed attempt to introduce a similar norm in 1996. It is a revised version of the
previous mining code – Decree 2655 of 1988, which was a tangible outcome of the implementation in the country of
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regulation around the legal relations between the state and the private parties in the context of the
mining industry,502 which was defined as a public-utility activity subject to social interest
considerations.503 The mining code is founded on the aim of promoting the exploration and
exploitation of the country’s mining resources so as to satisfy the internal and external demand
within a framework of sustainability.504 It reiterates a constitutional provision according to which
the minerals found in the soil and the subsoil of the national territory are exclusive property of the
state, regardless of the ownership conditions of the overlapped area.505 In this regard, the right to
prospect and exploit natural resources can only be granted by the state, by means of the
subscription of concession contracts that entail the constitution of a mining title in favor of a private
party.506
Law 685 states that, foreign private parties intending to take part in the mineral exploration and
exploitation process, have the same rights and obligations as Colombian nationals for the purpose
of conducting these economic activities on national territory. Yet, it is stipulated that in order to
submit a concession bid, they must constitute a commercial society domiciled in Colombia that
would act as a subsidiary of the matrix company.507 The resulting concession contract would have
a maximum term of 30 years and could be renewed for an identical period.508 On the other hand,
the mining code establishes that extractive activities performed on the territory of ethnic
communities must be in agreement with the principle of cultural integrity. Accordingly, every

IMF’s structural adjustment programs that commanded a transition into an extractivist economy. See SILVA,
Shameel. “El Código de Minas: una de las rodillas temblorosas del Establecimiento. El caso de Guamocóe”, Prensa
Rural, March 27 2009. Retrieved from http://www.prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article2080 (last accessed March 20
2016.)
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REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 685/2001, art. 2.
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See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 685/2001, art. 13.
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See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA, Congreso de la República. Ley 685/2001, art. 1.
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actor involved in the extractive industry is obliged to develop its economic enterprise in a way that
the cultural, social, and economic values of ethnic communities, who are the traditional occupants
of the area subject to concession, are not affected.509 On that point, the law provides for the
constitution of indigenous and Afro-Colombian mining zones,510 which confer a “preference right”
in favor of the benefitted communities to exclusively conduct extractive activities within aid
zone.511 However, third parties may be contracted by the ethnic groups to conduct activities
(whether partial or in their entirety) related to the concession.512
B. Constitutional and transitional justice regulation on the redress of ethnic groups through
territorial restitution
The previous section delivered the legal base that supports the promotion and protection of the
multinational mining companies considered by the case study. In turn, this section introduces the
norms and jurisprudence relevant to the processes of territorial restitution in favor of the Emberá
Katío and Cocomopoca communities. They are the ethnic groups which, in the context of the case,
were displaced from their traditional lands on the occasion of the conflict. Therefore, the particular
nature of the victims to be redressed demands the consideration of the constitutional and legal
protection of ethnic groups in Colombia. Subsequently, the section provides an in-depth
illustration of the transitional justice measures through which the territorial restitution in favor of
the ethnic groups is conducted. In the context of this case study, the public decision authorizing
the territorial restitution is thought to be the regulatory conduct that unchained the collision
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between the interests of foreign investors, and the state’s aim to produce substantial
transformations in the country to achieve durable peace.
1. Constitutional and legal protection of ethnic groups in Colombia
As previously mentioned, one of the most prominent features of the Colombian Constitutional
Order is its social peace function, which was determined through the constitutional process in
1991. The recognition of the multicultural nature of Colombian society, and the existence of
diverse and overlapped interests to be integrally addressed, led to the consideration of ethnic
communities as subjects of special protection. Not only did this acknowledgment generate the
country’s commitment to the protection of indigenous and tribal peoples in accordance with
international legal standards,513 it also encompassed the inclusion of special safeguarding norms
and mechanisms in the country’s legal order.
The 1991 Constitution importantly establishes the recognition of the ethnic and cultural diversity
of the Colombian nation, thus generating a correlative duty of public authorities and the private
sphere in protecting the country’s ethnic groups.514 In this regard, it was recognized that their
physical survival is ensured through the endorsement of their right to representation, the validation
of their internal norms and governance schemes, and the consequent protection of their particular
relationship with the land. While the Constitution included specific norms in favor of indigenous
peoples,515 the special protection of Afro-Colombian communities was only recognized in 1993
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through the enactment of Law 70.516 Therefore, regardless of the individual protection given to
their members, the CCO provides for the recognition of ethnic communities as truly rightholders.517 As such, the creation of special territorial entities such as indigenous reservations and
Afro-Colombian

territories

represent

the

materialization

of

their

self-determination.

Correspondingly, they constitute the object through which ethnic groups exercise their political
autonomy and have collective ownership, which is inalienable, imprescriptible, and not subject to
seizure.518 As a result, it is stipulated that in the decisions adopted with respect to the governance
of these territories, including the management of land and natural resources, public authorities
should consult preliminarily the communities.519
The Colombian Constitutional Court has put its attention on the situation of ethnic communities
as part of the judicial protection that the Court has conferred to internally displaced people, in the
context of judgement T-025 of 2004. This interest is derived from the constitutional protection to
ethnic communities, and proceeded upon the verification of the failure of public authorities in
addressing the massive and systematic human rights violations in the context of internally forced
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displacement.520 In monitoring the enforcement of judgement T-025,521 the Court has
acknowledged that ethnic communities are the most affected by forced displacement, and decided
to establish a series of objective factual deductions to be considered in future cases to ensure the
protection of their individual and collective rights. In this regard, the tribunal emphasized a number
of descriptive propositions – branded as “underlying and connected factors” – that unearth
dynamics which, although not directly related to belligerent actions, have been produced within
the spectrum of the conflict so as to negatively affect ethnic groups and/or benefit private actors.
In the case of indigenous peoples, the Court has referred to “territorial and socioeconomic
processes connected to the armed conflict that affect ethnic communities’ culture and territory” to
depict the existence of underlying and interconnected factors that had influenced their situation. In
this regard, it highlighted that at the local level, certain licit economic activities – including the
exploitation of natural resources – became intertwined with warlike processes through multiple
and complex patterns. The result of this connection was the massive and systematic violation of
individual and collective human rights, especially in the realm of the community’s ethnic
integrity.522 Likewise, the struggles over access to and use of land were identified as a common
underlying factor of the conflict. This is specifically associated with the impact on indigenous
people’s rights, due to both the special bonds these groups have with their territory and the
accentuated vulnerability they experience in relation to contact with western civilization.523 In turn,
the Court identified certain mining and agricultural processes that, in the case of Afro-Colombian
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communities, have imposed strong tensions on these peoples’ ancestral territories and have
facilitated dispossession as a transversal path.524 In that regard, it was said that Afro-Colombians’
collective right to territory is affected due to an association between armed actions and legal and
illegal pressures to impose a model of economic development based on productivity, which
overlooks the communities’ traditional uses and customs on self-provision and ecological
sustainability.525
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court sent a clear message: forced internal displacement entails
the impossibility for ethnic communities to develop their common life on their land. Thus, as social
and political structures are weakened, these groups can not properly exercise their right to prior
consultation on the occasion of the arrival of economic processes involving the extraction of
natural resources in the region.
2. The Victims Law and supplementary regulation on the collective restitution of lands
As introduced in chapter four, the implementation of the Colombian transitional justice project
took place by means of the enactment of domestic legislation that recognizes the victim’s rights to
justice, truth, and reparation, and sets up mechanisms towards their effectiveness. In the context
of the right to reparation, the Victims Law includes a restitution component that concentrates the
reduction of the detriments caused by the conflict on the legal position of the victims, with regards
to their patrimony and particularly, upon the territories they used to inhabit.526 Considering the
specific context and circumstances around the country’s internal armed conflict, the law provides
for administrative and judicial procedures through which the victims can achieve the effective
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restitution of their lands, in case they were abandoned or dispossessed on the occasion of either
direct conflict actions, or associated underlying and connected factors.527
In that regard, the recognition of Colombia’s multicultural demographic composition by the CCO
led to the inclusion of the principle of cultural and ethnic diversity within the Victims Law.528 As
a consequence, particular land restitution procedures for ethnic communities were adopted. They
supplement the Victims Law through the provision of a particular procedure for the satisfaction of
the collective rights of these peoples.529 While Decree 4633 deals with the assistance, attention,
integral redress, and territorial restitution of indigenous peoples, Decree 4635 provides the same
type of measures for Afro-Colombian communities. These norms are essentially identical, except
for certain aspects related to the particular features of each ethnic group’s self-identification and
vision of what constitutes redress.530 They build on the constitutional protection of ethnic groups
that derived from the establishment of administrative entities with a differentiated collective
property legal regime. Consequently, they include a series of mechanisms designed to promote the
effective enjoyment of these entitlements, which is translated in the material restitution of the
affected lands and their legal endorsement.
The passing of those decrees counted towards the endorsement of the bulk of Colombian ethnic
groups, through prior consultation with the representatives of the majority of the country’s
indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities. As a result, the Decrees adopted a legal
pluralistic perspective, since they rely on the recognition of their autochthonous normative orders
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and their articulation of the country’s Constitutional Order.531 Following the development of the
international protection of indigenous and tribal peoples, the foundation of these norms lies in
three principles: self-determination and autonomy;532 real and affective participation;533 and, the
collective dimension of protection mechanisms which function to eliminate the risks to their
physical and cultural survival.534 Correspondingly, two entitlements are given to the collective
subjects, so as to support the further adoption of specialized procedures: the right to territory and
the right to prior consultation.
Accordingly, the territorial restitution component acquires its particular scope from the
determination of the types of damages that can be redressed through the mechanisms embedded in
the norms. Since the ethnic communities are seen as subjects of rights, collective damage is
regarded as the specific injury of their entitlements and possessions.535 In turn, territorial damage
is related to either the infringement of ecosystems and the sustainability of the lands in the case of
Afro-Colombian communities,536 or the transgression of territory’s capacity to provide sustenance,
health, and food sovereignty to indigenous peoples.537 These descriptions engage with an
rationalization of lands as living entities. As a result, they are considered autonomous victims,
even if their legal representation is undertaken by the community.538 Likewise, territorial
restitution is informed by the normative idea that redress must be integral539 and transformative.540
This implies that compensation for material damages results in the elimination of structural
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discrimination and marginalization that might have been caused by the conflict. All things
considered, it can be argued that this territorial restitution procedure intends to break with the
continuity of the country’s civil and administrative laws in order to impose an exceptional regime
which, due to its reach and relevance, provides transitional justice administrators with quasiconstitutional attributes.
In accordance with the procedures embedded in decrees 4633 and 4635, the extent of territorial
restitution exceeds the mere physical and quantifiable restoration. It essentially intends to
recuperate the effective enjoyment of all the prerogatives and faculties associated with the
collective right to territory. The corresponding legal action can be exercised by the involved
community541 upon the occurrence of territorial injuries within the period 1991-2021, and may
operate on a variety of lands: those with a special administrative regime for ethnic communities;
those which are in process of acquiring this special condition; and, vacant lands that are expected
to be assigned to these peoples, regardless of any occupation by a third party or the conduct of an
economic activity.542 In this context, territorial injury is defined as the detriment produced on the
relation between a community and its territory. It is caused by actions directly linked to the armed
conflict or indirectly associated with underlying and connected factors, which have generated
abandonment, dispossession, or any other type of interference to the effective enjoyment of the
implied prerogatives of the social group with regards to their ancestral lands. In turn, abandonment
is regarded as the loss of the chance to have proper access to the spaces of collective enjoyment
and interaction. Further, dispossession refers to the illegal actions leading to the appropriation of
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the territory and natural resources by third parties to the detriment of the community. This
encompasses private and public legal acts concluded or dictated within the conflict’s sphere of
influence.543
Practically speaking, the territorial restitution procedure is composed of three well-defined stages:
precautionary measures, a characterization, and a judicial procedure. After a preliminary
restitution solicitude has been filed before the Land Restitution Unit, this institution may decide to
request, under circumstances of gravity and urgency, the issuing of precautionary measures while
a final decision is made in the realm of the judicial procedure. These measures maintain a
preventive character, and seek to prevent imminent damages to the territorial rights of the
community or the termination of the ones taking place. Consequently, they can address the
interruption of administrative or judicial procedures that deal with the territories subject to
restitution, the inscription of the restitution procedure on the corresponding cadastral certificate,
or any other procedure that the judge considers necessary to comply with the preventive purpose,
including the suspension of any ongoing economic activities in the zone.544
The Land Restitution Unit must elaborate the characterization of the territorial injury. This
document shall be considered the factual base of the formal collective restitution claim to be filed
before the competent tribunal, notwithstanding the effects produced by the precautionary
measures.545 The resulting report principally includes a detailed account of the context and
particularities of the territory intended to be restituted; a description of the antecedents and
circumstances around the presumed territorial injuries; the illustration of third parties eventually
interested in opposing the restitution and the particular interests on the territory that could be
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alleged as the base of their opposition, including economic activities, extractive projects or any
other relevant activity; a reference to the legal obstacles that could challenge a decision on favor
of the restitution; and the individualization and in-depth description of the community and its
members.546 Finally, the Land Restitution Unit must suggest specific actions that, with the aim of
ensuring the effective enjoyment of the community’s collective right to territory, the transitional
justice judge could order in the context of the judicial procedure.
Once a formal claim has been filed, the competent tribunal proceeds to study the case from the
standpoint of the characterization report, and from the arguments and evidence included in the
writs brought by both the claimants – which could be represented by the Land Restitution Unit,
the People’s Ombudsman or a non-governmental organization – and the opponents. Unlike
ordinary civil and administrative domestic procedures, the opponents must assume the burden of
proof to discredit the occurrence of abandonment or dispossession, due to the victim’s accentuated
vulnerability and consequent difficulty to present evidence of the alleged injuries.547 The tribunal
then analyzes the facts and arguments by applying a series of judicial presumptions which were
specifically provided by the exceptional norms. They assign legal consequences – either
inexistence or nullity, concepts coined by Colombian civil and administrative legislation – to a
number of public (administrative) and private acts that could eventually be linked to the territorial
injury under discussion. Thus, the application of these presumptions is intended to guarantee the
effective enjoyment of collective right to territory beyond the mere material possession of land.548
The judicial decision may not only order the material and legal restitution of the territory to the
community. The tribunal may also request specific actions from public authorities to accompany
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the return process. Moreover, it can suspend concession contracts or annul exploration and
exploitation titles in the context of extractive activities in order to secure the crystallization of these
orders.549
IV.

The legal conflict between territorial restitution and the protection of foreign
investment

Having introduced the structural elements of the case study, this section addresses the territorial
restitution processes where there is an apparent normative tension between the legal protection of
foreign investment and the implementation of the Colombian transitional justice project. In this
regard, after introducing certain preliminary aspects related to the configuration of the territories
under dispute, the collective restitution procedures to be contrasted – the cases of the Emberá Katío
people of the Alto Andágueda Reservation and the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian community –
are thoroughly illustrated. This descriptive exercise is relevant for the further analysis of the
regulatory implications of the alleged normative tension.
A. Preliminary aspects regarding the territorial configuration of the cases
While the Emberá Katío community’s reservation obtained official recognition in 1979, the
Cocomopoca territory was acknowledged as an Afro-Colombian collective property in 2011. This
particular territorial configuration, along with the negative impacts suffered on the occasion of the
country’s armed conflict, constitute the source of the collective restitution claims filed by the
ethnic groups. Yet, there are other situations which must be illustrated on account of the
administrative and judicial processes, which gave birth to this normative clash between the
safeguarding of the interests of a number of multinational corporations and the implementation of
certain territorial restitution measures.
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Following the provisions included in the mining regulation on the protection of the interests of
ethnic communities, the Emberá Katío community had requested an indigenous mining zone
within the reservation. It did so in order to take advantage of a corresponding preference right,550
and on the occasion of obtaining the mining titles constitute an economic enterprise to extract
mining resources. In June 2001, the country’s mining authority granted the Emberá Katío
community a mining title for the extraction of gold until 2012.551 In September 2011, a mining
operation contract was concluded between the Alto Andágueda reservation and Sociedad Minera
Santacruz S.A.S.,552 and, in September 2013, the mining concession was extended for ten more
years.553 Although the indigenous mining zone does not overlap with the mining titles granted to
the multinational mining companies, they are both located within the same reservation.
An additional territorial configuration process to consider is the constitution of strategic mining
areas in a great area of the country’s territory, including a portion of the zones inhabited by the
ethnic communities. This process took place in accordance with the provisions included in the
domestic mining regulation,554 and in accordance with National Development Plan 2010-2014.555
Following the command of this public policy, in January 2012, the government issued an
administrative act by means of which the extraction of gold was identified as a strategic interest
for the country’s economic development. Next, in February 2012, a public document proposed a
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number of areas that should be considered as potential strategic mining areas. As a result, the
Ministry of Mining determined that 3 million hectares should be deemed strategic for the
development of Colombia’s mining industry, and consequently 313 mining blocks were created.
Regarding the case under study, six of the abovementioned mining blocks overlap with the
ancestral territories of the ethnic communities located in the Alto Atrato Region.556 In response to
this regulatory activity, in September 2013, the non-governmental organization Tierra Digna –
representing the interests of the Cocomopoca community – introduced a constitutional writ (acción
de tutela) with the purpose of protecting the collective rights of the ethnic groups to the territory
and prior consultation. The organization alleged that these entitlements had been affected by the
strategic mining areas without considering their implications on the communities nor counting
their opinion. The tribunal that studied the case decided to rule in favor of the claimant and
suspended the constitution of 16 mining blocks until the administrative authorities of the state
pronounced the legality of the corresponding resolutions.557 The Ministry of Mining appealed the
decision and the nation’s State Council revoked the suspension in December 2013. In that regard,
the tribunal argued that the resolution did not breach the ethnic people’s rights, since the
administrative acts that delimited the strategic mining zones had a general character. Therefore, it
should not be subject to consultation. It pointed out that in any case, the communities should be
consulted upon the conclusion of concession contracts that would generate mining titles in favor
of private parties.558
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B. Territorial restitution of the Emberá Katío People of the Alto Andágueda Resguardo
In accordance with the Victims Law and its supplementary norms, in December 2012 the regional
branch of the Land Restitution Unit initiated a territorial restitution procedure, in representation of
the Emberá Katío communities of the Alto Andágueda reservation, before a first instance court in
Quibdó, the capital of the Department of Chocó.
1. Precautionary measures
As provided by the special procedure embedded in the transitional justice regulation, the Land
Restitution Unit went before a first-instance land restitution court in January 2013 and requested
the issuance of precautionary measures to preserve the collective rights of the indigenous people,
pending a final decision regarding the return of their territory was taken. The Unit requested the
suspension of the mining titles located within the indigenous reservation, and the deferral of the
study of new concession requests by the competent public authority. In turn, the representative of
the Public Ministry intervened as guarantor of the judicial process. It suggested that the injunction
should not be granted on the grounds of the improperness of the land restitution procedure to
discuss the validity of mining titles. These titles derived from the concession contracts concluded
between the mining authority and the companies, so the administrative jurisdiction had exclusive
jurisdiction to decide upon these type of affairs.559
In February 2013 the court decided to grant the injunction. It indicated that as a consequence of
the land dispossession that occurred on the occasion of the conflict, the indigenous community had
lost the opportunity to use, manage, and enjoy their collective entitlements over the territory and
natural resources.560 Therefore, the granting of mining titles to the multinational companies
559
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resulted from the application of incomplete procedures as no prior consultation was carried out
with the communities of the Alto Andágueda reservation, which affected their fundamental right
to self-determination.561 According to the Tribunal, this meant that the lack of prior consultation
affected the Emberá Katío in a number of ways. Firstly, it fixed their development priorities over
the use, management, and enjoyment of the ancestral lands and natural resources. Secondly, it
prevented the community from intervening in the discussions over the collateral damages that the
mineral extraction could cause on their territory and personhood. Thirdly, the ethnic group could
not take part in the negotiation of the eventual indemnifications of these injuries. Importantly, the
Quibdó Court highlighted that, notwithstanding the legality of the concession contracts object of
controversy, it was grave that foreign investors were receiving 30-year-valid mining titles while
the indigenous community had only received authorization to extract mining resources for 10
years. Thus, the Tribunal verified the excessive enjoyment of the territory by persons external to
the community, which was exclusively motivated by economic interests.562 In August 2013, the
first instance Court maintained the suspension of the mining titles until a final decision on the
territorial restitution would be taken.
Interestingly, the precautionary measures issued by the Quibdó Court were not initially challenged
by the foreign investors that had received the mining titles under suspension, those directly
affected, but rather by the National Mining Agency, which is a public institution inserted into the
state apparatus. In October 2013, eight months after the injunction was granted, the National
Mining Agency brought a constitutional writ before a higher court – the High Tribunal of Medellin
– against the judicial act that suspended the titles. The Agency affirmed that because the public
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authority had granted the mining titles that were under suspension, its rights to access to justice
and due process had been infringed upon by the transitional justice court’s decision. It argued that
the latter court had exceeded its jurisdiction, which should be circumscribed to address situations
directly related to the armed conflict. It further pointed out that there were ordinary procedures
that should have been exclusively used to claim compensation for the injuries that the development
of mining projects normally entails on the surface. Therefore, the National Mining Agency
requested the reestablishment of the companies’ economic entitlements derived from the
concession contracts, and lifting the restriction on the study of new concession requests.563
The High Tribunal decided to deny the constitutional protection sought by the National Mining
Agency. It based its reasoning on the impossibility to verify an irreparable prejudice on the
claimant – the National Mining Agency,564 and the fact that the Agency disregarded certain
fundamental particularities of the case when granting the concessions to the mining companies. It
overlooked the situation of accentuated vulnerability that the Emberá Katío communities faced as
a consequence of the armed conflict and other underlying factors, such as the conduct of certain
economic activities. Likewise, the Agency did not consider the distinctive relation that indigenous
peoples have with their ancestral territories, and the special constitutional protection granted to
such relations.565 Therefore, the High Court pointed out that these territories could not be subject
to the same treatment given to common private property, so every effort to secure indigenous
people’s land tenure, including the occasional suspension of mining titles, was justified.566
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2. Final decision on territorial restitution
In accordance with the territorial restitution procedure, after the precautionary measures stage was
concluded, the Land Restitution Chamber of the Antioquia High Tribunal assumed the task of
uttering a final decision regarding the territorial restitution of the Alto Andágueda reservation. In
addition to the material restitution of the territory in favor of the Emberá Katío, the Land
Restitution Unit requested that the tribunal address a number of actions connected to the redress.
Firstly, it petitioned the clarification of the boundaries of the reservation, in order to update the
cadastral registry. Second, it asked the Tribunal to annul the concession contracts concluded
between the state and the mining companies and the corresponding mining titles. Third, it
requested the banning of the consideration of additional mining concession proposals in the area
subject to discussion. Fourth, it claimed the creation of an indigenous mining zone in favor of the
Emberá Katío communities, so as to allow the extraction of the mineral resources located at the
Alto Andágueda resguardo.567 Once the Tribunal assessed and verified the harm suffered by the
Emberá Katío communities as a consequence of the armed conflict and its underlying factors, it
turned to study the arguments of the opponents – the mining companies. These arguments will be
illustrated in depth.
Continental Gold Ltd. was represented by the Colombian legal firm Lloreda Camacho & Co.568
The opposition was directed to dismiss the claimant’s annulment request and based its arguments
on three grounds: the lack of causal nexus between the victimization of the indigenous community
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and its territory; the existence of a valid concession agreement between the mining authorities and
the company; and, the lack of jurisdiction for the transitional justice judge to decide upon the
validity of the corresponding mining titles. The opposition alleged that it was not possible to
establish a connection between the territorial dispossession suffered by the indigenous
communities and the company’s decision to conduct an economic activity in the region upon the
conclusion of a concession agreement. Thus, it suggested that the claimants were trying to take
advantage of the transitional justice procedure to revive the opportunity to contest the validity of
its mining titles, an action that in any case would have had to take place by the time they were
granted and through the administrative procedure at disposition.569 In this regard, the claimant
pointed out that whereas the land restitution judges had been invested with the power to satisfy the
victims’ right to reparation, this capacity was restricted to facts explicitly considered by the law.
Therefore, it argued that an administrative act produced by the state’s regulatory activity – a mining
title – could not be considered as a factor underlying or connected to the armed conflict.570
In turn, AngloGold Ashanti and Exploraciones Chocó Colombia (Glencore) brought in identical
oppositions to the claimant’s pretensions, provided the existence of a joint venture agreement
between these companies as to the administration of the mining titles located within the Alto
Andágueda reservation. The companies were represented by the arbitration-specialized Colombian
law firm Botero Salazar & Tobón Asociados,571 and founded their opposition on five arguments
directed at the definitive cancellation of the mining titles and the suspension of the study of new
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concession proposals. The first argument was that the challenged concession contract was neither
linked to the armed conflict nor caused the dispossession of the indigenous communities.
Therefore, the territorial restitution procedure could not be used to affect clear and well-established
entitlements that had been legitimately obtained by the mining companies.572 The second argument
was that while the CCO provided that the subsoil and natural resources belong to the state
regardless of the owner of the surface territory, the land restitution procedure could not be used to
violate pre-established norms and procedures on the granting of mining titles. In particular, the
opposition sustained that the indigenous community could not request the creation of an
indigenous mining zone and the granting of a corresponding concession in lieu of the
administrative acts that were being contested, since the companies were legitimate right holders.573
The third argument was that Colombian law did not forbid the granting of mining titles that
overlapped with the territories of ethnic communities.574 The fourth argument was that the tribunal
could not apply the legal presumption included in the transitional justice norms575 on the
inexistence of certain legal acts that caused territorial impairment on the ethnic community’s lands,
and as such spillover could not be proved from the facts of the case.576 The last argument was that
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declaring the annulment of the mining titles under study would imply the transgression of the
mining companies’ legitimate expectations. With regards to this last argument, it is relevant to
reproduce the opposition party’s elaboration:
“The companies obtained a number of mining titles under the conditions established by the
domestic mining legislation. A decision disregarding these entitlements, which are product
of the conclusion of a contract with the state, would constitute a transgression of the
legitimate expectations principle. The latter principle has been developed by jurisprudence
derived from the interpretation of article 83 of the constitution, which provides for good
faith as a constitutional maxim.577 In this regard, the Constitutional Court has stated that
the juridical relations between public administration and the society must be fixed in
accordance with the former’s duty to proceed with loyalty, as there is a correlative right to
expect that the other party acts in conformity to what has been originally arranged. This is
especially relevant in the behavior of public authorities provided their natural prerogatives,
so their regulatory activity must be coherent with their precedent behavior. Thus, private
parties do not find themselves surprised by conduct contrary to their original expectations
on the rules governing the relations between the state and the ones being governed.578 In
addition, the State Council – the highest judicial authority on administrative matters – has
pointed out that the principle of legitimate expectations represents the materialization of
good faith, legal certainty and equity in the domestic legal order. Its purpose is to bring
stability and foreseeability to individuals from the activity of public authorities, so no
additional charges than the ones required to satisfy public purposes are imposed. Though
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legitimate expectations can not be foreseen as acquired entitlements, they impose the duty
on public authorities not to enforce unanticipated changes in the pre-established rules or its
regulatory activity.579 In conclusion, if the land restitution judge decides to question the
validity of the company’s mining titles, it would be responsible of infringing the principle
of legitimate expectations”.580
The representative of the Public Ministry was consequent with her prior position, when she
opposed to the granting of preliminary measures in favor of the Emberá Katío community.
Therefore, she opined that the pretensions related to the territorial restitution should be attended
by the tribunal, except for the annulment of the mining titles previously granted by the National
Mining Agency to the multinational mining companies.581
In order to set the foundations of its decision, the tribunal started by raising a number of
preliminary points. With regards to the nature and scope of the judicial process being carried out,
the tribunal asserted that it was entirely permeated by a transitional justice paradigm. Accordingly,
its creation responded to the aim of breaking with the continuum of the ordinary domestic –
administrative, civil, and agrarian – norms to remedy past harms associated with the conflict, and
thus produce tangible transformations in society. Therefore, transitional justice judges were
invested with special prerogatives to intervene by calling the action of a great number of public
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authorities at different levels.582 Next, the tribunal brought in a comprehensive legal base to decide
upon the territorial restitution claim. Not only did it include international legal documents, such as
ILO’s Covenant No. 169 and the UN Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, but
recognized indigenous peoples’ own norms – ley de origen, ley natural, derecho mayor or derecho
propio – as part of the legal base relevant to determine the conditions under which their territorial
rights had to be restituted.583 Finally, the tribunal depicted the Alto Andágueda reservation – the
administrative entity recognized by the state – as a subject of special protection and a rightsholder584. Thus, it manifested that the reservation was entitled with a right to collective territory or
collective ownership, which was built on the constitutional property clause and had to be
extensively depicted provided the special circumstances of the case.585 Consequently, because the
ordinary legal and economic dimensions of private ownership were influenced by the concept of
indigenous territory, lands should be understood not as a mere commodity but as a geographical,
social, cultural, and religious site, essential for the community’s self-determination.586
Considering the particular elements of the case, and the conditions imposed by the transitional
justice norms as to the determination of a territorial injury, the tribunal characterized the legal
exploitation of natural resources as an underlying factor in the armed conflict that affected the
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territorial and cultural integrity of the Alto Andágueda reservation.587 In this regard, it argued that
the ancestral territory possessed by the Emberá Katío communities were put at risk, as the mining
projects associated with the concession contract covered 62% of the reservation, and had a
prolonged duration – around 40 years.588 In this regard, the tribunal made reference to an essential
tension between economic development and the protection of the country’s ethnical diversity,
dynamics supported by public interest arguments. It pointed out that this tension concretized the
existence of contentious discourses on how nature was comprehended. An utilitarian vision,
according to which land and natural resources should be commoditized, was contrasted with an
alternative depiction that understood nature as a constitutive part of the identity of ethnic
peoples.589 In accordance with the tribunal, this tension – and the fact that the mining titles and the
concession bids omitted the realization of prior consultation with the indigenous communities –
encompassed a potential to increase the territorial damages and social changes already produced
by the armed conflict. Thus, it sustained that prior consultation was the mechanism for
harmonizing the abovementioned opposing views of nature. A similar belief is held by a normative
rule coined by the Colombian Constitutional Court, which states that every act, project, activity,
or initiative with proclivity to intervene in the territories of ethnic communities, regardless of the
scale of injury, should be subject to prior consultation since its beginning.590
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Having established a link between the advancement of the mining project and the situation of the
affected indigenous communities, the tribunal went to determine the conditions under which
territorial restitution had to be conducted, and the further effects of this process on the mining
titles. In order to prove the dispossession of the Emberá Katío communities’ territory, the tribunal
had to establish whether the legal presumption, regarding the nullity of certain administrative acts
that recognize or grant non-possessory rights over the affected territory, should be applied in the
case as provided by the transitional justice regulation.591 From a restrictive interpretation of the
norm, the Antioquia court decided that the case did not fit within the legal presumption. In this
regard, it established a formal difference between an administrative act and an administrative
contract, and decided that the conclusion of a concession contract to exploit resources overlapping
the indigenous territory should not be considered as a territorial injury.592 However, it considered
that the suspension of the concession contract and the corresponding mining titles, ordered by the
Quibdó Court in 2013 upon the imposition of precautionary measures, should remain until a prior
consultation procedure with the communities of the Alto Andágueda resguardo could be carried
out.593 Finally, with regards to the constitution of an indigenous mining zone, the tribunal
considered that such injunction would exceed its jurisdiction. Yet, it urged the Agencia Nacional
de Minería to consider that option, as the authority in charge of these regulatory procedures.594
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C. Territorial restitution of Cocomopoca
The previous section illustrated the territorial restitution procedure that supported the collective
rights of the Emberá Katío people of the Alto Andágueda reservation. This section in turn presents
an initiative that has been carried out with the same purpose by the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian
communities. It is worth mentioning that, since this ethnic group’s territory is adjacent to the lands
of the indigenous peoples, the land restitution process counted with the same opponents, and its
outcome was arguably influenced by the conduct of the same public authorities.
1. Precautionary measures
Similar to the territorial restitution process carried out in favor of the indigenous community, in
May 2014, the NGO Tierra Digna requested precautionary measures to protect the collective rights
of the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian communities. Importantly, this legal action was filed before
the same first-instance land restitution court that resolved the petition in favor of the Emberá Katío
people. The claim focused on three aspects: the suspension of the mining titles that overlapped
with the ethnic territory; the deferral of the study of the bids that aim to obtain a concession on the
same zone; and, the cancellation of a strategic mining area that overlapped with the community’s
territory.595 In this case, the representative of the Public Ministry manifested neither support nor
opposition to the injunction.
The Quibdó court acknowledged that the abandonment of lands as a consequence of forced
displacement, and the granting of numerous mining titles to multinational mining companies
during the period of greatest violence in the zone, were indeed factual circumstances that produced
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the systematic violation of Cocomopoca’s collective rights.596 Next, it added that the companies
had concluded contracts with Colombia’s Ministry of Defense in order to obtain security-provision
services from the country’s military forces within their projects.597 After confirming its
competence to study the precautionary measures request, the Court recognized that the coincidence
of forced displacement practices with the development of mining projects could be considered a
factor transversal to the armed conflict. In this regard, it depicted such a coincidence as a risk for
the collective rights of Afro-Colombian communities.598 However, it emphasized that not every
action against the territory should entail the protection of the state through transitional justice,
since the latter legal framework was limited to safeguard situations only directly connected with
the subsistence of the ethnic community, as well as those that had caused the conflict or certain
underlying factors.599
The Court indicated that the request for the cancellation of the resolution that created a strategic
mining area that overlapped the collective territory was not within its jurisdiction. Such an
administrative act, they argued, had a general character and was neither related to the armed
conflict nor incentivized by the dispossession of Cocomopoca’s territory.600 Concerning the
suspension of the mining titles granted to the multinational companies and the deferral of the study
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of new concession bids, the Quibdó judge acknowledged that some of the latter had already been
suspended by the decision in favor of the Emberá Katío people. Therefore, it was considered
unnecessary to pronounce upon such titles.601 Nevertheless, it decided to deny the injunction over
the titles and bids that had not been subject to previous scrutiny. It pointed out that the mining
companies were not operating on the territory where they had titles due to force majeure
circumstances. Further, no evidence indicated that the titles were related to the violence patterns
in the zone. Although there was an apparent administrative failure concerning the granting of
mining titles without conducting prior consultation with the affected ethnic community, this
inconsistency was not linked to the armed conflict so it should not be addressed by the transitional
justice jurisdiction. In any case, the duty to conduct prior consultation with ethnic communities
was not obligatory upon the conclusion of a concession contract but during the effective realization
of prospective and extractive activities, as provided by “the law governing these type of
agreements”.602 In sum, the Court supported the rejection of the precautionary measures claim on
the impossibility to verify a direct benefit for the mining companies from the factual circumstances
that affected the Cocomopoca community, as well as on the apparent non-obligatory character of
prior consultation during the pre-contractual phase.603 Finally, although the organization
representing Cocomopoca appealed the decision of the Quibdó Court, the Land Restitution High
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Tribunal confirmed both the rejection of the precautionary measures related to the suspension of
the company’s mining titles and the preclusion of the consideration of new concession bids.
2. Final decision on territorial restitution
In December 2014, after the injunction request was rejected by the first-instance land restitution
court, the Land Restitution Unit – in close collaboration with the NGO Tierra Digna – introduced
a formal territorial restitution petition in favor of Cocomopoca. In February 2015, the Land
Restitution Chamber of the Antioquia High Court acknowledged the claim brought by the
representatives of the victims concerning the restoration of ethnic communities’ ancestral territory.
As in the case of the Alto Andágueda reservation, and in addition to the material restitution of the
territory, the representatives of the victims requested the Antioquia Court to declare the inexistence
of the concession contracts concluded between the state and the mining companies, the consequent
annulment of the equivalent mining titles, and the deferral of any concession proposal on the area
subject of discussion.604 The Land Restitution Unit founded these claims on the territorial injuries
that the Afro-Colombian community suffered as a consequence of its victimization in the context
of the country’s armed conflict. In particular, the Unit argued that the conclusion of concession
contracts concerning the development of mining projects within Cocomopoca’s ancestral lands
occurred during a period when the zone was experiencing high levels of violence and forced
displacement. Therefore, it contended that the community could not participate in the decisions
affecting its territory, including the granting of mining titles for the extraction of natural resources
located within their lands.605 Consequently, the Unit pointed out that these administrative acts –
the concession contracts – should be declared inexistent by the Tribunal, supplementary to material
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restitution, as the transitional justice regulation provided for a number of legal presumptions in
that sense.606
In turn, the companies AngloGold Ashanti and Exploraciones Chocó Colombia (Glencore)
constituted as opponents in the process. As in the case of the Alto Andágueda reservation, they
were represented by the law firm Botero Salazar & Tobón Asociados through identical writs. As
in the previous case, the opposition to the title cancellation claim was founded on the discredit of
the land restitution procedure as a mechanism to address mining issues, and particularly, to decide
upon eventual irregularities in the conclusion of concession contracts between the state and private
parties. In this regard, it was claimed that there was no relation whatsoever between the companies
or their mining titles and the internal armed conflict. Thus, they argued that the tribunal could not
disregard nor violate the entitlements that the opponents had legally obtained from the Colombian
state under the development of the latter’s economic policy.607 In that sense, the opposition
strongly relied on the same arguments alleged on the occasion of the claim brought in favour of
the Emberá Katío people: the mining companies’ disconnection to the actions that caused the
victimization of Cocomopoca; the impossibility to verify any act of dispossession against the afroColombian communities provided the exclusive and excluding property rights that the state over
the subsoil and its natural resources; the inexistence of any prohibition for the Colombian state to
grant mining titles that overlap with ethnic territories; and the risk to affect the companies’
legitimate expectations.608
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See REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA. Decreto 6635/2011, art. 127-128. Land Restitution Unit, Land Restitution
Claim in Representation of Cocomopoca, 19 December 2014, p. 107-108.
607
See AngloGold Ashanti and Exploraciones Chocó Colombia. Opposition to the territorial restitution claim in favor
of the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombia Community, 27 February 2015.
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See AngloGold Ashanti and Exploraciones Chocó Colombia. Opposition to the territorial restitution claim in favor
of the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombia Community, 27 February 2015.
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However, a new element was introduced for the consideration of the Land Restitution Chamber.
According to the opposition, and contrary to what the Antioquia Court argued in the Alta
Andágueda reservation decision, the country’s legal order could not be interpreted as inferring that
prior consultation should be considered obligatory for the granting of mining titles. It should
instead be deemed mandatory only for the conduct of exploration and extraction activities. In
consequence, the representative of the mining companies considered that since they had not
infringed the communities’ rights in that regard, the concession contracts could not be cancelled.609
Finally, the opposition enforced this argument by making reference to both the decision of the First
Specialized Civil Court on Land Restitution that rejected the solicitude concerning the suspension
of the mining titles due to the lack of prior consultation, and the position of the Public Ministry in
the Alto Andágueda case that called for not infringing on the interests of mining companies.610
By February 2016 the Land Restitution Chamber of the Antioquia High Court had not issued a
final decision on the claim brought by the Land Restitution Unit and Tierra Digna, in representation
of the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian communities. Arguably, the Antioquia Land Restitution
Court has taken substantially more time to issue a decision than in the case of the Emberá Katío
people for unclear reasons.
V.

Analysis

The previous sections introduced the case study’s background and the particular legal conflict
arising from the development of territorial restitution procedures in zones under the influence of
mining concessions, in the Choco Department, Alto Atrato Region. Given this particular context,
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the following section will discuss the likelihood of a normative clash between the legal protection
offered to foreign investment via international investment agreements and the implementation of
a transitional justice project. This section explores the regulatory implications of such a collision.
A. Analysis on the likelihood of the normative collision
The case under analysis can be regarded from the standpoint of one of the main issues addressed
by the Colombian Constitutional Order: the relation between the state and the private sphere under
its jurisdiction. As explained in a precedent chapter, this dynamic is modulated by the interaction
between the consecration of economic freedom and private property as founding principles of the
country’s socioeconomic regime in relation to the capacity of public authorities to intervene in the
private sphere so as to ensure the achievement of public goals.611 In that respect, the relation
between the state – represented by the National Mining Agency – and the multinational mining
companies – which constituted subsidiaries in Colombia in order to obtain mining titles as
provided by the domestic mining regulation – arose from the conclusion of concession contracts.
Thereafter, this relation derived from the establishment and operation of these companies within
the country’s territory, particularly where ethnic communities live. Thus, under the country’s
public law regime, the effective formalization of these agreements created rights and obligations
between the parties. The companies are entitled to conduct exploration and exploitation activities
in accordance with technical and environmental standards and for a fixed period of time (30 years).
In exchange, they must pay a periodical royalty and, in case of a fruitful extraction of minerals,
transfer royalties to the country. In turn, the state must ensure that the licensees can effectively
conduct their activities in the zone of the project and that the terms of the contract are respected
by the public authorities and third parties.
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See Chapter One on the characterization of the Colombian Constitutional Order.
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In this case, the law has a constitutive role in the establishment of these multinational mining
companies in Colombia so as to conduct an economic activity – the extraction of gold in the Alto
Atrato Region – by means of the establishment of contractual relations that are framed in the
country’s public law regime. Yet, it also performed a regulatory role: to address the way in which
these private entities project their legal personhood. That is, to define how the mining companies
exert their rights and obligations in accordance with their social object and under the specific
context of the country’s Constitutional Order. This includes the determination of the use,
enjoyment and disposal of the mining titles acquired by means of the concession agreements
entered into with the state. In the present case, both the country’s conflictual background and the
constitutional consecration of special protection to ethnic groups were brought up to challenge the
legitimacy of the concession agreements. In particular, the validity of the corresponding mining
entitlements is disputed under the grounds of the transgression of the ethnic group’s collective
rights to territory and prior consultation. Thus, as a consequence of the lack of due diligence of the
contractual parties in the identification of particular circumstances that demanded the conduct of
additional actions to crystallize the concession agreements, the Emberá Katio and Cocomopoca
communities were deprived of the possibility of deciding upon access to and management of their
ancestral lands and attached natural resources.
Up to this point, the alleged normative tension arising from this case emerges at the intersection
of competing interests in the realm of access to and use of land and natural resources. Both sides
find undisputable support in the country’s Constitutional Order, which is said to be rational and
coherent, and are therefore provided with a collection of legal norms. Yet, when confronted, they
seem to hold contradictory views as to how scarce resources as an object of regulation should be
managed by public authorities. The mining regulation regards land and natural resources as
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separate elements, claiming that the latter’s ownership is an exclusive prerogative of the state, and
advocating for the protection and preservation of the mining company’s acquired rights. On the
other hand, the regulation in favor of the safeguard of ethnic groups encompasses an alternative
conception as to the separate character of lands and natural resources, supports the free disposal of
natural resources by the state to respect the special relation between the ethnic groups and the
territory, and speaks in favor of the production of structural changes in society so as to ensure their
survival, even if private interests are affected.
In principle, the latter formulation is essentially correct and consequently, it could be argued that
this case counts with a potential solution within the realm of the country’s Constitutional Order by
means of an interpretative exercise. However, the introduction of some additional elements to the
equation turns such an assessment into a more complex endeavour. Based on the facts of the case,
it becomes visible that each body of substantive regulation – respectively aligned with a particular
interest and offering protection to a specific group of people – is supported by supplementary
normative rationales. Thus, the protection of the interests and expectations of the multinational
mining companies finds support in their condition of foreign investors from countries with which
Colombia has entered into international investment agreements. On the other hand, the ethnic
communities are recognized as victims of the armed conflict, which have been especially affected
by the dispossession of their lands as a consequence, have been forcibly displaced, and whose
rights must be effectively redressed within the realm of transitional justice.
Both transitional justice and international investment law are herein considered as transnational
legal processes that progressively entered into contact with the Colombian Constitutional Order,
insofar that the particular – political, social and economic – circumstances of the country promote
the reception of these normative rationales. Although they do not directly encompass the regulation
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of substantive areas, their purpose is to stimulate the conduct of the state towards a consistent
attitude with the paired substantive regulation. On the one hand, the conclusion of international
investment agreements is aimed to guarantee a stable environment of operation to foreign investors
by means of the imposition of behavioral standards that may eventually restrict the regulatory
activity of public authorities that could affect their interests and expectations. This is supplemented
by the provision of a transnational dispute-settlement mechanism. On the other hand, with the
primary objective of achieving durable peace, transitional justice breaks with the continuum of a
country’s legal order, and pushes the state to assume a pattern of exceptional regulatory activism
towards the realization of structural transformations in the country, including the satisfaction of
the victims’ right to reparation by means of redistributive measures.
In this case, these transnational legal processes come to support interests and legal frameworks
that are in direct contention: the interests of mining companies and the mining regulation as
opposed to the interests of ethnic groups, human rights, and social regulation. Thus, they end up
pushing the action of the state in opposite directions over the same object of regulation: access to
and use of land and natural resources. That is, whether to abstain from intervening so as to preserve
acquired rights, or to regulate in order to support structural changes. All in all, these normative
rationales are powerful since they count with the support of the country’s Constitutional Order,
which makes them legitimate in the eyes of the citizens, the international community of states and
other relevant transnational actors. However, as argued, they problematize the eventual solution
of these types of situations.
In the case under analysis, the activation of transitional justice’s territorial restitution procedures
in favor of the Emberá Katío and Cocomopoca communities has been acknowledged as the only
way in which these ethnic groups could obtain the effective recognition of their territorial rights,
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after several incomplete or unsuccessful attempts made through the ordinary legal means offered
by the domestic legal order. Incidentally, the transitional justice judge argued that, provided the
specific circumstances of these collective restitution claims, the effective enjoyment of territorial
rights by the ethnic groups required going beyond the material restoration of the land. It
encompassed the revision of any political or economic public decision conducted over the zone
under dispute, even if the rights and expectations of third parties could be affected. In contrast, the
fact that the mining companies directly involved in the Dojura project belong to multinational
entrepreneurial conglomerates coming from countries with which Colombia has concluded
international investment agreements – AngloGold Ashanti from the United Kingdom; Empresa
Minera los Quenuales from Peru, which in turn is owned by Glencore from Switzerland; and
Continental Gold Ltd. from Canada – opens the door to whether they might consider using these
treaties, directly or indirectly, to contest the negative impact of their economic interest and
expectations derived from the conclusion of concession contracts with the state.
B. The regulatory implications of the normative collision
So far, this chapter has provided the illustration of a real-life situation to verify the existence of an
actual normative tension between the legal protection of foreign investment via international
investment agreements and the implementation of a transitional justice project in Colombia –the
territorial restitution of ethnic communities in Colombia’s Alto Atrato Region. Next, this section
intends to explore the particular regulatory implications of this particular instance. In this regard,
the core inquiry that will be addressed is whether and to which extent the safeguards given to the
multinational mining companies involved in the Dojura Project have the potential to, or have
actually affected, the effective implementation of the territorial restitution processes in favor of
the ethnic communities inhabiting the zone. That is, whether the legal protection resulting from
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the conjunction of the international investment agreements concluded by the country and the
domestic mining regulation might occasionally constrain the adoption of the regulatory measures
related to the eventual suspension or the definitive annulment of the mining titles that overlap with
the lands of the latter communities.
Considering the case addresses distinct administrative-judicial procedures with its focus on diverse
ethnic communities, this analysis intends to evaluate two key elements. First, the identification of
direct or indirect references to either the existence of international investment agreements that
could eventually be used to discipline the conduct of public authorities, or to the nature and extent
of the protection that the multinational mining companies enjoy as foreign investors. And second,
the verification of particular variations in the conduct of the relevant actors from one case to the
other. This includes shifts not only in the actions taken by the public authorities or the opponents,
but modifications in the argumentation of the positions actually assumed by each actor.
The argumentative core of the territorial restitution processes under analysis was the protection of
the collective territorial rights of the ethnic communities. However, this process changed to
encompass a further discussion: the extent to which clear and well-established economic
entitlements, derived from the conclusion of a legal agreement between the state and foreign
private parties, could legitimately be affected by subsequent and exceptional transitional justice
regulatory measures. In that regard, the response to this hypothesis comes from the validation of a
number of variables.
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1. Existence of a conflict between the pursuance of a public interest (durable peace) and the
protection of private interests of foreign investors, produced by the regulatory action of
the transitional justice authorities
In accordance with Colombia’s development policies, the mining industry has been designated as
a critical economic sector that has to be boosted through the attraction of foreign investors, which
contribute to the sector with capital, particular expertise and specialized technology. Therefore,
the country has concluded concession agreements with several mining companies to allow the
massive extraction of minerals. In parallel, Colombia has been implementing a transitional justice
project that is intended to create the conditions for the achievement of durable peace after an
extended internal armed conflict. One of the project’s prominent components is the protection of
the victims’ right to reparation through the conduct of territorial restitution procedures. From the
facts of the case, it is proved that the private interests of three mining companies – subsidiaries of
multinational corporations – are being challenged by a number of judicial decisions that decided
to grant territorial restitution in favor of ethnic groups. In this regard, they provide for the
suspension of their mining titles due to both their overlapping with the lands to be restored and the
fact that no prior consultation with the affected communities was conducted on the occasion of the
concession granting. This represents an economic detriment for the companies, as well as an
alteration of their expectations of the project’s further development.
2. Feasibility of resorting to investment arbitration to challenge the transitional justice
regulatory measures that affected the interests of foreign investors
Colombia has adopted a policy of systematic conclusion of international investment agreements
with capital-exporting countries. These agreements include standards by virtue of which
behavioral obligations are imposed on the state parties and particularly, on their public authorities.
In addition, the agreements provide for investor-state arbitration as a mechanism that foreign
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investors may resort to claim compensation from the eventual breach of treaty obligations by the
state party where they are settled. From the facts of the case, it can be affirmed that the mining
companies whose mining titles have been affected by the regulatory measures on territorial
restitution are owned by multinational corporations. These companies were either constituted or
enlisted in countries with which Colombia has international investment agreements – United
Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland and Peru. Therefore, the opportunity for the mining companies to
activate the investor-state arbitration mechanism to request damages from the regulatory action of
Colombian public authorities is real, as the mechanism is current and directly available.
3. Verification of an “investment arbitration threat” and its eventual perception by the
transitional justice public authorities
So far, the existence of a conflict between the economic entitlements and expectations of a number
of multinational mining companies and the implementation of transitional justice regulatory
measures has been discussed. Likewise, it is certain that these private parties could activate, under
their condition of foreign investors, the investment arbitration mechanism to claim damages from
the state on the other. It is now necessary to determine whether these companies have stated,
directly or indirectly, their intention to undertake investment arbitration against Colombia in
retaliation for the suspension of their mining titles or conditionally upon their definitive
cancellation of the corresponding concessions in further procedures. Also, it has to be established
whether this aim was effectively perceived by the threatened public authorities.
In line with the difficulties to corroborate the subjective component of these types of situations (a
possible case of regulatory chill), it was not possible to find any direct statement by foreign
investors in the present case, nor a particular declaration of the transitional justice public
authorities from which any type of threat could have been perceived. However, there are other
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elements, listed below, that reveal certain patterns in the conduct of public authorities and foreign
investors that should also be considered. These patterns help to establish a causal nexus between
the impact of the economic interests of foreign investors – a product of the enforcement of the land
restitution regulatory measures – and the production of subsequent variations in the behavior of
the transitional justice public authorities from one case – the Emberá Katío People of the Alto
Andágueda Reservation – to the other – the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian people.
-

It is reasonable to presume that Colombian public authorities were generally aware of the
impact of international investment agreements on public interest regulation.
o During the examination of the constitutionality of the international investment
agreements concluded between Colombia and the main capital-exporting countries,
such as the United States and Canada, concerns on the potential adverse effects of
these treaties on the state’s regulatory capacity were raised publicly by civil society
and academics. This is consigned in the corresponding judicial decisions that
declared the agreements’ accordance with the country’s Constitutional Order.
o A great number of contemporaneous investment arbitration decisions affecting
countries of the region – including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and
Venezuela – were made publicly available, including the important adverse effects
on their political stability and fiscal sustainability.
o In 2013 the Ministry of Commerce’s Foreign Investment Division started
implementing a legal defense strategy to address the eventual emergence of
international investment controversies derived from the breach of the international
investment agreements in force. Moreover, well in advance the Ministry had been
implementing an aggressive information program that sought to instruct public
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authorities on the risks their regulatory activity might include to the country’s
international responsibility in the realm of investment arbitration.
-

It is reasonable to infer that being aware of the risks of investment arbitration, some public
authorities assumed a favorable attitude towards foreign investors on the occasion of the
occurrence of situations affecting their economic interests and expectations.
o During the territorial restitution procedure in favour of the Emberá Katío people,
the representative of the Public Ministry assumed a firm position against the
eventual impact on the mining companies’ entitlements. By virtue of its
constitutional mandate the Public Ministry is in charge of safeguarding the respect
of human rights, the judicial guarantees and the interests of the victims – such as
the ethnic groups – in the course of judicial procedures. Yet, the support given to
the mining companies is consistent with a series of guidelines that this institution’s
central level set forth on the occasion of the enactment of the transitional justice
regulation. Particularly, the idea that private interests should not be affected as a
consequence of the implementation of the Victims Law.
o On the occasion of the territorial restitution procedure in favour of the Emberá
Katío people, the public authorities of the mining sector – especially the National
Mining Agency – assumed the representation of the interests of the multinational
mining companies affected by the suspension of mining titles. Not only did this
institution oppose the suspension of the mining titles that had been granted to the
companies through precautionary measures, but it interposed a constitutional writ
against this injunction.
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o There is evidence of permanent meetings between the national mining authorities
– the Ministry of Mining and the National Mining Agency – and the Land
Restitution Unit, the institution in charge of representing the ethnic groups in
territorial restitution procedures. This might indicate discussions on the prejudicial
effects that certain elements of the land restitution processes might encompass the
country’s development strategy, as they could collide with the economic interests
of the multinational mining companies operating in the country.
o In the Alto Andágueda case the first instance judge that decided on the granting of
precautionary measures suspended the mining companies’ titles. Nevertheless, the
land restitution tribunal that produced the final decision on the territorial restitution
affirmed the mining contracts. Instead, it decided to maintain the suspension of the
titles until prior consultation with the indigenous people could be conducted. This
conservative attitude in the application of the transitional justice regulation could
indicate an awareness of further consequences that this decision might have implied
for the state’s international responsibility.
-

It is reasonable to infer that the multinational mining companies affected by the transitional
justice regulatory measures were informed in advance of both the non-financial risks
associated with investing in the zone subject to concession, and the exorbitant protection
they enjoyed from the international investment agreements concluded between Colombia
and their home countries. Particularly, the possibility of resorting to arbitration in order to
settle eventual controversies with the host state.
o The multinational mining companies increased their investments in Colombia after
the corresponding IIAs with their home countries were concluded. This can be
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explained by the fact that they became aware of the additional protection provided
by these treaties, and so the level of political risk they were exposed to went down.
o In their opposition to the territorial restitution claims brought about by the Land
Restitution Unit in representation of the ethnic groups, the mining companies made
specific reference to a number of elements that are sympathetic to the normative
rationale of the protection of foreign investors through international investment
agreements. In particular, their argument that builds on the legitimate expectations
doctrine, points to the safeguarding of private interests from unexpected changes in
the regulatory activity of public authorities, an idea that is familiar to past
investment arbitration cases. The latter could indicate mindfulness towards their
capacity to use investment arbitration in order to claim damages from the state.
Thus, they incorporated this type of argumentation in their opposition to the land
restitution claim.
o As early as February 2011, by the time the transitional justice regulation was issued,
some companies requested a certificate on the presence of ethnic communities on
the region. This is arguably another indication of their awareness of what could
potentially happen with the mining titles. In spite of that, no prior consultation was
conducted, perhaps because the companies trusted in the power of mining
regulation and the IIAs to dissuade the initiation of territorial restitution procedures.
Or even more, because knowing the risk of suspension or cancellation, they
undertook direct actions to dissuade public authorities from initiating LRP or to
suggest no restrictions on their economic interests.
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o The reports of at least one of the mining companies – the Canadian Continental
Gold Ltd. – contain references to the regulatory risks that it must deal with in
Colombia, including the ones derived from land claims.612 Likewise, the reports
reveal that the Dojura project is important for their operation in the country as they
are explicitly considering the commencement of prior consultation procedures with
the ethnic communities so as to offset the titles’ suspension.613
4. Regulatory outcomes of the perception of an “investment arbitration threat” by
transitional justice public authorities

By January 2016, the Antioquia High Court had not issued a final decision on the territorial
restitution claim interposed by the Land Restitution Unit in representation of the Cocomopoca
Afro-Colombian community. As a result, it is not yet possible to establish whether there were
particular variations in the conduct of this tribunal, with respect to the eventual impact of the
entitlements and expectations of the opponents, and as a consequence of a perceived threat of
investment arbitration. However, there was a clear inconsistency in the granting of precautionary
“Any changes in regulations or shifts in political attitudes in this jurisdiction, or other jurisdictions in which the
Company may acquire projects from time to time, are beyond the control of the Company and may adversely affect
its business. Future development and operations may be affected in varying degrees by such factors, among others, as
government regulations (or changes thereto) with respect to the restrictions on production, export controls, income
taxes, expropriation of property, repatriation of profits, environmental legislation, land use, water use, land claims of
local people, mine safety and receipt of necessary permits. The effect of these factors cannot be accurately predicted.
See “Risks of the Business” See CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD, “Annual Information Form for the Year ended
December 31, 2014”, p. 7. Retrieved from www.continentalgold.com/files/doc_financials/2014/Q4/CNL-_-YE2014AIF_Final[1]_v001_l1tc91.pdf (last accessed March 20 2016.)
613
“During 2012, the Company received a summary of the results of an airborne geophysical survey performed by
AngloGold over a portion of the property. The results are consistent with the long-standing recommendation that the
property has potential for large-scale copper-gold porphyry style mineralization. (…) On September 23, 2014, the
Superior Court of the District of Antioquia rejected a claim to cancel exploration and mining concessions that
encompass traditional indigenous land due to indigenous groups being displaced as a result of security conditions.
However, the court did temporarily suspend exploration and mining activities on indigenous land until formal
consultation with indigenous communities occur. Approximately 7,726 hectares in the Dojura project are affected by
this court ruling. The Company plans to begin the process of consulting the indigenous communities in the affected
areas.” See CONTINENTAL GOLD LTD. “Annual Information Form for the Year ended December 31, 2014”, p. 50.
Retrieved from www.continentalgold.com/files/doc_financials/2014/Q4/CNL- 2014AIF_Final[1]_v001_l1tc91.pdf
(last accessed March 20 2016.)
612

244
measures by the first instance judge of Quibdó. They substantially varied from one case to the
other.
In deciding the request for precautionary measures made by the Land Restitution Unit in favor of
the Alto Andágueda Reservation, the first-instance court developed an extensive argumentation
based on the particular relation between the ethnic community and its ancestral lands. In this
regard, it introduced an inclusive concept of territorial rights that encompassed the possibility to
grant injunctions with respect to public acts related to the management of natural resources. In
particular, they importantly provided for the provisional suspension of the mining titles already
conceded, as well as the preclusion of consideration of further concession bids until a final decision
on the territorial restitution claim would be issued by the upper Court.
Surprisingly, from the facts of the case, it is evidenced that the same first-instance judicial authority
– the First Specialized Civil Court on Land Restitution of Quibdó – substantially changed its
position regarding the eventual suspension of mining titles to protect the rights of an ethnic group
with the advent of a new precautionary measures claim. In fact, the petition brought up by the
representatives of Cocomopoca came only six months after the injunction in favor of the Embera
Katio people had been decided. Importantly, it has to be pointed out that this happened around
cases that shared most of the same factual elements: the zone, the evidence of territorial injuries,
the fact that the victims are recognized ethnic groups, the identity of the mining companies, and
even some of the mining titles.
The judge acknowledged the grave situation of the Cocomopoca Afro-Colombian community, the
considerable vulnerability of their territorial rights, and the negative impact that certain
socioeconomic phenomena – including the development of legitimate mining projects such as the
ones carried out by the multinational mining companies of the case – could have on them.
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However, it finally decided not to suspend any mining title or further concession bid. In order to
support such preclusion, it assumed a legal rationale that was drastically different from the one
utilized in the precedent case. It argued that as a transitional justice judge, it had no jurisdiction to
decide upon administrative matters; alleged an apparent impossibility to verify a direct benefit on
behalf of the mining companies from the facts of violence affecting the Cocomopoca community;
and disputed the obligatory character of prior consultation during the pre-contractual phase.
It is not possible to provide direct evidence that the Quibdó judge was affected by any type of
coercion or perceived a threat related to the possibility that his decision could eventually affect the
economic interests of the multinational mining companies and thus compromise the country’s
international responsibility – as a consequence of investment arbitration. Yet, it is at least
noticeable that this type of shift in the argumentation of the Court was produced in a sudden and
obscure way, and invites reflection on the possibility that it might have taken place as the result of
some type of external influence.
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Concluding Remarks
Assuming a public-law perspective, this dissertation aimed to approach a puzzling conversation
that is currently taking place in Colombia between two politically-infused transnational legal
processes, which have been identified as paramount for the accomplishment of the country’s
national project. As a result, this project contends that the legal protection of foreign investment
through the conclusion of international investment agreements has entered into tension with the
adoption of a transitional justice project oriented to produce significant transformations in the
country’s society. The principal objective of this exploration was to verify the existence of an
essential normative tension that is supposedly produced by the confrontation of the legal orders
that correspondingly emerged from the incorporation of these transnational legal processes into
the country’s Constitutional Order. This in turn led to a discussion of the content and extent of this
tension, in order to identify the regulatory implications of the safeguarding of the rights and
expectations of foreign investors on the country’s sovereign choices associated with the effective
achievement of durable peace. Thus, a case study was used to demonstrate that the collision
between the abovementioned transnational legal processes materialized in concrete situations and
encompassed particular consequences with respect to the exercise of the country’s public
sovereign choices.
I.

What was found

The introduction of the Colombian Constitutional Order provided an understanding of the
country’s complex and diverse social background and the aspirational character of the national
project, which is aimed to achieve durable peace among the various and competing social interests.
In turn, the thorough illustration of the transnational processes under consideration revealed that
although they share a liberal matrix, their respectively embedded normative rationales provide
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opposite views as to the nature and configuration of the socioeconomic model that the country
must adopt in order to achieve its political objectives. Particularly, they provide conflicting
prescriptions with respect to the conceptualization and management of land and natural resources
located in the country’s rural areas. Whereas both processes recognize an economic dimension to
these elements (for example, their condition of exchangeable commodities) their social function is
openly disputed. Under the perspective of the promotion and protection of foreign investment,
lands and natural resources are deemed to be “development locomotives”. In this regard, the
provision of a stable environment of operation to foreign investors is considered a means of
achieving economic growth as long as transnational capital and expertise are considered necessary
to take effective advantage of these assets. On the other hand, the transitional justice project
considers LNR as both the primary supplies for the correction of the socioeconomic injustices
associated with the country’s armed conflict, and the ambit within which its transformative action
must produce the greatest impact. Thus, the regulatory intervention of public authorities in the
prospective adjustment of social relations is recognized as a fundamental mechanism to attain
durable peace.
Correspondingly, it was found that the legal regimes that were developed within the realm of these
transnational processes entered into direct tension on the occasion of the contrasting of their
differing normative perspectives. Although they are deemed to be legal orders that have been
coherently articulated around the Colombian Constitutional Order, the emergence of legal disputes
around the vindication of the rights and expectations associated with access to and use of LNR is
becoming a recurrent pattern. Importantly, while the international investment agreements
concluded by Colombia are intended to provide extensive protection to foreign investors’ accrued
entitlements by placing behavioral duties on the state that can be claimed before an arbitral
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tribunal, the transitional justice project includes effective tools to occasionally intervene in the
private sphere in order to comply with its reparatory and transformative functions.
Therefore, when this dialogue is studied from a public-law perspective, the argued normative
tension is found to entail a large-scale regulatory challenge. As a fundamental structure of global
governance, the Colombian state is in charge of performing as an agency of political representation
in the context of the effective incorporation of the transnational legal processes under consideration
within its jurisdiction. In this context, it was found that the international investment agreements
concluded by the country have the potential to place great restrictions on the regulatory activity of
public authorities that is oriented towards the adjustment of the social relations in which foreign
investor are directly or indirectly involved. In particular, these international legal instruments are
provided with a set of standards that can be broadly interpreted when delimiting the behavioral
duties of the state and a powerful dispute-settlement mechanism by virtue of which public actions
can be reviewed and what pronounced monetary indemnifications may be imposed. As a result,
they might restrict or penalize the implementation of the regulatory actions part of the Colombian
peacebuilding strategy –including TJP’s land restitution program, insofar as they safeguard the
rights and expectations of foreign investors.
II.

What is at stake

It is not surprising that Colombia’s rural areas, where the spill-over produced by the internal armed
conflict caused the greatest impact, have the highest levels of poverty and social inequalities. Yet,
it is shocking that most of the country’s economic potential – a high ratio of land and natural
resources – lies therein. In this context, there is an evident historical debt in terms of the recognition
of this region’s relegated social structures as a constitutive part of the national project. As a result,
the Colombian transitional justice initiative has been designed to overcome a classical paradigm

249
that is centered on the application of corrective justice to situations that emerged on the occasion
of authoritarianism or violent strife. In turn, it has been alternatively configured as a peacebuilding
mechanism that aims to bring up a real alternative to break with the vicious cycle of violence and
poverty that has marked the country’s history. The implementation of both a holistic understanding
of the conflict’s root causes and a transformative approach centered on addressing structural issues,
is expressly intended to crystallize the multicultural and inclusive national project embedded in
the 1991 Constitution. Therefore, the resulting regulatory scheme that implements the TJP is
infused with the power to eventually adjust social relations by means of the effective intervention
in the private sphere’s interests, if required. This includes the possibility to affect the property
rights and expectations of the economic enterprises located in the rural areas, such as the ones of
foreign investors.
The importance of the Colombian Transitional Justice Project transcends the general purpose of
bringing about justice and the rule of law to a concrete situation. This is so since the application
of its different components and dimensions is crucial for the very fate of the state, the
materialization of a still-forming national identity and consequently, the sustainability of its
diverse society. Above the finalization of armed hostilities with the insurgent groups, the
traditional marginalization of persons and communities that has served as an instrument of capital
accumulation must be properly addressed. This should be done by providing effective redress to
identifiable injuries on peoples’ socioeconomic rights, as well as through the prospective
elimination of the discriminatory patterns that have legitimized the prevalent social structures.
This, in turn, entails the possibility of setting up alternative schemes through which the political
inclusion of the ones historically excluded becomes effective. Herein, the role of law and
regulation is paramount. Although the generation of substantial social transformations finds its
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source in a political milestone, this process cannot be accomplished if the adequate instruments
are not put in place to serve the associated normative aspirations. Unlike other mechanisms of
social control – and particularly because of its embeddedness within the social, the legal
phenomenon has the capacity to transmit normative rationales, legitimize their incorporation
within society, and provide specific institutions, commands and procedures for their effective
materialization. It is under these terms that the Colombian transitional justice project should be
acknowledged as a second constitutional moment and as an instance of subaltern cosmopolitan
legality. It represents an opportunity to set off the country towards the attainment of a more stable
national project, coherent with its social base. Therefore, it cannot be merely acknowledged as a
simple scheme of public regulatory activity but as a distinctive phenomenon that demands special
consideration by those interested in its content and extent, including anyone intending to exert
adjudicative review over it.
Following this line of reasoning, an eventual failure in the implementation of Colombia’s current
peacebuilding strategy as a consequence of the operation of IIAs’ disciplinary powers would be
devastating. It would cause permanent and insurmountable repercussions on the country’s attempt
to overcome poverty and violence. At a superficial level, the country would face strong fiscal
constraints associated with the impossibility of achieving socioeconomic stability. The defective
implementation of transitional justice components, such as the land restitution program, would
restrict the chance to adopt an alternative model of rural development that is much needed to
reinvigorate economic dynamism in rural areas. The maintenance of both the fragile social
situation of the peasantry and the lack of democratic access and use of land and natural resources,
would collide with the agrarian accord that was concluded with FARC in the realm of the
corresponding peace process. This agreement is the result of a conscious effort by the parties to
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address some of the conflict’s root causes while projecting into the future to attempt solving the
country’s socioeconomic issues. Therefore, if the provision of the agrarian accord's performance
preconditions – the restitution of usurped lands and the clarification of old disputes around
property rights – is blocked by the latent threats posed by the legal protection to foreign investors,
the proposed development alternative would not have the chance to succeed in the long term. The
bigger picture indicates that the socio-demographic impact of this disappointment would entail
two severe repercussions. First, a great portion of the internally displaced people who are confined
in the country’s urban centers will not have a place to return or be relocated to, so cities will
become the primary settlements of conflict and social marginalization (re-victimization). And
second, the ethnic communities – the indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities that
have ancestrally inhabited the Colombian territory – will tend to disappear, due to the irremediable
fracture produced by a separation from ancestral territories. The resultant uprooting and the
consequent deprivation of their capacity to intervene in the decisions affecting their territory would
lead to the exhaustion of the conditions necessary for their survival as ethnic groups. In the
meantime, the countryside will be preserved for large-scale agricultural and extractive activities
and the land will maintain its concentration ratio, one of the highest in the world.614 A final peace
accord will eventually be concluded with FARC and the other insurgent groups, thus
encompassing a natural decrease in the levels of direct violence. Nevertheless, if there is not a
parallel implementation of the retributive and distributive justice actions oriented at adjusting the
socioeconomic dynamics that originated and fuelled the conflict, poverty and discrimination will
not be reduced and strife will eventually reappear under new slogans or actors. Thus, not even the

See EFE, “Colombia, uno de los más desiguales por alta concentración de tierras.” ABC Color, September 25 2011.
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greatest legal safeguards would persuade transnational capital to arrive in a country sunken under
perennial belligerence and instability.
Moreover, the non-implementation of the transitional justice project (in its entirety or in part) by
cause of the regulatory constraints exercised by the IIAs would entail serious consequences for
Colombia at the international level. Not only the country has acquired political compromises with
the international community as to the achievement of durable peace, but owns particular
obligations in the realm of the promotion and protection of Human Rights, International
Humanitarian Law and International Labor Law that are linked with the victims’ rights to justice,
truth and reparation. These binding duties could be ultimately breached in case the TJP is not
properly implemented through the adoption of the necessary regulatory measures. Thus, Colombia
might face the possibility of being found accountable for its inactivity at well-established
international governance bodies such as the Inter-American Human Rights System, The
International Labor Organization and the United Nations' human rights monitoring mechanisms.
For instance, in a recent decision the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found Paraguay
responsible for the violation of the collective rights of an indigenous community, which had been
displaced on the occasion of the advancement of an economic project carried out by a multinational
corporation on its territory. In this case, the Court rejected the state’s defense as to the existence
of duties derived from an international investment agreement with the foreign investor’s home
country. In particular, it pointed out that “the enforcement of bilateral commercial treaties negates
vindication of non-compliance with state obligations under the American Convention; on the
contrary, their enforcement should always be compatible with the American Convention, which is
a multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class of its own and that generates rights for
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individual human beings and does not depend entirely on reciprocity among States”.615 Moreover,
since the Inter-American Human Rights System has identified the Colombian transitional justice
project as a priority case, it is reasonable to expect close scrutiny on its implementation.616
A third scenario to consider is the possible activation of the dispute-settlement mechanism
included in the IIAs concluded by Colombia, a consequence of the effective implementation of
measures stemming from the transitional justice project. Foreign investors, whose economic
interests were arguably affected on the occasion of the regulatory activity of the state, would go
before arbitral tribunals to claim liability. Whether this is the case, it is inferable that the quantity
and ratio of the monetary indemnifications that the country would be obliged to pay as
compensation could produce grave setbacks on its already fragile economy. This assertion is built
on the consideration of previous awards that decided upon similar situations that occurred in the
region. For instance, in the context of a bilateral investment treaty concluded between Ecuador
and the United States, in 2012, an ICSID arbitral tribunal decided upon an investment dispute
about the passing of a domestic regulation that cancelled a 30-year concession granted to a US oil
company that operated several wells in the former country. As a result, Ecuador was ordered to
pay around US 1 billion dollars for the breach of fair and equitable treatment and indirect
expropriation provisions included in the IIA.617 This sum amounted to approximately 5% of
Ecuador’s general budget for 2012, which speaks clearly about the fiscal implications of these
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kinds of procedures on developing countries.618 Considering the similarities encountered in the
type of activities that foreign investors conduct in these countries and their respective levels of
development, it is likely that Colombia could face comparable predicaments. Particularly, with
respect to the awarding of large sums, on the occasion of the exercise of sovereign prerogatives,
they have the potential to thoroughly strike down Colombia’s economic sustainability. In this
regard, Colombia is a small-scale economy that has historically incurred massive loans to support
the funding of its budgetary needs, and is currently facing a severe recession that is partly linked
to the global oil and financial crises. Thus, scarce resources that were initially allocated to serve
socioeconomic goals would have to be used to cover the repercussions of these arbitral awards.
The general discontent produced by these arbitral decisions would unchain political instability and
consequent impulsive responses from the government, which would aggravate the already severe
situation.
The account of these challenging scenarios speak about what is at stake with the encounter of these
colliding vernaculars. That is, what are the implications of the normative tension produced by the
– either pre-emptive or actual – constricting influence of international investment agreements on
the effective implementation of the Colombian transitional justice project. Prominently, it
comports an assessment of the function and purpose of sovereignty within a modern global society
that governs itself through complex dynamics that combine domestic and international structures
with transnational dynamics. In turn, a normative dilemma is intrinsically attached to the political
question. It involves accepting the existence of conflictual approaches as to the nature of
Colombian society and the way in which social problems should be therein addressed. There is a
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pretention about achieving an homogeneous social setting, formed by free individuals that seek to
maximize their preferences in the realm of the market and the rule of law. Yet, this version is
confronted by the portrait of a diverse and unequal society that requires both the active intervention
of the polity to adjust unjustified and disproportionate disparities, and the solidarity of the private
sphere on the occasion of these adjustments. These considerations leads to inquiring about the role
of the law in Colombian society. Particularly, whether the law predominantly serves as a
mechanism of social control to regulate variant expectations or if it can also be deemed an effective
instrument to produce structural transformations.
At a first glance, the problem emerging between the protection of foreign investment via IIAs and
the implementation of transitional justice in Colombia may be related to the way in which the law
has been arranged to address competing social interests. From this perspective, the solution to the
issue lies in the awareness that the satisfaction of the rival concerns should be conducted with
limited means and upon the recognition of private accrued rights. Due to the latter’s relative
inviolability, the action of public authorities is shaped. This approach does not consider the context
in which these potential disputes are produced nor the implications of a given allocation on the
allocator’s mandate – in this case, on the country’s Constitutional Order. Therefore, the ensuing
response would be based on both the respect of the pre-established rules of the game and the
maximization of the available resources to be distributed, regardless of any normative orientation
distinct to respecting the rule of law and achieving the greatest utility. Most likely, it could be
argued that Colombia has willingly consented to the restriction of its sovereign prerogatives, so
the eventual regulatory discipline occurs in accordance with the law and is legitimated by the aim
of safeguarding the rights and expectations of profitable businesses. Thus, the responsibility in
which the country might have to incur the legal changes produced by the transitional justice project
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would be founded on both the expectations generated by the sovereign on the private sphere and
the quantifiable effects of the public conduct that produced the breaching of these legal
concessions.
However, this normative tension can be viewed from an alternative perspective. Unlike the
previous account, this distinct regard is founded on the recognition of the paramount relevance of
both the surrounding context and the social and political implications of these types of conflicts
on the evaluation of the alleged normative tension, which takes place in the realm of the country’s
Constitutional Order. These elements introduce exceptional considerations that should be taken
into account when assessing the regulatory actions that the state has taken on the occasion of the
abovementioned dilemma. This includes any decision as to the eventual imposition of either
compensatory sanctions or restrictions on the sovereign choices of the governance actor. Starting
with the most salient point, the nature and extent of sovereignty should be revisited. Through the
framework of a legal conflict, its eventual allegation should be made in light of both the
progressive change of the state paradigm and the evidence of an emerging transnational and diverse
society, which can only be governed through the lens of inclusion and cosmopolitanism. It is
neither a matter of claiming deference to public actions under the grounds of broad and obscure
references to national independence or peoples' self-determination, nor demanding inexcusable
coherence with respect to the preliminary assumption of similarly ample and vague behavioral
obligations by the polity. Nowadays, sovereignty should be acknowledged as a prerogative defined
by functional contours, whose claim must be carefully conducted with reference to particular
normative explanations rather than as a simplistic spell.
Further, it is argued that the international investment agreements concluded by Colombia might
not be interpreted and applied in such a way that the operation of public regulatory schemes, like
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the one implementing the country’s transitional justice project, is limited. In case of the emergence
of tensions, the protection offered to foreign investors’ rights and expectations – whichever are the
nature of the aims appealed or the pedigree of the means adopted – can not be deemed to be a
compelling reason to disregard the crucial opportunity for the country to advance in the
crystallization of the lasting-social-peace aspiration. Not only does this goal lie at the very heart
of the national project, it represents the interests of the majority of the Colombian population and
encompasses the possibility to address the rights of those who have been historically marginalized.
The IIAs under discussion are in effect the result of the exercise of sovereign prerogatives and
place-binding obligations on the state. Their formal validity is not herein discussed. Yet, they
cannot be amounted to impregnable commands able to shape indeterminately the country’s public
policy space. In this regard, they might not be advertised in a way that public authorities end up
preventing from acting in accordance with their mandate, nor be interpreted as authorizations to
deliberately review Colombia’s public conduct. Be it as it may, the legal phenomenon cannot be
properly comprehended outside of the social framework within which it is given meaning and
functions as a mechanism of control. Therefore, any effort to find a solution to this normative
tension must acknowledge both the transnational nature of the interests at stake and the marked
political character of the corresponding epistemic communities. Contrary to what has been argued
by certain champions of International Investment Law, the legal responses to investor-state
controversies must encompass strong political considerations rather than mere technical
disquisitions. This is not to suggest that the law has a modest role in the settlement of these type
of disputes. Quite the contrary, the legal phenomenon should be realized as a mechanism that can
lead to the production of social transformations as long as they are identified with the attainment
of the Colombian Constitutional Order. In turn, the neutrality mask that is usually worn by both
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international investment agreements and investor-state arbitration should be removed in order to
proceed with a more honest dialogue among the different positions under mêlée.
All things considered, it is not improbable that particular investment-related legal disputes – such
as the one suggested by the dissertation’s case study – end up emerging on the occasion of the
implementation of the regulatory measures stemming from the Colombian TJP. Thus, it is expected
that prospective investor-state arbitrations will address the occasional breaching of IIAs’
obligations at the expense of foreign investors. In such an eventuality, under the assessment of
state responsibility, the adjudicators should go beyond a simple evaluation of the negative impact
that these measures have caused on the claimants’ rights and expectations. They might also want
to consider the particular factors and conditions surrounding the conduct of the state that is pointed
as the alleged source of the harm produced on foreign investors. These include Colombia’s
socioeconomic background, the political considerations that determined the decision to implement
the transitional justice project and the distinctive character of the associated regulatory scheme.
Likewise, with the purpose of maintaining a coherent international legal system, arbitrators could
not discard from their assessments certain international human rights obligations upon which
Colombia proceeded to design its peacebuilding strategy. In the same way that the IIAs concluded
by Colombia generated expectations on foreign investors, these commandments have produced
valid prospects on the Colombian population, which must be honored by the public authorities. In
sum, those deciding upon the responsibility of Colombia must balance the undeniably legal
interests of transnational capital with the expectations of a whole country on the achievement of
durable peace.
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III.

What to expect

It is expected that further investment-related conflicts around the adoption of the Colombian
transitional justice project, prone to affect the country’s sovereign choices, will increase in the
short term. In the first place, the implementation of TJP’s regulatory scheme is a legal mandate
that comes from the very heart of the country’s Constitutional Order. Although the process may
find detractors and significant hurdles, transformative justice components such as the land
restitution program will continue advancing. In parallel, the endorsement of a peace accord with
FARC and other insurgent actors, which contemplates a serious adjustment of social relations in
the rural areas through the eventual intervention in the private sphere's economic interests, has
reached a point of no return. Thus, there is a high probability of encountering new investor-state
disputes around access to and use of lands and natural resources in the country’s rural areas, like
the one that involved the protection of territorial rights of ethnic communities in the Choco
Department at the expense of the mining titles granted to a number of multinational mining
companies. It is not clear, however, whether the significance of this situation has been
acknowledged by the Colombian government, due to its apparent reluctance to accept the
regulatory implications of the legal protection to foreign investors via IIAs on its own governance
capacities. Yet, the very existence of a mechanism to address occasional international investment
disputes represents a note of optimism towards the defense of the peacebuilding process, and,
particularly, the safeguarding of the victims’ interests. Not only does this category include those
directly affected by the armed conflict, but also the entire Colombian population that live under
conditions of poverty and social exclusion.
Moreover, new tensions of this kind are currently emerging in a variety of regulatory areas such
as the protection of the environment or the health industry. For instance, in August 2014, a
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controversy around the regulation of the production of biotechnological medicaments emerged
between the Colombian government and a number of foreign pharmaceutical companies operating
in the country. The Ministry of Health had considered passing an executive decree to modify the
domestic norms on the matter, and in doing so would facilitate the generic production of this type
of medicine. In particular, it was intended to adjust the traditional route to obtain the corresponding
patents for the sake of avoiding the consolidation of a monopoly leading the multinational
corporations, and thus increase the chances for poor people to access this medicine. Consequently,
a provision of this kind would immediately open the door to internal competition and a subsequent
reduction in the price of certain products that were part of the companies’ patent stock. As soon as
the government’s regulatory initiative was noticed by the potentially affected foreign investors,
diplomatic support was sought from the home countries’ diplomatic missions in Colombia. In this
regard, both the United States and the Swiss embassies sent letters to the Minister of Health,
Alejandro Gaviria, expressing great discontent related to the plan to issue the executive decree.619
Furthermore, the anger of these multinational corporations reached the Colombian ambassador in
Washington, who in turn sent a letter to the Ministry of Health, informing them of the situation
and warning them about the possible negative outcomes that the planned regulation would have
on Colombia, in accordance with the Free Trade Agreements that these countries had concluded
in 2007.620 The response of the public authority was nothing but a “we are ready to battle”, so the
decree was finally approved.621 Hopefully, the occurrence of these kinds of incidents persuade the
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Colombian government to either revise the existent investment treaties or at least reconsider the
negotiation of new international compromises of this kind.
Considering both the content and extent of the international investment agreements endorsed by
Colombia and the particularities of the above-mentioned transitional phase that the country is
going through, the eventual emergence of investment arbitration cases involving the Colombian
state can be reasonably anticipated. This fact, along with the essential purpose of expanding the
critical comprehension of the issue beyond its mere assumption, invites further research devoted
to addressing the following issues. The first is the identification and characterization of further
scenarios of tension between the issuance of social-oriented public regulation and the legal
protection of foreign investment via international investment agreements. The second is the
systematic production of case studies to explore the implications of these tensions, including the
conditions under which situations of regulatory chill might take place. The third is the elaboration
of anticipatory analyses as to the content and extent of the investor-state legal controversies that
countries like Colombia would have to face on the occasion of the emergence of these kind of
disputes. Finally, the fourth issue is the exploration of reliable and sustainable alternatives in the
regulation of the relations between host states and foreign investors, which include the imposition
of correlative duties on the latter in order to balance social interests and expectations.
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